Bandinus Magister
(First Book of the Sentences: On the Most Holy Trinity)
The Four Books of Sentences of Master Bandinus
Most Learned Theologian
In which the sum of all theology and the compendium of our faith is treated purely, simply, and methodically; now published much more correctly than before, for the benefit of all students of Christian piety. Summaries have been added to each book indicating what is contained in each one.
At Louvain, from Petrus Colonaeus, sworn bookseller. In the year 1557. With royal privilege for four years.
Petrus Colonaeus Sends Greetings to the Kind Reader
Under the auspicious patronage of the most pious and most illustrious Emperor Maximilian of blessed memory, ever Augustus, Christian reader, there were published at Vienna nearly 40 years ago the four books of Theological Sentences of the most learned and very ancient theologian Bandinus, in which that author, most versed in sacred letters, wove together the sum of all theology and the compendium of our faith briefly but diligently and exactly, in a style not inelegant. When a certain friend made a copy available to us, and I observed that it greatly pleased everyone who had seen it -- because it expounded the doctrine of religion, which lies scattered far and wide throughout the Scriptures, most skillfully organized, purely, simply, and methodically -- I thought it would be no small service if, having removed by the judgment and diligence of learned theologians the innumerable errors of the first printer, who, as those times were, was excessively careless and unpolished, I should command a corrected and more elegantly typeset Bandinus to come forth into the light, so that as many people as possible could more easily enjoy such a treasure.
And indeed I had at first resolved to present only the first small work of this author, which is on the Trinity, printed separately for the benefit of students, so that from this the studious might form a conjecture about what should be thought of Bandinus -- an ancient, most learned, and most compendious teacher, but hitherto seen by few. But when this little book was scarcely finished and read by students, they did not cease to demand most eagerly the remaining works as well, which they had no doubt were written with no less skill and conciseness. In complying with their wishes, we do not spare our great expenses. Therefore, kind reader, accept in good part our labor and expenditures, uniquely dedicated to your studies, and farewell. And aid our endeavors if you can, rescuing from moths and bookworms copies of both these little books and other as yet unpublished works of Bandinus lying hidden in libraries, especially handwritten and ancient ones. Again, farewell.
Dedicatory Epistle
To the most unconquered and magnanimous Emperor Maximilian Caesar Augustus, Benedictus Chelidonius, Abbot of Vienna at the Scots, his tireless servant, wishes happiness.
That those devoted to wisdom ought to preside over commonwealths so that they may stand safe is the opinion of Plato, most pious Caesar Maximilian. How true and how useful this is, setting aside Greek and Latin examples, the histories of the Barbarians also indicate. But a wise mind, which is the leader and commander of mortal life, seems to me to be truly such only if it is religious. Hence it comes about that wisdom, which the Greeks call philosophy, which as Seneca attests forms the mind and orders life and, as the guide of our actions, shows what should be done and what should be omitted -- since it is knowledge not only of human but also of divine things -- has an indissoluble kinship with religion. Whoever is imbued with it lives rightly and acts successfully. For such a person all fortune is despised, and heaven itself serves. If you entrust to such a person the management of the highest affairs, it is a most beautiful empire to behold. The Roman jurists, not unaware of this, frequently combined the imperial height with pontifical dignity. And that august majesty is called sacred even to this day. Out of this regard for holiness, the ancients -- among whom, besides what was publicly administered, nothing against the enemy was conducted successfully without auspices, as their opinion held -- believed that the Roman Republic had grown as great as we know it to have been. Nevertheless, their religion was not sacred but rather execrable, their wisdom foolish, and their devotion profane superstition.
Therefore we, who are instructed not in pagan but in orthodox piety, and invoke not Mars but Christ upon our fortunes -- since it is established that things have happened in your times which were seen in no previous ages, and which all posterity will admire, being most beneficial to public welfare and almost incredible unless seen with one's own eyes -- why should we not think these should be ascribed also to your most sacred auspices?
I pass over the new institutions of military discipline which your enemies have experienced in many ways, by which their stubborn pride has always been subdued from your adolescence to your old age, as your countless triumphs testify -- which Joannes Stabius, historian of your majesty, collected in the great work he calls the Triumphal Arch. The commentary of which we translated from German into Latin at your command.
I say nothing of the new and astounding war machines invented by you, endowed with divine industry in all things, whose thunder and lightning would make even the Alps tremble and collapse, and which nothing can withstand. Meanwhile, how great was your zeal for peace -- for whose sake all your wars were undertaken -- can be gathered from the fact that you drew so many kings and so many princes into your alliances and family connections by the great skill of your genius, and especially recently at Vienna.
For we beheld so many notables clothed in purple and decorated with insignia, summoned by you from the entire Roman world, then flowing together there, as no age records having ever assembled anywhere. This most illustrious convention, worthy of being celebrated in eternal memory, we described in two books in heroic verse, and offered into your most sacred hands. These things, I say, I pass over, and deliberately so, because they surpass not only my powers but even themselves. On account of which I also see that Virgilian verse, in which the same poet embraced the best prince, being fulfilled in you.
Remember, Roman, to rule the peoples with your authority: these shall be your arts -- to impose the custom of peace, to spare the conquered, and to subdue the proud.
Let me come to that one thing which surpasses the fates of all princes from the beginning of the world. We know that Bacchus and Hercules forced the most remote peoples into their empires. Likewise that Pompey and Julius and many other Roman princes conquered very many nations, though not unknown to us, and added them to the Latin empire. But when you were scarcely born, and then under your most valiant father the emperor, and afterwards with you most valiantly ruling, another world of lands and other peoples known in no previous ages and not even dreamed of, have been added to the Christian empire -- with the Spaniards, and the Portuguese from whom your maternal lineage derives, especially by naval and almost insane exploration (if I may say so), crossing both tropics and the farthest sea of the antipodes.
In those same times a new kind of writing, unknown I think even to Pallas herself until then, which we call printing, came to light. By this occasion those most illustrious talents now widely flourish, letters grow, and libraries are everywhere filled to a Philadelphian emulation.
Whoever would wish to worthily commemorate each of these and many more things, rightly to be ascribed to your destiny and your auspices, would need a summer's day and a hundred tongues and a voice of iron. Nor less -- whoever would attempt to speak, even selectively, of the most ample renown of your lineage, which is most ancient and which we read descends from the great Ham, extending to your grandsons, than whom the entire world now has nothing more precious, and of the royal genealogies -- would be anxious not so much about the beginning as about finding an end; and would need to call Calliope to his aid, and Apollo himself from whom no history is hidden, and would nevertheless laugh at his own powers striving in vain.
Let us omit the others of your line, everywhere celebrated with the greatest praises. Who among mortals does not know that Charles, a specimen most like you, the thunderbolt of tyrants and king of the West now, and soon, by your effort, of the East -- whom it is right to call Catholic -- is a most powerful and very great increase of your glory? Who could pursue him with worthy praises? After whom Ferdinand, younger in birth, equal in natural gifts, born and destined for the scepter most worthily alongside his brother. Both are outstanding emulators of your virtues. For all Christians, the one by the excellent hope he offers of himself, the other also in reality, stirs up immense joy.
On account of these and very many other most great gifts of glory granted to you from heaven as a uniquely divine prince, and above all on account of the worship of the Christian religion which you zealously support and most valiantly defend, our Bandinus -- found long ago at Melk among many other very ancient volumes, and brought to light by Lord Sigismund, a man most adorned with excellent morals and the best studies, master of the liberal arts and most vigilant abbot of that same monastery -- presents himself most joyfully, with me leading him by the hand, and ascribes to your happy auspices the fact that he has at last been freed from his long imprisonment.
Happy auspices indeed, for you in whom living justly and piously, taken up as a habit from boyhood, has turned into nature. Than whom no one is now found braver or more prudent, no one more cautious, more upright and more holy, no one more merciful to the conquered, and more loving of letters, which you know most excellently. Deem him worthy of your favor, most sacred Caesar -- small indeed in weight, but filled with the holy doctrines of our religion.
From which, as is the opinion of myself and many other not inexpert men, that Peter Lombard seems to have derived his great and fourfold volume. Likewise we also, for whom it is considered the most beautiful honor to serve so great a prince, and the safest protection to enjoy you as patron -- deign to enroll us, your majesty's most ready servants, in the number of your clients, whom you always regard as the best.
At Vienna at the Scots, 1518.
Epistle of Benedictus Chelidonius to Abbot Sigismund
To the most reverend Father and Lord, Lord Sigismund, abbot at Melk, a man most adorned in both letters and religion, bound to him by most pleasing familiarity and to be most highly esteemed, Brother Benedictus Chelidonius, Abbot of Vienna at the Scots, sends greetings.
Concerning the literary disputation which recently took place at Vienna between Dr. Johann Eck, doctor of sacred theology, and the Viennese doctors of the same faculty, in a very large gathering of scholars: when recently during a meal at your place, most worthy Abbot Sigismund, conversation was being held in your usual manner with some other professors of good letters, and I myself, as very often before, had sat down at your invitation according to the longstanding custom of familiarity between your paternity and myself, through mention of Dr. Eck we digressed to the memory of your library, which you had newly built, full of very ancient and handwritten codices.
From among these, your Reverence brought forth a certain book full of age, whose title was 'The Book of Sentences of Master Bandinus,' found a few days before on the indication of Dr. Eck. When we had all judged by unanimous opinion that it was worthy of publication, the task of reviewing it and -- what it most needed -- correcting it was entrusted to me, since you, best father, were at that time wholly occupied with domestic cares, and I happened then to be less busy.
This task I, owing very much to your Paternity for your great benevolence and many benefactions, undertook readily, relying more on boldness than on skill, having taken with me into this work Martinus Milius, a regular canon and then pastor of our monastery, a man abundantly skilled in every literary matter. I organized it in the manner of Peter Lombard as far as was possible, and rescued it from errors, with which it was fuller than a leopard with spots; and finally I annotated most of the sources of the authorities cited.
In the course of reading, therefore, I discovered most certainly that Peter himself, in his four books, used our Bandinus throughout in order. For Peter in his fourth book, which is about the sacraments, discusses confirmation, though little, yet somewhat. If Bandinus had abbreviated him, as some have supposed, he would not have been silent about the same sacrament, being a matter necessary to the subject, in the way that he was.
As to whose countryman Bandinus was and of what fortune, although I investigated long and much with the help of the most learned men -- Georgius Collimitius, doctor of medicine and astronomy, Sebastianus Vunderhi, licentiate of laws, Masters Ambrosius Salser and Andreas de Mergentem, and also Johann Eck by letter -- we discovered nothing about a man worthy of enduring glory. And if he had not left behind this monument of his genius, he would perhaps lie entirely buried in eternal oblivion.
Let us therefore be content with the volume, since we have nothing certain about the author. It is now in the hands of the printers and will come to light as quickly as possible, as you commanded. Farewell, abbot most renowned as a lover of letters.
Given at Vienna at the Scots, the first day of July 1518.
Testimony of Johann Eck Concerning Master Bandinus
We came to Melk, a distinguished monastery of Saint Benedict, where while at the inn my traveling companions cared for their bodies and horses, I, out of my love for good letters, ascended to the monastery to see the paper furnishings. There I found very many codices. But above all I was wonderfully delighted by the theological summa of Master Bandinus. When I had read it more carefully, I discovered that, apart from elegance of style, he differed not at all, or very little, from Peter Lombard the Master of the Sentences, pursuing each opinion in the very same order as the Master, most learnedly.
For I immediately compared book with book, in more than one place, so that no small doubt arose in me as to which of them was the cuckoo, substituting another's offspring as his own. For Peter has been accepted for so many centuries as the certain and primary author of this summa. But on the other hand, Bandinus's codex is very ancient, in a most ancient monastery, composed in such a manner that someone would more easily have added something than taken something away.
Thus Eck.
(1) This doubt as to which of these two owes his work to the other is resolved by a codex from Upper Altaich (Ober-Altaich), written in the 13th century, in large quarto, in which Bandinus's work is clearly and affirmatively called an 'Abbreviation of the book of sacraments of Master Peter, Bishop of Paris, faithfully executed.' D. B. Pez, Dissertation in vol. I of the Thesaurus Anecdotorum, pp. XLV-XLVII. See the Literary Notice prefixed to the Works of Peter Lombard, in the preceding volume, col. 22.
Master Bandinus: On the Most Holy Trinity, Which Is the First Book of the Sentences
Summary. -- In this first book (just as in all the others) Bandinus, using wonderful brevity and clarity, a man (as his writings clearly demonstrate) most versed in sacred letters and in the reading of the orthodox Fathers, from these very sources by a clear method (having first set out the general subject matter of all Scripture) discusses the Most Holy Trinity most concisely and most clearly: teaching that God is one in essence, three in persons. Then how these persons are distinguished from one another, and how some derive their origin from others: meanwhile being truly equal in eternity, greatness, and power. Finally, concerning God's knowledge, providence, predestination, power, and will, he raises and clearly resolves various abstruse but very pleasant to read, and no less useful, questions in few words.
Distinction I: The General Subject Matter of All Scripture: Things and Signs
Concerning divine things, desiring to hand down to students some compendium by heavenly favor, we are advised that there are first of all two things in which the teaching about God principally consists, namely things and signs. For as Augustine says: All teaching is either of things or of signs. Now things are those which are not employed to signify something; signs, however, are those whose use consists in signifying -- such as the sacraments of both laws.
The Division of Things
Concerning these two, with God the Lord of knowledge bearing aid, we intend to treat. And first of things, afterward of signs we shall discourse. Concerning things Augustine says: Some things are those which are to be enjoyed, others which are to be used, and others which enjoy and use. By the things which are to be enjoyed, we are made blessed. Those are the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. Yet the same Trinity is a certain supreme thing. To enjoy is to cling in love to something for its own sake. This is recognized as belonging to the Trinity alone.
The things which are to be used are those by which we are aided so that we may cling to the things that make us blessed; these are the world and all things created in it. These are to be used so that in them the invisible things of God, through what has been made, may be seen by the understanding -- that is, so that from temporal things eternal things may be grasped (Rom. 1). For to use is to direct whatever has come into use toward obtaining that which is to be enjoyed. Finally, the things which both enjoy and use are the holy angels, and we are placed as if in the middle between both kinds.
Whether Human Beings Are to Be Enjoyed
But it is asked whether human beings ought to enjoy one another? To which Augustine responds thus: If a person is to be loved for his own sake, we enjoy him; if for the sake of something else, we use him. Therefore it does not seem that a person should be loved for his own sake, because in that which is loved for its own sake, which alone we enjoy, the blessed life is constituted. The hope of which also consoles us in this time. But hope is not to be placed in a human being. Therefore a human being is not to be enjoyed, not even by oneself.
But it is objected that the Apostle says to the Romans (15): If I shall first have enjoyed you in part. It should be understood that "in the Lord" is implied, as the same Apostle says to Philemon (20): Yes, brother, let me enjoy you in the Lord. Finally, when you enjoy a person in God, you enjoy God rather than the person, as Augustine says.
Whether God Enjoys Us
Likewise it is asked whether God enjoys us? Augustine denies this, because He has no need of our good. For the prophet says: You have no need of my goods (Psalm 15). Therefore He does not enjoy us, but uses us; otherwise, if He does not even use us, I do not find how He loves us. We also use one another, but differently from Him. For He uses us by showing mercy, so that we may fully enjoy Him; but we use one another by cooperating, so that we may fully enjoy Him.
Whether the Virtues Are to Be Enjoyed
Nor are the virtues to be enjoyed either, because what we enjoy we love only for its own sake, as has been said; but we love the virtues for the sake of blessedness, not for their own sake. Whence Augustine says: Perhaps the virtues, which we love for the sake of blessedness alone, dare to persuade us not to love that very blessedness. But if they do this, we certainly cease to love even the virtues themselves, when we do not love that for the sake of which alone we love them.
But against this it is objected what Ambrose says in his commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians: The Apostle does not call these works virtues, but fruits, because they are to be sought for their own sake. If this is so, then they are to be loved for their own sake, not solely for blessedness.
Furthermore, it should be known that the virtues are also to be loved for their own sake, because they delight their possessors piously and holily, and do not sadden them in anything. But one must not stop here; rather, through them, as through certain aids, we proceed further, seeking something in the sole attainment of which the end of joy and delight, which is to be blessed, is proposed. This, however, is the supreme and unchangeable good, God the Trinity. And for this reason it was said that the virtues are to be loved for the sake of blessedness alone. Therefore the virtues are to be used, and through them, not in them, the supreme good is to be enjoyed. Likewise we say the same about the will and all the powers of the soul. Such is the distinction of things, as was touched upon above.
First, therefore, with the help of Him of whom we speak, let us treat of those things which are to be enjoyed: namely, the Most Holy and undivided Trinity.
Distinction II: On the Most Holy Trinity
This, therefore, is to be held by true and pious faith, as Augustine says: that the Trinity is the one and only true God, namely the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. This Trinity is said, believed, and understood to be of one and the same substance or essence, which is the supreme good.
The Trinity Must Be Discussed with Reverence
Let us treat of this most excellent matter with modesty and fear; let us also listen with most attentive and devout ears. For nowhere is error more dangerous, nothing is sought with more labor, and nothing is found more fruitfully.
Let everyone therefore in this matter strive to imitate Augustine speaking about himself: It will not irk me, wherever I hesitate, to inquire; nor will it shame me, wherever I err, to learn.
What the Intention of Those Who Wrote about the Trinity Was
Hence it should be known that all Catholic writers on this matter intended to teach according to the Scriptures that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are of one substance, and in inseparable equality are one God; so that it may be taught that there is unity in essence and plurality in persons. And therefore it should not be believed that there are many gods, but one God. Let us hold, therefore, as Augustine says, that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are naturally one God; yet that the Father is not the same as the Son, nor the Son the same as the Father, nor the Holy Spirit the same as the Father or the Son.
In What Order the Trinity Should Be Treated
Moreover, as Augustine says, in this matter we should proceed in such a way that first it is shown through the Scriptures whether the faith is so; then against the garrulous, we should advance with Catholic arguments and fitting analogies, for asserting and defending the faith, so that by satisfying their inquiries we may more fully instruct the moderate. But if those people cannot find what they seek, let them complain about themselves rather than about the truth itself, or our definition or assertion.
Testimonies of the Old Testament on Divine Unity and Trinity
Let us therefore bring forward the authorities of the Old and New Testaments, by which the truth of unity and Trinity may be demonstrated. And first let the very beginnings of the Law present themselves. Moses therefore says: Hear, O Israel, the Lord your God is one God (Deut. 6). Likewise: I am the Lord your God, who led you out of the land of Egypt (Exod. 20). Behold, here the unity of the divine nature is asserted. For God and Lord, as Ambrose says, are names of nature and power. Likewise elsewhere: I am who I am; and: He who is sent me to you (Exod. 3). By saying "I am," not "we are," and "He who is," not "who we are," He most openly declares the unity of the divine substance.
The Trinity of Persons
The Lord also showed the plurality of persons and the unity of nature at the same time, saying: Let us make man in our image and likeness (Gen. 1). For when, as Augustine says, He says "let us make" and "our," He shows that the same God has not one but several persons. But by saying "in the image," He shows that there is one nature, in whose image man would be made.
Likewise, since it is written: In the beginning God created heaven and earth (Gen. 1), it should be known that the Hebrew original has "Elohim" where "God" is written, which is the plural of the singular "El," and is interpreted as "gods" or "judges." Because Moses said "Elohim," not "El," he indicated the plurality of persons. To this also refers: You will be like gods (Gen. 1), for which the Hebrew again has "Elohim," as if to say: "You will be like the divine persons."
Finally the greatest of prophets, David, understanding above the elders (Psalm 118), testifies to the unity of the divine nature where he says: Lord is his name (Psalm 67), not "Lords." He also indicates the distinction of persons, saying: By the Word of the Lord the heavens were established (Psalm 32). May God bless us, God our God; may God bless us, and may all the ends of the earth fear Him (Psalm 66). For the threefold confession of God expresses the trinity of persons; but when he adds "Him" in the singular, he reveals the unity of essence.
Likewise Isaiah says that the Seraphim cry out: Holy, holy, holy, Lord God (Isa. 6). By saying "holy" three times, he signifies the Trinity; by adding "Lord God," he openly distinguishes the unity.
Testimonies of the Old Testament on the Eternal Generation of the Son from the Father
Furthermore, David in the person of the Son shows the divine generation there: The Lord said to me: You are my Son, today I have begotten you (Psalm 2). Of this Isaiah says: Who shall declare his generation? (Isaiah 53). Of this generation Clement writes in his first epistle to James the bishop, saying: This secret origin, with His own Son, He alone who begot knows. Nor should God be examined by us, but believed, since in ourselves we do not understand what we know -- namely, how our wisdom generates a word.
It suffices therefore to know that light begot splendor, as the Prophet says: In the splendors of the saints, from the womb before the morning star I begot you (Psalm 109). And elsewhere: This is our God, and no other shall be esteemed compared to him (Baruch 3). In Wisdom also, it is said of her: Before the earth was made, I was already conceived (Prov. 8). When there were not yet springs, mountains, or hills, I was being brought forth. Likewise: I came forth from the mouth of the Most High, firstborn before all creation (Sirach 24). Behold, clear testimonies of the eternal generation.
Testimonies of the Temporal Generation
Micah gives testimony of both generations of the Word, temporal and eternal, thus: And you, Bethlehem Ephrathah, you are small among the thousands of Judah; from you shall come forth for me one who is to be ruler in Israel, and His going forth is from the beginning, from the days of eternity (Micah 5).
Testimonies Concerning the Holy Spirit
Concerning the Holy Spirit also, Scripture specifically testifies thus in Genesis: The Spirit of the Lord was borne over the waters (Gen. 1). And David: Where shall I go from your Spirit? (Psalm 138). And in Wisdom: The Holy Spirit of discipline will flee from the deceitful (Wisdom 1). And Isaiah: The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, etc. (Isaiah 61).
Testimonies of the New Testament on the Same Matters
But that the truth may be recognized in the midst of two living creatures, and a coal may be taken with tongs from the altar to touch the lips of the faithful, let us also set forth the testimonies of the New Testament concerning the divine Trinity and unity. The Master of truth therefore says: Go, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit (Matt. 28). By saying "in the name," not "in the names," as Ambrose says, He declares the unity of essence; through the three names He sets forth, He declares that there are three persons.
Likewise: I and the Father are one (John 10). "He said 'one,'" says Ambrose, "lest there be a separation of nature or power. He added 'are,' so that you may recognize the Father and the Son."
John also says: In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God (John 1). Openly showing that the Son is eternally with the Father, as one person with another.
Likewise elsewhere: There are three who bear witness in heaven: the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit, and these three are one (1 John 5).
The Apostle also distinguishes Trinity and unity there: From Him and through Him and in Him are all things, to Him be glory (Rom. 11). "From Him," as Augustine says, he says on account of the Father; "through Him," on account of the Son; "in Him," on account of the Holy Spirit. This is the Trinity. But by the fact that he does not say "to them be glory" but "to Him," he shows that this Trinity is one God. Since indeed nearly every syllable of the New Testament harmoniously suggests this, omitting to adduce further testimonies, let us show by arguments and fitting analogies, as far as our weakness permits, that it is so.
Distinction III: The Creator Could Be Known through Creation in Three Ways
The invisible things of God are clearly seen through the things that have been made, being understood by the creature of the world (Rom. 1) -- that is, by man, who, as the Apostle says, was aided by two things to know the invisible God: namely, by rational nature and by outward works, in which the judgment of the Maker in some measure shines forth.
For Ambrose says: So that God, who is invisible by nature, might be known even from visible things, He made a work which manifested the Maker by its visibility -- which is impossible to be done by a human being or by any creature. It is established, therefore, that He who made creation is above all creation, and through this the human mind was able to recognize that He is God.
The philosophers also recognized that He made all things and was made by none. For they saw that every substance is either body or spirit, and that spirit is better than body, but far better still is He who is the Maker of both. They therefore most rightly believed that He is the principle of all things -- who was not made, and from whom all things were made.
That the truth of God is known through the things that have been made in many ways, the Apostle says "the invisible things of God" in the plural (Rom.), even though the essence is only simple and one: For from the perpetuity of creatures, the Creator God is understood to be eternal; from their greatness, omnipotent; from their arrangement, wise; from their governance, good. Therefore through all these things, man was able to know the unity of the Godhead.
How the Trinity Is Known through Creatures
An indication or vestige of the Trinity could also be found through the things that have been made. For Augustine says: All these things which have been made by divine art both show in themselves a certain unity and form and order. For each created thing is something one, and is formed by some form, and seeks or maintains some order. Behold, such a vestige of the ineffable Trinity appears in creatures. For in it the supreme origin is the Father; the most perfect beauty, the Son; and the most blessed delight, the Holy Spirit. Thus, therefore, through the things that have been made, we are aided in the faith of invisible things.
How the Image of the Trinity Exists in the Soul
In the human mind, moreover, which is the image of the divinity, these things can be more fully understood. For even if, as Augustine says, the human mind is deformed by the loss of participation in God, the image of God nonetheless remains in the very fact that it is capable of Him and can participate in Him.
Because it remembers itself, understands itself, loves itself: if we discern this, we discern a trinity -- not yet God, but we find an image of God, namely memory, understanding, and will. These, therefore, are both three and one. For, as Augustine says, there are not three lives but one. These are also spoken of relatively, as Augustine says, for the mind cannot love itself or remember itself unless it also knows itself. For how does it love or remember what it does not know? The same must be said of the others as well. But the mind itself, or life, is spoken of in relation to itself.
How Those Three Are Equal
Accordingly, they are equal not only each to each, but also each to all. For I remember that I have memory, understanding, and will; I understand that I understand, will, and remember; I also will that I will, remember, and understand.
How Those Three Are Said to Be One
But how are these said to be one mind, when they would seem rather to be called powers of the mind? Precisely because they exist substantially in the mind itself. Whence Augustine says: We are advised that these exist in the soul substantially, not as in a subject, like color in a body, because, even though they are spoken of relatively to one another, each is nevertheless substantial in its own substance. In a wonderful way, therefore, these three are inseparable from one another, and each of them, and all together, are one substance, as has been said.
What the Dissimilarity between the Created and the Uncreated Trinity Is
Although through these things a created trinity appears similar to the uncreated Trinity, it nevertheless exists as dissimilar in many more respects, which is easily shown if one pays attention. For behold, one man is he who has these three things. But he himself is not these three things, nor are these three things one man: but there one God is three persons, and three persons are one God. Likewise here there is only one person, but there three persons exist: the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. Finally, here none of these three things is the man: but there any one of the persons is fully and perfectly God. Our mind therefore is very far distant from the uncreated Trinity. This mind is indeed the image of God, as Augustine says, not only because it remembers itself, understands, and loves itself, but because it can also remember, understand, and love Him by whom it was made. Through this it is able to understand unity in Trinity and Trinity in unity. For it understands that there is only one principle of all things, because if there were many, either all would be insufficient, or the rest besides the one would be superfluous. Moreover, it did not consider that principle to be foolish, whence it understood that wisdom is there, and when it loves that wisdom, it also discovers by right reason that love is there. It is evident therefore how our mind is similar to God, and how through it the unity and Trinity of the divinity was able to become known to man.
On the Unity of the Trinity: A Firm Argument for Confirming the Trinity
Therefore, according to the meaning of the things stated above, let us believe that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one in nature and three in persons. For as Augustine says: There is one nature or essence of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, not one person. For if there were one person in the same way that there is one substance of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, it would not truly be called a Trinity. Likewise, the Trinity would indeed be true, but the Trinity itself would not be one God, if the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, just as they are distinguished from one another by the property of persons, were also separated by a diversity of natures. Let us hold therefore that in that holy Trinity, there is one Father, who alone begot the Son; and there is one Son, who alone is born of the Father; and there is one Holy Spirit, who alone proceeds from both. All of which one person cannot do, that is, to beget himself, and to be born of himself, and to proceed from himself.
Distinction IV: Whether God Is Rightly Said to Be Begotten
There emerges therefore this question: whether God begot Himself? For it is established that God begot God, because the Father begot the Son, and each is God. From this one proceeds as follows: if God begot God, then either He begot Himself as God, or another God. If another, then there is not only one God. But if He begot Himself, then some thing begot itself. Against this Augustine speaks, saying: Those who think that it is within God's power that He begot Himself err all the more, because not only is God not like that, but neither is any creature: for there is no thing that begets itself.
Yet Augustine seems to contradict himself where he says: God the Father begot another of Himself, which is rightly understood thus: that is, He begot from Himself another person; or He begot another, that is, the Son, who is the very same thing that He Himself is. But against the aforementioned inference -- namely, if God begot God, then either He begot Himself as God, or another -- this analogy argues: the Son of God began to be a person of man, therefore either the person of man which He Himself is, or another; since both alternatives are absurd, it is by no means to be conceded. And so it must be said about similar cases.
Yet they press the same question in other words. God the Father begot God; therefore either a God who is God the Father -- by which He seems to have begotten Himself -- or a God who is not God the Father -- by which He seems to have begotten another God. But although this can be conceded in a catholic sense, because the expression "God the Father" is not said according to substance but is personal, nevertheless, to eliminate all obstinacy, we advise that the proposition -- namely, "God the Father begot a God who is not God the Father" -- must be determined by the force of the relation, so that "who" referred simply to God introduces a falsehood, but referred to God as begotten, fittingly proposes the truth. For God the Father is the same God as the one begotten, but God the Father is not the begotten God, because then one person would be another, which God forbid!
Distinction V: Whether the Divine Essence Is Rightly Said to Be Begotten or to Have Begotten
Consequently it is asked whether the Father begot the divine essence, or whether it begot the Son, or whether essence begot essence, or not? That the Father begot the divine essence seems apparent from the words of Augustine saying: When God begot the Word, He begot that which He Himself is. Likewise, God the Father, who most truly both willed and was able to manifest Himself to minds that would come to know Him, begot for the purpose of manifesting Himself that which He Himself is who begot. But He Himself is nothing other than the divine essence, and therefore He seems to have begotten it. However, we say that the foregoing must be understood thus: the Father begot that which He Himself is -- that is, the Son, who is that which the Father is, but not he who is the Father. For the Father is one person, the Son another, but not another thing.
He Proves That the Essence Was Not Begotten
Moreover, that the Father did not beget the divine essence is proved by a threefold reasoning. First, if He begot it, it follows that the divine essence is said relatively to it, since what is said relatively does not indicate substance. For Augustine says: What is said relatively does not indicate substance. Second, if He Himself begot it, since He Himself is the divine essence, the same thing begot itself, which cannot be, as was stated above. Third, because if He begot it, it would not be the begetter who is the cause of the begotten, but the begotten would be the cause of the begetter -- for it to exist and to be God -- since the divine essence is God the Father, and it exists, and is God. Similarly it must be said, that neither did the divine essence beget the Son, because it is not said relatively to Him.
Nor did essence beget essence, for the reason already stated, because the same thing does not beget itself. Yet Augustine seems to go against what we say. For he says: As essence from essence, so wisdom from wisdom. And elsewhere: Believe that Christ the Son of God is true God, so that you may not doubt that His divinity was born from the nature of the Father. But these and any similar statements you should know are to be understood thus: "as from essence, essence," etc. -- that is, just as the Son is essence from the Father's essence, so also the Son is wisdom from the Father who is wisdom. That this is rightly expounded, you may gather from the words of Augustine saying: Christ is therefore called the power and wisdom of God, because from the Father who is power and wisdom, He too is power and wisdom.
What Hilary says also seems contrary to the foregoing: The Son has nothing except what is born. But the Son also has the divine essence (for it is wholly in Him), and therefore it too seems to have been born. The same author says more clearly: We do not proclaim the Father in the Son by a corporeal indwelling, but that from Him, of the same kind, a begotten nature has had in itself a nature that naturally begets. Behold, by these words he manifestly says that the nature of God was begotten and did beget. But as the same author says, the understanding of what is said must be drawn from the reasons for saying it. For the thing is not subject to the word, but the word to the thing. These words therefore can be faithfully received as follows: The Son has nothing except what is born -- that is, the Son has nothing, insofar as He is God, except what He received by being born. Likewise, "we proclaim from Him a begotten nature of the same kind," etc. -- that is, we proclaim that the Father, who is the nature, exists naturally in the begotten, that is, in the Son begotten by Him, who is the same nature as the Father. Hence the same Hilary says: The begotten has the same nature as He who begot.
What It Means That the Father Begot the Son from His Own Substance
One also frequently encounters in reading that the Father begot the Son from His own nature. Hence Augustine: God the Father, begotten of no God, once and without beginning begot the Son God from His own nature. Likewise Augustine on the text: Who rescued us from the power of darkness and transferred us into the kingdom of the Son of His love. What is said, he says, "of the Son of His love," is understood as nothing other than "of His most beloved Son," which means "of the Son of His substance." For the love of the Father, which is in His nature, is nothing other than that very nature and substance; and therefore the Son of His love means He who was begotten from His substance. The same author also says: that the substance of God begot the Son. "Full of carnal thoughts," he says, "you do not think the substance of God can beget a Son from itself unless it suffers what the substance of flesh suffers when it begets. You err, not knowing the Scriptures nor the power of God (Matt. 22)." By these words it plainly seems that the nature or substance of God begot the Son.
But lest these and any similar statements become vessels of death for us rather than of life, we advise that they must always be brought back to the sense of simplicity, which is the friend of truth. Without prejudice therefore we say that what seems to be said about nature or substance must be referred to the persons. The authors expressed these things not with the name of persons but of the nature itself, thereby intimating to us that the three persons are of the same nature and substance, and immutably, as Hilary says, and indivisibly. Hence Augustine in the same work: This Trinity is of one and the same substance.
Distinction VI: Whether the Father Begot Willingly or Unwillingly
Furthermore it is asked: whether the Father begot the Son by will or by necessity; whether unwillingly or willingly He is God? That He begot by will seems provable as follows: the nature of the Father and His will are the same. But you concede that He begot by nature, therefore also by will. But this is easily refuted by an analogy: for His knowledge and His will are the same, therefore whatever things happen with Him knowing also happen with Him willing -- this does not follow. But He did not beget by necessity, because, as Augustine says, a great misery and absurdity would be placed in God if He were said to have begotten by necessity. We say therefore that He begot neither willingly nor unwillingly -- in this plain sense, namely that the will did not precede or follow the begetting, as Eunomius supposed. For the will of begetting in the Father and the begotten one Himself existed simultaneously from eternity, as Augustine says: The Son of God always existed with the Father, nor did the paternal will precede Him so that He would exist.
According to this therefore we say that the Son is Son not by will but by nature; and just as the Father is God by nature, not by will, so is the Son, and also the Holy Spirit. Because Eunomius could not understand this, nor was he willing to believe it, he said that the Only-begotten of God was a Son not of nature but of will. Surely his dialectic is to be ridiculed, as Augustine says. It must be held therefore that the Father did not beget the Son by will, because the will of begetting the Son did not precede. Nor by necessity, lest we speak absurdly about God, but He begot by nature. For He is, as Hilary says, a Son by nature, who has the same nature as He who begot.
Distinction VII: On the Equal Power of the Father and the Son
Since the Father and the Son are one and the same essence, as has been said, it must also be held that the power of both is one and the same. For there, to be is altogether the same as to be able. Whence it is established that whatever the Father can do, the Son also can do. But from this a difficult question arises. For if whatever the Father can do, the Son also can, therefore the Son can beget, because the Father can do this. This is weakened by an analogy: for whatever the Father is, the Son also is; therefore the Son is the Father, because the Father is the Father -- which does not follow. This is so, evidently, because for the Father to be the Father is not for the Father to be something, but to be in relation to something. So perhaps it is not unfaithfully said that for the Father to be able to beget is not for the Father to be able to do something, since just as "Father," so also "to beget" pertains to the relative. The question is pressed more forcefully, indeed, from the words of Augustine against the heretic Maximinus, who asserted that the Father was more powerful than the Son, because the Father was able to beget and begot the Son, God the Creator, but the Son was not. To whom Augustine says: Far be it that the Father is therefore more powerful than the Son, as you suppose, because the Father begot a Creator, but the Son did not beget a Creator. For it was not that He could not, but that it was not fitting.
If you attend diligently to this, he seems to say that the Son also could have begotten, but it was not fitting. And then why was it not fitting? Augustine adds: For there would be an unbounded divine generation, if the begotten Son were to beget a grandson for the Father, because that grandson too, unless he begot a great-grandson for his grandfather, would be called powerless according to your wonderful wisdom. Similarly also that one, if he did not beget a grandson for his grandfather and a great-grandson for his great-grandfather, would not be called omnipotent by you. Nor would the series of generation be completed, if one were always born from another. For no one would complete it, if one omnipotent were not sufficient.
We think therefore that what was stated above is to be understood thus -- namely, "for it was not that He could not, but that it was not fitting" -- that is, it is not from powerlessness that the Son did not beget, but because it was not befitting Him, for the reason stated above. Just as the Father is not the Son, nor the Son the Father, nor can He be. This is not from the powerlessness of either, but because it does not befit the Father to be the Son, or the Son to be the Father. As for what Augustine says to Maximinus who asked why the Father cannot be the Son, or the Son the Father: It is certainly not, he says, from powerlessness, but the Father is Father by the property of generation, by which it is fitting that He not be the Son; and the Son is Son by the property of nativity, by which it is fitting that He not be the Father. And so, not from powerlessness but by the property of generation the Father begets, by which it is fitting that He not be begotten. And the Son is begotten by the property of nativity, by which it is fitting that He not beget.
The Son Could Not Beget
Finally it is proved that the Son cannot beget. For if He could beget, then He could be a Father; and if He could be a Father, then either of the Father, or of Himself, or of the Holy Spirit, or of another. But not of another, because no other could exist from eternity. Nor of the Father, because He is unbegotten and unable to be born. Nor of Himself, because no thing can beget itself. Nor of the Holy Spirit, because He cannot be born, otherwise He would be changeable. It remains therefore that the Son could not beget.
How the Father and the Son Are of the Same Power
The proposed question therefore seems to be resolved as follows. Whatever the Father can do, the Son can also -- that is, whatever is subject to the Father's power is likewise subject to the Son's power, because it is altogether the same. We call "subject to power" those things that follow upon the power itself. But generation or to beget neither precedes nor follows the power, for it exists simultaneously with it from eternity. However, if it is conceded that to be able to beget is to be able to do something, it is objected thus: the Father has this ability that the Son does not have; therefore the Father has some ability that the Son does not have. The response is drawn from an analogy: the Father has this being that the Son does not have, namely to be the Father; therefore the Father has some being that the Son does not -- this is false. For every and the whole being of the Father is altogether also the Son's.
We say moreover that the power of the Father and the Son is utterly the same, although not everything that is said of the Father according to it is said of the Son. This is clear from an analogy. For the same marriage bond is wholly in these two, and yet according to it the man is called husband and not wife, and the woman wife and not husband. Or to speak more clearly: the will of the Father and the Son is altogether the same, yet by it the Father wills to be the Father and not the Son, and the Son wills to be the Son and not the Father. So therefore the power of the Father and the Son is the same, yet by it the Father can beget and not be begotten, and the Son can be begotten and not beget. Or it is not unsophisticated if someone were to say that the Father's being able to beget cannot be said from power alone, but also from the property of generation. Since this does not befit the Son, it is no wonder if the ability to beget does not befit Him.
In What Way the Son Has the Power of Begetting
But if it is said that the Son has the power of begetting, distinguish thus. He has the power of begetting -- that is, so that He may beget or be able to beget: this is false. But He has the power of begetting by which, namely, He is begotten or can be begotten.
Taken impersonally it is true. Just as "you have the knowledge of writing" -- that is, by which you know how to write -- is false; but "by which writing is known" is true. We also say that in the progression of the aforementioned opposition -- namely, whatever the Father can do, the Son also can; but the Father can beget, therefore the Son also can -- the word "can" is taken one way in the major premise, and another way in the minor premise or the conclusion. Just as the words "God" and "is," placed in different locations, signify in different ways. For example: everything that God the Father is, the same God the Son is; but the Father is God begetting, therefore the Son also is God begetting -- this does not follow. Likewise: whatever the Father is, the Son also is; but the Father is begetting, therefore the Son also is begetting -- this does not follow. The reason is that these words "God" and "is" signify essentially in the major premises, but then signify personally in what follows. Thus therefore the aforesaid question is solved in many ways. And that the Son cannot beget but can be begotten, and the Father can beget and cannot be begotten -- this is truly believed and understood.
Distinction VIII: On the Truth of the Divine Essence
Now we must treat of the truth of the divine essence. God is therefore without doubt a substance, or, if it is better said, an essence, which the Greeks call ousia. For just as from that which is "to be wise," wisdom is named, and from that which is "to know," knowledge, so from that which is "to be," essence is named. And who is greater than He who said: I am who I am, and: He who is sent me to you? (Exod. 3.) He, I say, is truly and properly said to be, whose essence knows no past nor future. Hence Jerome writes to Marcella: God alone, who has no beginning, holds the name of true essence. For of that of which "he was" is said, he is not; and of that of which "he will be" is said, he is not yet. But God only is -- He who knows not to have been or to be about to be. God alone therefore truly is, and compared to His essence our being is nothing.
However, against these stand the things that Scripture frequently commemorates: God was from eternity, He always was, and He will be forever, and such like. Augustine also says on John: Although "is" is properly said of a sempiternal thing, according to our manner of speaking "was" and "will be" are rightly said. "Was," because He never ceased; "will be," because He will never cease; "is," because He always is. He has not passed away, as though He does not remain; He will not be, as though He was not -- as is not said of us. According to these words therefore, understanding Jerome, we say: He knows not to have been or to be about to be -- that is, He has not passed away nor will He cease to be, but He only is, because He always is.
For although substantive verbs of different tenses are said of God, they do not thereby distinguish temporal changes, but simply intimate the essence of the Divinity. God alone, therefore, is properly and naturally called essence or being. Hence Hilary: Being is not accidental to God, but is subsisting truth and abiding cause and the natural property of His kind.
God Is Immutable
This essence of God is properly immutable, because it neither changes nor can be changed. Hence Augustine: Other essences or substances receive accidents by which changes occur in them. But nothing of this sort can happen to God, and therefore His substance or essence alone is immutable.
Every Creature Is Mutable
And for this reason the Apostle says of God: Who alone has immortality (1 Tim. 6), understanding by this the immutability that no creature can possess, since it belongs to the Creator alone. Hence the Apostle James: With whom there is no change nor shadow of alteration (James 1). And David: You will change them and they will be changed, but You are the same (Ps. 101). And elsewhere: I am God and I do not change (Mal. 3). However, every creature is subject to mutability, which, as Augustine says, is a kind of death for the creature itself, because it causes something in it not to be which was. Indeed the human soul itself, although it is immortal because according to its own mode it never ceases to live, nevertheless has its own death -- because if it was living justly and sins, it dies to justice; if it was sinful and is justified, it dies to sin -- to say nothing of its other changes. And the nature of heavenly creatures could die, because it could sin. For some of the angels sinned, and those who did not sin could have sinned. But nothing of this sort can happen to God. Therefore since God alone is properly immutable, He alone is also truly immortal.
The Simplicity of God
This same divine essence is also properly and truly simple, because in it there is no diversity, variation, or multiplicity of parts, accidents, or any forms whatsoever -- which obtains in no creature. For as Augustine says: Bodily creation consists of parts, so that one part is larger, another smaller, and the whole itself is greater than any part. In which also magnitude is one thing, color another, shape another -- all of which produce multiplicity in a body.
The Creature Is Manifold
Spiritual creation also is manifold. For although the soul, compared to the body, is simple -- in that it is not spread out piecemeal through spaces of place, but wherever it is, it is whole -- nevertheless not even in it is there true simplicity. For since being skillful is one thing, being sluggish another, being acute another, being retentive another, and these and innumerable other things can be found in the nature of the soul, it is clear that it is not simple but manifold, since the soul is none of these things but has them. Finally, whatever is in God is God -- whence His simplicity also appears -- especially since what is had and what has are the same. For we do not call the nature of the supreme good simple because the Father alone is in it, or the Son alone, or the Holy Spirit alone -- that is, because there is only a trinity of names or subsistence of persons, as the Sabellians supposed. But it is called simple because it is what it has, except for what is said relatively, where each person is said in relation to another and is not that other. For of course the Father has the Son, in relation to whom He is said relatively, yet He is not the Son. And the Son has the Father, yet He Himself is not the Father. But in that which is said in reference to Himself, not to another, He is what He has. Just as He is called living in reference to Himself by having life, and He Himself is that same life -- which does not obtain in other things. For one who has liquid is not the liquid; nor is a body its color; nor is the soul its wisdom, but only has it. And for this reason God alone is truly and properly simple.
God Is Spoken of in Many Ways
Yet God is spoken of in many ways -- as wisdom, justice, prudence, and holiness, and whatever other such thing may be said of God without indignity. This is so because God works in manifold ways in things, not because there is any multiplicity in Him. For although He is one in the underlying reality, God is nevertheless named by many words according to the variety of meanings. Wisdom signifies one thing, knowledge another, justice another, and so on with the rest. He is wisdom because He instructs in the disciplines of divine and human things. He is justice when He is understood as judge and distributor of merits. He is prudence when the teaching or demonstration of good and evil, true and false things, or neutral things, is recognized. Furthermore, He is holiness because He Himself is the foundation and confirmation of all things. This and whatever such thing is said of God is understood apart from any reference to accidents.
As Augustine also admonishes us, saying: Let us understand, as far as we can, God as good without quality, great without quantity, Creator without need, presiding without position, containing all things without encompassing, everywhere whole without place, eternal without time, making changeable things without any change in Himself, and suffering nothing. Whoever thinks of God thus, although he has not yet found altogether what He is, should yet piously take care not to think anything of Him that He is not.
So great is the simplicity of God that He is subject to none of the categories. Therefore God is not subject to the laws and accidents of the categories. And so He is not properly called substance, since we derive "substance" from "to subsist," which is rightly said of those things in which there are subjects -- that is, things said to exist in a subject, as color in a body -- which it is impious to say of God. Therefore, "substance" being used improperly, God more properly and truly is and is called essence.
Distinction IX: On the Personal Properties of the Trinity and Unity
Now, approaching the distinction of persons, we must confess that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are naturally one God, yet the Father is not the Son, nor the Son the Father. For since the Son is begotten by the Father, the Father is indeed one person and the Son another.
On the Coeternity of the Son with the Father
Yet the Father did not exist before the Son, as the heretic falsely claims, for the three persons are coeternal with one another. Indeed Scripture says: Before Me there was no other God, nor will there be after Me (Isa. 43). If these words are the Father's, He says that after Him there is no other God; if the Son's, He says that before Him there is no God. And so neither does this one have a predecessor, nor that one a successor. Furthermore, if the Father existed before He had the Son, then the Father was changed by the addition of generation, which is blasphemy. Likewise, since the Son is the wisdom and power of the Father, if at some time the Father existed without the Son, then the Father was at that time without His wisdom and power -- which is no less profane than foolish to say.
A Fitting Analogy
For it is established that the Son is coeternal with the Father, just as the splendor that is diffused from a fire is coeval with it, and would indeed be coeternal if the fire were eternal. However, this is ineffable, as is the generation itself. Hence Isaiah: Who shall declare His generation? (Isa. 53.) He means the divine, not the human generation, although the latter too is in great part beyond telling. Yet the former is entirely beyond telling, because even though the Son is said to be begotten by the Father, nevertheless in what manner, neither apostle nor prophet knew, nor angel.
Whether It Should Be Said That the Son Is Always Being Begotten, or Was Always Begotten
It is asked whether it should be said that the Son is always being born. On this Gregory says thus: Of the Lord Jesus we cannot say "He is always being born," lest He seem imperfect. But so that He may be designated as eternal and perfect, let us say both "always" and "born," so that "born" pertains to perfection, and "always" to eternity.
Origen Contradicts the Foregoing
But Origen seems to contradict this in these words: Our Savior is the splendor of brightness, who is not born once and then ceases, but is born as many times as the light arises from which He is born; so therefore the Savior is always being born.
Harmonizing Origen and Gregory
We, recalling to harmony the apparent disagreement of such great men on so great a matter, think that each author had something suspect in his manner of speaking. For when we say "the reading is always being read," we show by common usage an imperfection in the reading, which Gregory, denying this of the Only-begotten, says: "We cannot say He is always being born." That this is indeed what he understood, he shows by adding: "Lest He seem imperfect." Similarly, when a reading has been read, we say "it was read long ago but has now ceased being read," signifying this by our manner of speaking. Origen, abhorring this in regard to the nativity of the Word, asserts its perpetuity, saying: "The Savior is always being born" -- which he makes clear by prefacing "He is not born once and then ceases." Therefore, by different modes of speaking, excluding various errors, they both affirm that the nativity of the Son is from eternity perfect and everlasting.
But the heretic says: Everything that was born did not always exist, because it was born in order to exist. To whom we say: Let no one doubt that this is so in human affairs. For there, he who is a father did not always exist; nor is he who existed always a father. Therefore neither always begetting nor always begotten -- but none of this applies in divine things, where there is no before or after, but only eternity.
But where the Father always is, the Son always is.
What Is Proper to the Father and the Son
If it is always proper to God the Father that He is always Father, it is necessarily always proper to the Son that He was always born. Therefore we confess that the Only-begotten was born, and that He did not exist before being born, nor was He born before existing. This indeed exceeds human sense and the understanding of the world; neither does the reasoning of human intelligence grasp this, but it is the profession of faithful prudence.
Distinction X: On the Personal Procession of the Holy Spirit
Now let us discuss the Holy Spirit, with His own gift enabling us. The Holy Spirit, therefore, is the love or affection of the Father and the Son, by which each is conjoined, by which the begotten is loved by the one who begets and loves His begetter; and they are so not by participation but by His own essence, nor by the gift of any superior, but by His own proper gift, preserving the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace (Eph. 4). For He is not the Spirit of the Father alone or of the Son alone, but of both. And therefore they impart to us the mutual charity by which they love one another.
The Holy Spirit Is Properly Called Charity. The Whole Trinity Is Charity
He is called charity properly, since He Himself is that by which the Father and the Son love one another, demonstrating the ineffable communion of both. What, therefore, is more fitting than that He should properly be called charity, who is the Spirit common to both? Yet we do not say this in such a way as to deny that the Father and the Son are charity. For just as the unique Word of God is properly called wisdom, while yet the Holy Spirit and the Father are in common that very wisdom, so the Holy Spirit is properly named charity, while the Father and the Son are in common charity. The Word, moreover, was called wisdom by the mouth of the Apostle who says: Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God (1 Cor. 8). Likewise the Holy Spirit is called charity in the epistle of John, for he says: God is charity (1 John 4), which Augustine manifestly proves is properly to be understood of the Holy Spirit.
The Third Person Is Properly Called the Holy Spirit
Furthermore, He Himself is also properly called Holy Spirit. For although the Father and the Son are both Spirit and both holy, it is not without reason that He Himself is properly called Holy Spirit. For He who is common to both is rightly called properly what they are called in common.
Distinction XI: That the Holy Spirit Proceeds from the Father and the Son
He who is the Spirit of the Father and the Son proceeds from both, as is proved by the testimonies of the Scriptures. For the Apostle says: God sent the Spirit of His Son into our hearts (Gal. 4). And elsewhere: Whoever does not have the Spirit of Christ does not belong to Him (Rom. 8). The Son Himself also testifies concerning Him thus: It is not you who speak, but the Spirit of your Father who speaks in you (Matt. 18). And elsewhere: The Spirit who proceeds from the Father (John 15). Through these and similar passages it is established that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, which many heretics denied.
What the Greeks Think. The Principal Councils Determined Regarding the Procession of the Holy Spirit
The Greeks, however, do not acknowledge that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, led by these reasons: namely, because when the Truth says the Spirit who proceeds from the Father, He mentions only the name of the Father and not of the Son. Likewise, because in their creed the Holy Spirit is said to proceed from the Father, and not also from the Son -- which things, I say, were so enacted in the principal councils, with anathemas appended, that no one is permitted to teach or preach anything other than what is contained therein concerning the faith of the Trinity. Whence they even dare to charge as guilty by the bond of anathema those whom they know confess that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son.
But we, confessing this for eternity, say that the Truth indeed confesses that the Spirit proceeds from the Father; yet He does not confess that He proceeds from Him in such a way as to deny that He also proceeds from Himself.
He Responds to the First Objection of the Greeks
The reason He names only the Father is that He was accustomed to say that what is His own is not His own, but to refer it to the Father, as in: My teaching is not My own, but His who sent Me (John 7). He says this not by denying it of Himself, but by showing that the authority of the principle resides in the Father.
He Responds to the Second Objection
As for that other objection they raise, it must be understood contrariwise, so that the meaning is: Let no one say something else, that is, something contrary. As the Apostle puts it to the Galatians: If anyone, he says, has preached another gospel -- that is, a contrary one, as Augustine explains -- let him be anathema (Gal. 1). He did not say 'if anyone has added'; otherwise he would have prejudged himself, he who desired to come to certain people to supply what was lacking in their faith. Moreover, he who supplies what was insufficiently stated does not say something contrary to what was said. Indeed, it must be known that although in the present article the Greeks disagree with us in word, nevertheless they do not differ in meaning. For they confess that the Spirit is of the Son, even if not from the Son, because it is written: the Spirit of the Son (Gal. 4). But we faithfully believe it to be the same thing: that the Spirit is of the Son and that He proceeds from Him.
By the Testimony of the Greeks Themselves It Is Shown that the Holy Spirit Proceeds from Both
This is proved by the testimony of the Greek doctors. For Athanasius says in the creed: The Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son, neither made, nor created, nor begotten, but proceeding. Likewise Christ says: For He will not speak on His own, because He will receive from what is mine (John 16). Likewise Cyril: The Spirit is not alien to the Son: For He is named the Spirit of truth, and flows forth from Him, just as indeed He does from God the Father. We say that the Holy Spirit is coequal to the Father and the Son, and proceeding from the Father and the Son. Therefore, with the Greeks corrected by the testimony of their own teachers, let every tongue confess that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son.
Distinction XII: Whether the Holy Spirit Proceeds Earlier or More Fully from the Father than from the Son
Yet the Holy Spirit does not proceed from one of them earlier or later than from the other, as the heretic ravingly claims. For in that supreme Trinity there are no intervals of time, without which there can be absolutely no before or after. Nor does the Spirit proceed more fully from one than from the other, because just as from the Father, so also from the Son the Holy Spirit proceeds. But wherever it is read that the Spirit proceeds properly or principally from the Father, it is said in the sense that the Father has from no other, but from himself, the fact that the Holy Spirit proceeds from him. Finally, Jerome uses the word 'properly,' for he says: We believe in the Holy Spirit, true God, who is from the Father and proceeds. Augustine, however, uses the word 'principally' in these words: Not without reason in this Trinity, is only the Son called the Word of God, and only the Holy Spirit the gift of God, and only God the Father the one from whom the Word is begotten and from whom the Holy Spirit principally proceeds. But that this is to be understood as we have said above, he himself makes clear when he adds: I added 'principally' because the Holy Spirit is found to proceed also from the Son. But this too the Father gave to Him; yet no one gave this to the Father. And therefore he confesses that the Spirit proceeds principally from the Father.
On the Difference between the Procession of the Son from the Father and that of the Holy Spirit
The Son also proceeds from the Father, as He Himself testifies: I came forth from God and have come into the world (John 8). Yet differently from the Holy Spirit. For the Holy Spirit, as Augustine says, proceeds from the Father, not in the manner of one born, but in the manner of one given or as a gift. The Son, however, proceeds by being born and came forth as begotten. Between this procession and that one, says Augustine, I do not know how to distinguish, I am unable, I am insufficient: for each is ineffable. For just as the prophet, speaking of the Son, says: Who shall declare His generation? (Isaiah 53). So of the Holy Spirit it is most truly said: Who shall declare His procession?
Distinction XIII: Why the Holy Spirit Is Not Called Begotten or Son
Finally, although the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, nevertheless He is called neither begotten of both nor their Son. For indeed no one is called the Son of two except of a father and a mother. But far be it from us to suspect any such thing between God the Father and God the Son!
The Question Whether the Holy Spirit Can Be Called Unbegotten
The Holy Spirit, however, is not called unbegotten. Whence Augustine, writing to Orosius: Sure faith declares that the Holy Spirit is called neither begotten nor unbegotten. For even though we do not call the Holy Spirit begotten, yet we dare not say unbegotten, lest by this word someone should suspect either two fathers in that Trinity, or two who are not from another. Jerome, however, seems to contradict this. For he says the Holy Spirit is not Father, but unbegotten and unmade.
Solution by Means of a Distinction
However, each of them used the word 'unbegotten' in a different sense. For Augustine says 'unbegotten' means that which is not from another, which he makes clear when he says 'or two who are not from another.' But Jerome says 'unbegotten' means 'not born,' which is proved from the universal division of things that he sets forth. Everything, he says, that exists is either unbegotten, or made, or begotten. And in pursuing this discussion, he explains that what he had called 'unbegotten' means 'not born,' adding the example of the Holy Spirit.
Distinction XIV: On the Twofold Procession of the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit Himself Is Given to Us
The Holy Spirit proceeds both from eternity in common from the Father and the Son, and in time, likewise in common from both, for the sanctification of creatures. When, I say, He is poured into the souls of human beings and flows into their senses to sanctify them, as the Apostle says: The love of God has been poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us (Romans 5). For the Holy Spirit Himself, the third person in the Trinity, is given to us, as Augustine testifies: For we ought not to doubt, he says, that the same Holy Spirit was given when Jesus breathed upon His disciples, of whom He immediately said: Go, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit (John 21). And below concerning the same: How then is He not God, who gives the Holy Spirit? Indeed, how great is the God who gives God? Who, although He is inaccessible by nature, is nevertheless receivable by us on account of His goodness, filling all things with His power; but He is participated in only by the just. And below: Angels were sent to a few; but the Holy Spirit was poured out upon peoples. Who then would doubt that what is poured out simultaneously upon many and is not seen is divine? Augustine also says: Great is the mercy of Him who gives a gift equal to Himself, because His gift is the Holy Spirit.
By these and many other authorities, therefore, it is plainly shown that the Holy Spirit Himself is given to us, not only His gifts; which some, misled by the authority of Bede, refuse to believe. For he says: When the grace of the Holy Spirit is given to human beings, the Holy Spirit is indeed sent and proceeds from the Father and the Son, because His mission is His very procession. Furthermore, to this we say that either one ought not to raise an objection against such great authorities, or what he says is to be understood in a different sense. The Holy Spirit is therefore sent and given to us, yet He is not for that reason to be considered lesser, because the Father and the Son send Him.
Whether the Holy Spirit Is Given by Human Beings
Furthermore, it must be known that the Holy Spirit is not given by human beings, because since His giving has been said above to be His procession, if the Holy Spirit were given by human beings, then the Creator would proceed or be sent by a creature, which is absurd. Whence Augustine: None of the disciples of Christ gave the Holy Spirit; for they prayed that He would come upon those on whom they laid hands, they themselves did not give Him. Which custom the Church still observes in its bishops even now. And elsewhere: We can indeed receive this gift according to our measure, but to pour it out upon others we certainly cannot do, but that this may happen, we invoke God who effects it upon them.
But against this is objected what the Apostle says of himself to the Galatians: He who bestows the Spirit and works miracles among you (Galatians 3). But this must be understood as something the Apostle said not by authority of power, but by the ministry of preaching. For while he was preaching to them, they had visibly received the Holy Spirit. For the faith was preached to them by the Apostle, and in that preaching they perceived that the Holy Spirit had come. For indeed, in the newness of the invitation to faith, the presence of the Holy Spirit appeared even through perceptible miracles.
Distinction XV: That the Holy Spirit Is Given by Himself
The Holy Spirit also gives Himself. For since the giving of the Holy Spirit is an operation of God, and the operation of the three persons is common and undivided, the Holy Spirit is given not only by the Father and the Son, but also by Himself. Concerning which Augustine says: The Holy Spirit is so given as a gift of God, that He also gives Himself as God. Nor can it be said that He is not of His own power, of whom it is said, the Spirit breathes where He wills. And through this it is established that the Holy Spirit is given by Himself.
On the Mission of the Son Also from Himself
Here it must be considered that although there are three persons in the Trinity, the Father alone is nowhere read to have been sent, but only the Son and the Holy Spirit. Now the Son was sent by the Father, as the Apostle says: God sent His Son, made of a woman (Galatians 4), where he sufficiently shows that the Son was sent by the very fact that He was made of a woman. And He was sent by the Holy Spirit, as Isaiah says: The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because the Lord has anointed me, he has sent me to bring good tidings to the poor, to proclaim release to the captives (Isaiah 61). And also by Himself. For Isaiah has: A Son is given to us (Isaiah 9): for since it was not defined by the prophet by whom He was given, the Son is shown to have been given by the grace of the Trinity. Whence also the Son Himself gave Himself, as Augustine says: Since the will of the Father and the Son is one, and the operation inseparable, therefore the Son was sent by the Father and the Son, that same Son, the Holy Spirit not being separated, because it was done by the Father and His Word that He should be sent, that is, that He should appear incarnate to human beings.
But if this is so, why then does He say, I did not come of myself? (John 8). This however was said according to the form of a servant, according to which He did not cause Himself to be sent, that is, He did not effect the incarnation, but rather according to the form of God.
The Son Is Said to Be Sent in Two Ways
Finally, Augustine distinguishes two ways of sending the Son, saying: The Son is not said to be sent by the very fact that He was born of the Father, but either because He appeared to this world, the Word made flesh -- whence He says: I came forth from the Father and have come into the world (John 16) -- or because He is perceived in time by someone's mind. As was said of Wisdom: Send her from your holy heavens, and from the throne of your majesty, that she may be with me and labor with me (Wisdom 9).
The Words of Augustine Are Explained
According to the first mode, He was sent once, both into this world and to be a human being. But according to the other mode, He is sent often: and not into this world, nor to be a human being, but to be with a human being. Which Augustine explains, saying: He is sent in one way to be with a human being, and the wisdom of the Father was sent in another way to be a human being. For she transfers herself into holy souls and establishes friends of God. But when the fullness of time came, she was sent not to be with human beings, as she previously was with the patriarchs and prophets, but so that the Word itself should become flesh, that is, a human being.
Distinction XVI: The Son, Insofar as He Is a Human Being, Is Less than the Father and the Holy Spirit and Himself
Finally, according to the fact that He was made a human being, the Son is less than the Father. For He Himself says: The Father is greater than I (John 14). This the Truth says on account of the form of a servant, according to which He is said to be less even than the Holy Spirit and Himself. Whence Augustine: He did not so take up the form of a servant as to lose the form of God, in which He was equal to the Father. In the form of God, therefore, the Only-begotten of the Father is equal to the Father; but in the form of a servant, He is even less than Himself, that is, the Son of God is equal to the Father according to the form in which He exists, but according to the form which He assumed, He was found to be less not only than the Father, but also than the Holy Spirit, and indeed even less than Himself. And not only this, but He was also made a little lower than the angels.
That the Father Is Greater than the Son, Yet the Son Is Not Less than the Father
Hilary, however, seems to say that even according to the form of God, on account of the authority of generation, the Father is greater than the Son, yet the Son is not less than the Father, in these words: The Father is indeed greater than the Son, by the authority of the one who gives, who grants Him as much being as He Himself has, who imparts to Him the image of unbegottenness by the sacrament of His birth, whom He begets from Himself in His own form. The giver is therefore greater, but the one to whom oneness of being is given is no longer lesser; for He says: I and the Father are one (John 10). See to it, reader, that you diligently note and piously understand the words of Hilary, wherever they may occur.
The Holy Spirit Was Sent in Two Ways: Visibly and Invisibly
The Holy Spirit also is read to have been sent both visibly and invisibly. For He was sent visibly when a certain form of creature was made in time, in which the Holy Spirit might be visibly shown: whether when He descended upon the Lord Himself in the bodily form of a dove, or when on the day of Pentecost there suddenly came a sound from heaven, as though a violent wind were blowing, and there appeared to them tongues divided as of fire, which also settled upon each one of them. This operation visibly expressed and presented to mortal eyes was called the visible mission of the Holy Spirit.
Why the Holy Spirit Is Not Said to Be Less than the Father
But it is asked: if the Son, insofar as He was sent, was made less than the Father, why then is the Holy Spirit not said to be less than the Father, since He too assumed a creature in which He appeared? Because the Spirit assumed a creature in which He appeared in a different way from the Son; for the Son received it through union, but the Spirit did not. For the Holy Spirit did not beatify that dove or that wind or that fire, nor did He join it to Himself in a unity of person for eternity, as the Son of Man was assumed -- in which form the person of the Word of God Himself would be presented, not so that the Word would be in flesh, that is, in a human being, but so that the Word would be flesh, that is, a human being. For 'flesh' is used for 'human being' in the statement: The Word was made flesh (John 1). And therefore it is nowhere written that God the Father is greater than the Holy Spirit, or that the Holy Spirit is less than the Father.
Distinction XVII: On the Invisible Mission of the Holy Spirit
How the Holy Spirit is sent invisibly must now be discussed. But so that this may be conveyed more intelligibly, let us first establish that the Holy Spirit is fraternal love. For Augustine teaches that this is so: Let no one say, 'I do not know what to love'; let him love his brother, and let him love that very love itself. For he knows the love by which he loves more than the brother whom he loves. Behold, he can already know God better than his brother: plainly better known, because more present, because more interior, because more certain. Augustine also proves this same point more openly with the example of John. For John says: Let us love one another, because love is from God; whoever does not love does not know God, because God is love (1 John 4).
This passage declares plainly enough that this very fraternal love, by which we love one another, is not only from God but is also God. When therefore we love our brother from love, we love our brother from God. Therefore fraternal love is God.
That the Holy Spirit Is Simply Called Charity
But lest you think this was said by way of causation, as when it is said, God my hope, you my patience -- Augustine says: It was said to God, you are my patience (Psalm 70), not indeed because God's substance is our patience, but because it comes to us from Him. Whence: From Him is our patience (Psalm 61). But we are not going to say that charity was called God in this sense. For it is not said: God is my charity, or you are my charity. But rather it was said: God is charity (1 John 4:8), just as it is said: God is spirit.
That Charity Is Properly Said to Be God the Holy Spirit, Not the Father nor the Son
Since fraternal love is God, and neither the Father nor the Son, but only the Holy Spirit, who is properly called love or charity: for if among the gifts of God nothing is greater than charity, and there is no greater gift of God than the Holy Spirit, what is more logical than that He Himself is the charity that is God and from God, as was mentioned above? Whoever does not discern this, let him seek understanding from the Lord, not an explanation from us. For we cannot say anything more clearly.
How the Holy Spirit Is Sent, So That God May Be Given to Us
The Holy Spirit is therefore said to be sent and given when He is so in us that He makes us love God and neighbor, through which we abide in God and God in us. Whence Augustine: God the Holy Spirit who proceeds from God, when He has been given to a person, sets that person afire to love God and neighbor. For He Himself is the love through which God the charity is poured into our hearts, through which the whole Trinity dwells in us. For this reason most rightly the Holy Spirit, since He is God, is also called the gift of God. And what is this gift properly to be understood as, if not charity?
But to what we are saying the following objection is raised: Charity is given to one who does not have it. If therefore the Holy Spirit is charity, He is also given to one who does not have Him. But how is He given to one who does not have Him, since He, as God, is everywhere? Surely He is everywhere, and wholly in every creature. Yet there are many who do not have Him; for not all have the Holy Spirit, even those in whom He is. Otherwise even brute animals would have the Holy Spirit, which the piety of faith does not admit.
Whether Charity Is Increased and Diminished
Likewise, charity is increased and diminished, and is thus mutable, which is absurdly said. To which we respond by saying that this should not be simply conceded, but with this qualification, namely 'in us' or 'to us,' in whom certainly charity, or the Holy Spirit, is increased or diminished -- just as God in us cannot indeed be exalted in Himself. Whence: A person shall approach a deep heart and God shall be exalted (Psalm 63). Where Cassiodorus says that God does not grow in Himself, but in the heart of a person. Moreover, to speak more truly, it is not charity that is increased in us, but we who are increased in charity. Whence Augustine: Let each person prove how much charity has advanced in him, or rather how much he himself has advanced in charity. For if charity is God, it neither advances nor diminishes.
Whether Fraternal Charity Is God
Indeed some, while conceding that God is charity, deny that fraternal charity is God, misusing the writings of the Fathers, by which they erroneously maintain that there is one charity by which God loves us and another by which we love Him. For they say Augustine has: The charity of God is said to be poured into our hearts, not the charity by which He Himself loves us, but that by which He makes us His lovers; just as the Lord's salvation is spoken of, by which He saves; and the faith of Christ, by which He makes us faithful. To whom it must be said that Augustine did not mean by these words that God's charity is one thing and another, but since it is one and the same, he was pointing out the diverse reasons for which God's charity is spoken of in Scripture. For the charity of God is spoken of either because by it God loves us, or because by it He makes us lovers of Himself. The meaning of the aforesaid words is therefore: Charity there, that is, in the Apostle, is called the charity of God (Romans 5), not according to the sense that God loves us by it, but according to the sense that by it He makes us lovers of Himself. And so that this could be said in such a sense, he showed it through a similar manner of speaking: as the Lord's salvation, by which He saves us, etc.
Whether There Is One Charity and Another
Likewise, they say, Augustine has elsewhere: When John had recalled the love of God, not that by which we love Him, but that by which He, John says, loved us. Wishing through this to assert that there is one love and another. But we, reducing these words also to the meaning set forth above, say that they are to be understood thus: As though John recalled the love of God, not according to the sense that by it we love God, but according to the sense that by it He loves us.
It Is Proved by Reason that the Holy Spirit Is Not Charity
Furthermore, still contradicting the truth, they say: If the Holy Spirit is charity, then He is a movement of the soul and an affection, since charity is this. For Augustine says: I call charity a movement of the soul toward the enjoyment of God and of oneself and one's neighbor, for the sake of God Himself. Likewise where it is said: Nothing will be able to separate us from the charity of God (Romans 8), the charity of God, he says, is here called the virtue that is the most upright affection of our soul. To which we say that this is said not by the property of essence, but by the reason of efficiency. For just as it is said: God is our hope and patience, not because He is those things, but because He makes them, so also charity is said to be a movement or affection of the soul, because through it the soul is moved and disposed to love God. Wherefore, having repelled the cold and feeble calumny of the enemies of truth, we freely confess that charity is the Holy Spirit. Let them be angry that He is God and the gift of God, through which many gifts proper to each are distributed to individuals.
Distinction XVIII: Whether the Holy Spirit Is Called Gift and Given for the Same Reason
He who is also called gift or given, but for different reasons. For He is called gift because He proceeds; but given because He has been bestowed. Whence Augustine: The Holy Spirit is the gift of the Father and the Son, because He proceeds from both. The Holy Spirit always proceeds and not in time. But because He so proceeded as to be giveable, He was already a gift before there was anyone to whom He could be given. For gift is understood in one way, given in another. For a gift can exist even before it is given. But something given, unless it has been bestowed, can in no way be called so. Eternally therefore the Spirit is a gift, but temporally given.
Insofar as He Is a Gift, and Insofar as He Is Given. How the Holy Spirit Is Ours
Accordingly, insofar as the Holy Spirit is a gift, He is referred to the Father and the Son. But insofar as He is given or bestowed, He is referred both to the one who gave and to those to whom He is given. Whence Augustine: What has been given is referred both to the one who gave it and to those to whom he gave it; thus the Holy Spirit is said to be not only of the Father and the Son who gave Him, but also ours, who have received Him. As it is written of John, that he came in the Spirit of Elijah (Luke 1). To Moses also the Lord said: I will take of your Spirit and give to them (Numbers 11) -- speaking of the Holy Spirit, whom He had already given to him.
How the Son Is Said to Be Ours. Whether the Holy Spirit Is Called Our Gift
But it is asked whether the Son, since He has been given to us, can be called ours? To which we say that He is called our God, our redeemer, and the like, but not our Son. For since the Son is said relatively only in relation to the one who begat Him, He is called the Son of the Father only, not our Son. Nor is the Holy Spirit called our Holy Spirit, or our gift. Since each is said by an eternal relation only in reference to the Father and the Son. Hence it is that nowhere in Scripture does it occur that one says, our Holy Spirit, or your, or his. For Augustine says: What is born of the Father is referred to the Father alone, when it is called Son. And therefore He is the Son of the Father, not ours. Yet we say give us our bread, just as our Spirit. For the Son is our bread, because He also nourishes us. And the Holy Spirit is our Spirit, because He is breathed from the Father and the Son, and breathes in us as He wills.
Comparison of the Son and the Holy Spirit
Finally, it must be known that just as the Son has by being born that he exists at all, so also the Spirit by proceeding. Whence Augustine: The Son does not have by being born only that He is the Son, but that He exists at all. Just as generation from the Father gives essence to the Son, so procession from both gives it to the Holy Spirit. We do not say, however, that the Son is essence by nativity, as the Holy Spirit by procession, since it is said elsewhere that neither is the Father the Father by that by which he is God, nor is the Son the Son by that by which he is God, nor is the Holy Spirit the gift by that by which he is God.
Distinction XIX: On the Equality of the Three Persons
For by these names their relations are shown, not their essence. But because just as the Son, by being born, received from the Father all that He eternally is, so also the Spirit, by proceeding, received from both.
After the treatment of the coeternity of the three persons, it remains to speak of their equality. For the Catholic faith asserts the three persons to be coequal, just as coeternal. In what this equality is to be noted, Augustine teaches, saying: None of them either precedes another in eternity, or exceeds another in magnitude, or surpasses another in power. These three, although they are enumerated as though diverse, are nevertheless the same in God, namely the divine essence. Whence Augustine: He is not great by one thing and God by another. For His greatness is the same as His essence. Likewise: The will and power of God is God Himself. Likewise: The eternity of God is His very substance, having nothing mutable. In these three words, therefore, Augustine briefly encompassed the equality of the three persons.
That One Person Is Not Greater Than Another
Just as no one of the three persons precedes another in eternity, as was said, so neither does one exceed another in magnitude, concerning which this must be said: The Father is not greater than the Son, nor greater than the Holy Spirit. Nor is anything greater in two or three persons together than in one; nor is there a greater essence in two or three than in one, because the whole is in each. Whence John Damascene: We confess that the whole nature of the divinity is perfectly in each of its hypostases, that is, persons. And therefore the Father is perfect God, the Son is perfect God, the Holy Spirit is perfect God. Whence Augustine: On account of the natural unity, the whole Father is in the Son and in the Holy Spirit; the whole Holy Spirit also is in each. Hence it is also that the Father is said to be in the Son, and the Son in the Father, and the Holy Spirit in each.
Hilary suggests this more clearly, saying: The Lord's saying causes obscurity for many when He says: I am in the Father, and the Father is in me (John 14). Truly it must be understood that the Father is in the Son and the Son in the Father: the fullness of divinity is perfect in each. For the Son received all things from the Father. For if each received a part of the same one who begat, neither is perfect, for that from which something departed would be lacking. Nor will there be fullness in one who consists of a portion. Since this is absurd, let us confess the same in each: both the likeness of power and the fullness of divinity. Because the Truth says: I am in the Father, and the Father is in me (John 14). And in this sense therefore the Holy Spirit is understood to be in each, and each of the persons in each, because the same fullness of divinity and likeness of nature is proved to be in each of the persons.
Distinction XX: That One Person Does Not Surpass Another in Power
Similarly, the Father is not more powerful than the Son or the Holy Spirit; nor are two or three together more powerful than each individually. That the Father is not more powerful than the Son, Augustine proves against Maximinus, who said the Father was more powerful than the Son. All things, says the Son, that the Father has are mine (John 16). And the Father has omnipotence: therefore it belongs to the Son, and so the Son is equal to the Father. But if this is denied, Augustine proves it against the same man, who falsely said the Son was less than the Father. You say, he says, that the Father begot a Son less than Himself, in which you also derogate from the Father. For if He begot His only Son as less, either He could not or He did not wish to beget an equal. If you say He could not, He is found to be weak; if He did not wish to, He is found to be envious -- and no one would dare to say either: therefore the Son is truly equal to the Father. Nor is it relevant if you happen to say that the Father is more powerful and greater than the Son because the Father received power from no one, nor was begotten, while the Son has both from the Father. For the question of origin is who is from whom; but the question of equality is of what kind or how great one is. Therefore it is not according to the fact that the Father begat and the Son was begotten and the Holy Spirit proceeds from both that equality or inequality exists there; rather the order of nature is demonstrated. Finally, a brief summary in confirmation of the above, let us add this: nothing else there is magnitude or power other than truth. If therefore no one there is more true than another, then by clear reasoning neither is one greater nor more powerful.
Distinction XXI: On the Difference of Names by Which We Speak of God
Let us now take up the names by which we speak of God. Of these, some belong to God eternally, others temporally. Of those that belong eternally, some express a property of the divinity and can be called personal, such as generation, Son, Word. Others are those that show the unity of the divine majesty, such as wisdom, power, truth, and the like. There are also others that are said of God metaphorically through likeness, such as splendor, mirror, and the like. But of those said of God temporally, some are said relatively and of all the persons, such as Lord and Creator; certain ones are not said of all, such as bestowed, given, sent. Others are said temporally, not relatively and not of all, such as incarnate, made human, and similar terms. There is moreover a certain special rational name, neither personal nor essential, but as it were collective of all the persons, which is said of none individually, but of all together, such as Trinity.
Distinction XXII: In How Many Ways Names Are Said of God
Since there are so many differences among the aforesaid names, it must be held that all those that signify the unity of essence are said in reference to itself and substantially, and of individual persons separately, and are taken in the singular not the plural in their totality. Whence Augustine: Whatever God is said to be in reference to Himself is said similarly of each person, and at the same time of the Trinity itself, not in the plural but in the singular. As the Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God, yet we say this Trinity is not three Gods but one. Which can be said of similar names and also of those that are said temporally and relatively of all the persons. But those that properly pertain to individual persons are sometimes said relatively, never however substantially. Whence what is properly said of an individual person in the Trinity is in no way said in reference to itself, but in reference to another person reciprocally or to a creature. And therefore it is manifest that these are said relatively, not substantially, such as Father and Son and Holy Spirit.
Distinction XXIII: On the Substantial Divine Names in Particular
This name too, which is 'person,' is said in reference to itself and according to substance. Whence Augustine says: To be God is not one thing and to be a person another, but altogether the same. Likewise, the Father is called a person in reference to Himself, not in relation to the Son or the Holy Spirit, just as He is called God, and great, and good in reference to Himself. And just as for Him to be is the same as to be God, as to be great, as to be good, so for Him to be is the same as to be a person. But if this is so, why do we say these three -- Father, Son, and Holy Spirit -- are three persons and not one person, when we say not three Gods but one?
Augustine says: Because we wish, he says, to preserve at least one word for this signification by which the Trinity is understood, so that we may not be entirely silent when asked what the three are. For we confess there are three, since it is written: There are three who give testimony in heaven (1 John 5). Indeed, when it is asked, three what? Human speech labors under a truly great poverty. For no name occurs by which we might properly embrace these three. And therefore pious faith assigned this word, borrowed from other things, to this article of belief, through which it might satisfy whatever understanding, provided it be pious, of what one holds about God in the secret chamber of the mind, and might somehow express, to one who asks, by means of 'three.' For it is said that there are three persons, not so that what is sought might be thereby expressed, but so that one may not be entirely silent. Because the supereminence of the divinity exceeds the capacity of ordinary speech. For God is more truly thought than spoken, and more truly is than is thought.
Therefore by the aforesaid necessity, this name is excepted from the aforementioned rule of names that are said of God according to substance. Because although it is said in reference to itself and substantially, it is not taken in the singular but in the plural in its totality. For we confess not one, but three persons. The Greeks too, constrained by the same poverty of speech, say three hypostases and one ousia, that is, three substances and one essence. And let no one be troubled that they say three substances while we say one, as though we understand the word 'substance' differently from them.
In the Trinity There Is No Multiplicity or Singularity
Although there are three persons, as has been said, there is nevertheless absolutely no diversity or singularity there, but unity and Trinity. Whence Augustine: Human poverty, seeking what to call the three, said three persons or substances. By which names he did not wish diversity to be understood, but he did not wish singularity, so that not only unity would be understood there, from the fact that one essence is spoken of, but also Trinity from the fact that three persons are spoken of. Likewise Ambrose: The equality is neither diverse nor singular, neither separating the Father and Son after the manner of the Arians, nor confusing the Father and Son after the manner of the Sabellians. For the Father and the Son have distinction, but do not have separation. Hence if anywhere it occurs that three are said to be diverse persons, 'diverse' there is to be understood as 'distinct.' Similarly neither is there triplicity nor multiplicity in God. And therefore he is not to be called triple or multiple, but triune and simple. Hence Augustine: God is not to be thought triple just because he is a Trinity. Ambrose: Nor confused, which is one; nor can that be multiple which is undifferentiated. God is therefore not multiple, but simple and one; of whom no one of the three persons is a part, because each of them is true and perfect God. Whence Augustine: In the Trinity the Father is God, and the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God, and together these three are one God, nor are all of them something greater than each individually, because the magnitude is spiritual, not corporeal. He who can grasp this, let him grasp it (Matt. 19); but he who cannot, let him believe and pray, that what he believes, he may understand. For it is true what is said through the prophet: Unless you believe, you shall not understand (Isa. 7).
How the Three Persons Are Said to Be One God or of One Essence
It should further be known that the three persons are one God, or of the same essence, not according to a material cause, as three statues are one gold; nor according to a likeness of composition, as three men are said to be of the same nature. For in statues, there is more gold in three together than in each one. But in the three persons the essence is not greater than in each one. Likewise in three men there is not only one man, but two and three men, whereas in the Trinity there is only one God. Finally, nor is it according to a predicamental account, that is, such that the essence be understood as the genus and the three persons as species; or that the one essence be the species and the three persons be thought of as individuals. For if we discuss these matters according to genus, species, and individual, then three essences would be said just as three persons are said, just as Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are three individuals, so also they are called three men and three animals.
However, what John Damascene says seems to contradict this. He says: Substance signifies a common species that is inclusive of like hypostases, that is, of persons similar in species, for example, God, man. But hypostasis designates the individual, namely the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit, Peter, Paul, and the like. John should rightly be understood to have said this not according to the existence of a property, but on account of a similarity of predication. For just as what is common is said of many, and the individual is said of one alone, so too the divine essence is said of all the persons. But each of them is predicated not of another, but only of itself.
How the Persons Differ in Number
The same John also added something that should not be passed over in silence. For he says that the hypostases are said to differ in number, not in nature. To understand this correctly, note that one kind of number is that by which one counts, namely an accidental property; another kind is that which is counted, namely the countable things themselves. The hypostases therefore differ in number, that is, they are distinguished from one another so as to be countable, so that you can reckon thus: the Father is one; the Father and the Son are two; the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are three. But they do not differ by number as an accidental property, as if there were one unity in one person and another in another, since the same unity is in all of them inestimably, namely the divine essence.
Distinction XXIV: What Is Signified by a Numerical Name in Divine Matters
Here therefore it must be known that to those who diligently examine the authorities of the saints, it is clear that the use of numerical terms, such as one, two, three, and the like, was introduced not for the purpose of positing anything, but rather for removing from the simplicity of the Godhead what is not there.
What Is Signified by 'One' When We Speak of God
For when one God is said, the multitude of gods is excluded by 'one,' and no quantity of number is posited in the Divinity, as if to say: God exists, and there are not many gods. Whence Ambrose: When we say God is only one, the unity excludes a number of gods, and does not posit a quantity in God, because neither quantity nor number is there. Similarly when it is said the Father is one, the Son is one, the meaning of this statement is that there is a Father and a Son, but not many fathers or sons. So likewise for similar cases.
What Is Signified by 'Several'
Likewise when we say there are several persons, we exclude singularity and solitude, and do not posit diversity or multiplicity there -- as if we were to say: we confess persons without solitude, diversity, or singularity. Whence Hilary: God said: Let us make man in our image and likeness. I ask now whether you think God spoke to Himself alone, or whether you understand this speech of His to have been addressed to another? If you say He was alone, you are refuted by His own voice saying: Let us make, and our. Therefore by the profession of plurality, He did not posit diversity or multitude, but denied solitude and singularity. So also when we say three persons, by the name of the ternary we do not posit diversity, but signify that our understanding is to be referred to none other than the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, so that singularity is shown not to be there. The meaning is: the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are three persons, that is, not only this person or that, or only this one and that one, but this and that and that other are in the Godhead, and no others. That this is how it should be understood, Augustine sufficiently shows where he says: By which names He did not wish diversity to be understood, but He did not wish singularity.
What Is Signified by 'Two'
Similarly also when it is said that the Father and the Son are two, the meaning is that there is not only the Father or the Son, but both the Father and the Son, and this one is not that one.
What Is Signified by 'Distinct' and 'Discrete'
But when we say the persons are distinct or discrete, we exclude the Sabellian confusion and signify that this one is not that one. So also when it is said that the person of the Father is one, the person of the Son another: by 'another,' we show not separation but the distinction of each one's property. For Ambrose says: The Father and the Son have distinction; they do not have separation.
What Is Signified by This Name 'Trinity'
The name 'Trinity' seems to signify the same thing as this expression, 'three persons.' Just as therefore no one of the persons is three persons, so also no one of them is the Trinity.
Distinction XXV: What Is Signified
Furthermore, let us consider, since this name 'person' is said according to substance, whether when said in the plural it signifies the same thing. Some, holding this opinion, try to prove it thus: when it is asked, they say, 'what three?' or 'what three things?' the fitting response is 'three persons.' But by 'what,' one asks about essence. If therefore we respond correctly to this question, we must signify essence by responding with the name 'person.'
They add: Augustine also says that three persons are so called because what it is to be a person is common to them. And nothing is common to them except essence. But if this is so, how will it be said that the person of the Father is other than the person of the Son, as though the essence were other? They say this must be understood as follows: the Father is one, the Son is another, yet they have in common that which is person. They confirm this by the authority of Augustine, who says: We say three persons of the same essence, or the same essence; not from the same essence, as though one thing there were essence and another were person. And so they judge that three persons agree entirely in being a person.
But if this is so, how will it be consistent with what Augustine says in On the Faith to Peter: The Father is one in person, or personally; the Son is another personally, the Holy Spirit is another personally? Therefore let us seek another meaning, in accord with the authority of the saints.
It must be known, therefore, that when it is asked 'which three?' or 'what three?' the question is not about essence, nor does 'what' there refer to essence. Indeed, since the Christian faith confesses there to be three, because it is written: There are three who give testimony in heaven (1 John 5), it is asked what those three are, that is, by what name one might declare those three. By this question, therefore, faith, constrained by poverty of speech, said 'three persons' -- not, I say, understanding essence by this name, but subsistences, or hypostases, according to the Greeks.
Finally, these three can all the more be called three persons, that is, subsistences, because what person is -- that is, essence -- is common to them. For they would not be called three true subsistences unless each one were true essence.
What Is the Meaning of: The Person of the Father Is Other Than That of the Son
It must be known that the sense in which it is said 'the person of the Father is other than that of the Son' is understood as easily as it is correctly: that is, one subsistence or hypostasis is the Father's, another the Son's; or one person is the Father, another the Son, that is, one subsistence or hypostasis is the Father, another the Son. Understand the same of the Holy Spirit. But what Augustine said, 'The Father is one in person or personally; the Son is another personally,' -- although it can be said in the same sense, we think it more fitting that by the name 'person' there the personal property is understood, so that the meaning is: the Father is one in person or personally, that is, the Father by His own property is other than the Son.
The Threefold Signification of the Name 'Person'
Thus the signification of this name 'person' in the Trinity is threefold. For sometimes it signifies essence, sometimes property, and sometimes hypostasis. That it signifies essence is clearly established above from the words of Augustine. That it signifies property, Jerome says: We confess not only names but also the properties of names, that is, persons, or, as the Greeks express it, hypostases, that is, subsistences. That it signifies hypostasis, John Damascene says: In the Divinity we confess one nature and three hypostases, that is, persons, truly existing.
Distinction XXVI: On the Properties of the Persons
Furthermore, it must be noted that heretics used this name 'hypostasis' to ensnare the simple, because it was sometimes said in place of both person and essence. Therefore, as Jerome warns, since it is of dubious repute, one must either remain silent against the heretics or speak with its proper interpretations.
On the Properties of the Persons: Why They Are Called Properties, Notions, and Relations
Now let us consider the properties of the persons, which are also often called notions or relations. And first let us treat of those which are generation, nativity, and procession. These are also called properties because according to them the proper characteristics of the persons are assigned. Whence Augustine: It is proper to the Father that He begot one Son. Proper to the Son, that He was born from the essence of the Father. Proper also to the Holy Spirit, that He proceeds from the Father and the Son. They are also called notions because through them the persons are known, that is, distinguished from one another. They are also called relations because by them the persons are referred to one another.
These indeed are not accidental to God, but exist in the persons themselves from eternity immutably. Whence Augustine: Nothing is said of God according to accident, yet not everything that is said is said of God according to substance. For something is said in relation to another, as Father to Son and Son to Father; which is not an accident, because He is always Father and He is always Son. And because the Father is not called Father except from the fact that He has a Son. And the Son is not called Son except from the fact that He has a Father; these things are not said according to substance, but in relation to one another. Finally, Hilary, assigning the proper characteristics of the Father and the Son, says: If it is always proper to the Father that He is always Father, it is necessary that it be always proper to the Son that He is always Son; likewise: It is manifest that it is proper to God the begotten that He is Son.
Distinction XXVII: Whether Augustine and Hilary Assign the Same Properties
But it is asked whether Hilary and Augustine expressed the same properties. If this is conceded, then for the Father to be Father is the same as to have begotten the Son. But if this is so, whatever the one applies to, so does the other. But the divine nature is the Father; therefore it begot the Son -- which is not rightly said. Responding to this question without prejudice to a sounder interpretation, we say that where Hilary said it is proper to the Father that He is always Father, it must be understood so that this name 'Father' there signifies the hypostasis with a determination of relation, so that the meaning is: It is proper to the Father that He is always Father, that is, that He always begot. Which meaning he himself also declares when he adds: Therefore he who is not always Father did not always beget. But when 'Father' is said of the divine nature, it posits the hypostasis without a determination of relation; or, to speak more plainly, it is not said relatively, so that the meaning is: The divine nature is the Father, that is, the hypostasis which is the Father. Understand the same of the name 'Son' and 'Holy Spirit.'
The Diversity of Names in Divine Matters
Among terms, some signify hypostases with relations, such as begetting, born, proceeding, and the like. Others signify relations only, such as generation, nativity, procession, and the like. And all of these are said both of persons and of the nature. Others are those which signify determinations only, such as to beget, to be born, and to proceed, and similar terms, which are said only of persons but never of the divine nature. For properties determine only persons, not the nature. Whence John Damascene: The hypostases do not differ from one another according to substance, but according to characteristic properties, that is, determinative properties. The characteristic, that is, determinative features belong to the hypostases, not to the nature. And through this it seems that it is not entirely the same thing to say that something is the Father and that it begot the Son; or that something is the Son and that it has a Father; or that it is the Holy Spirit and that it proceeds from both.
How Man Is the Son of the Trinity
Clearly, what Hilary said, that it is proper to God born of God that He is the Son, seems to be contradicted by the fact that men too are and are called sons of God, according to the verse: You are all sons of the Most High (Psalm 82). And: Israel is my firstborn son (Exodus 4). But men are sons of God by creation; the Only-Begotten, however, by the property of being born. Whence the same Hilary: We indeed are sons of God, but by creation, because by grace we were made, not born; acquired, not generated. For man is a Son of God by adoption, not by generation.
How the Trinity Is the Father of Man
It must be known that the whole Trinity is also called the Father of man. Whence Augustine: The Trinity cannot be called Father except perhaps figuratively in relation to the creature, on account of the adoption of sons; for He whom we rightly call the one Lord our God, we shall also rightly call our Father on account of His grace regenerating us. For it is established that the only-begotten is the Son of God, but properly and by nature. Men also are, but by grace. So also, although there are many gifts of God, the Holy Spirit is properly called the gift of God, because He is so called by an eternal property or relation, which manifestly appears in this name 'gift.' Whence Augustine: The Holy Spirit, who is not the Trinity but is in the Trinity, is understood in that which is properly called Holy Spirit; but He is said relatively when He is referred to the Father and Son; yet the relation itself does not appear in this name. It appears, however, when He is called the gift of God. Nor should it trouble anyone that these names do not reciprocally correspond to the Father and Son; for in many relative terms it happens that no word is found by which they might correspond to each other reciprocally. When, therefore, we say the gift of the Father and Son, we do not say 'the Father of the gift' or 'the Son of the gift'; but, so that these might correspond reciprocally, we say the gift of the giver and the giver of the gift; yet God was not a giver except in time, although the Holy Spirit is a gift from eternity.
On the Names 'Word' and 'Image'
Furthermore, there are other names which are said relatively to the Father, by the same notion as 'Son,' such as 'Word' and 'image.' Whence Augustine: He is called Son by the same reason He is called Word, and Word by the same reason He is called Son. The same: Son is said relatively, and relatively also are said Word and image. And in all these terms He is referred to the Father; but none of these is the Father called.
Whether These Names God, Light, Etc., Are Said According to Substance
Finally, names of essence, such as God, light, and the like, are never said relatively. Sometimes, however, they are taken for relatives, that is, for persons, as when it is said God from God, light from light. For we use one for the Father and the other for the Son.
Distinction XXVIII: On the Name 'Image'
Sometimes, however, 'image' signifies essence, as in: Let us make man in our image and likeness (Gen. 1). Whence Hilary: Man was made according to the common image. And Augustine: There is one image of the Trinity, according to which man was made. It must also be noted that to be the Father and to be the Son are diverse only by relation. Whence, although it is diverse to be Father and to be Son, the substance is nevertheless not diverse, because this is not said according to substance, but according to the relative.
On the Name 'Unbegotten'
It is moreover necessary to know that the Father is called unbegotten by a different property than that by which He is called begetter. Whence, since both are said of God the Father, one notion is that by which He is understood as begetter, another that by which He is understood as unbegotten. This latter is unbegottenness. Whence Hilary: There is one from one, that is, the begotten from the unbegotten, by the property in each of both origin and unbegottenness. But according to this notion, He is referred to the non-begetter. Whence Augustine: Just as Son is referred to Father, and not-Son to not-Father, so begotten is referred to begetter, and not-begotten must be referred to non-begetter. For what is 'unbegotten' but 'not begotten'?
Distinction XXIX: On the Name 'Principle'
What It Is to Be a Principle in Relation to Creatures
There is yet another name, namely 'principle,' which is always said relatively, yet in multiple ways. For the Father is called principle, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, but differently. For the Father is principle in relation to the Son, because the Son is begotten by Him, and in relation to the Holy Spirit, because the Spirit proceeds from Him. Whence Augustine: The Father is the principle of the whole divinity, that is, of the Son and the Holy Spirit, in each of whom the whole divinity resides. The Son, however, is the principle of the Holy Spirit, because the Spirit proceeds from Him. But the Holy Spirit is principle only in relation to creatures. Finally, the Father is principle without a principle; the Son is principle from a principle; and the Holy Spirit is principle from both.
But the Father is from eternity the principle of the Son; and the Father and the Son are the principle of the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit, however, is not a principle from eternity but in time. For since He is principle only of creatures, when creatures began to exist, He also began to be their principle. So also the whole Trinity began to be principle in relation to creatures. But to be principle in relation to creatures is to be Creator. Whence Augustine: When it was said to Him, Who are you? He answered: The Principle, who also speaks to you (John 8). In which He wished to show Himself as Creator.
The Trinity Is One Principle, Not Three
These three, however, are not three principles, but one, because they work in things in one and the same manner so that they exist. Understanding this, the Apostle says: From Him, and through Him, and in Him are all things (Rom. 11). By saying 'all things,' understand natures and things that exist naturally, not sins which vitiate nature and arise from the will of sinners.
The Father is called principle in relation to the Son because He is the begetter. For if the one who begets is the principle of that which is begotten, the Father is the principle in relation to the Son because He begot Him. In the same way also the Father is called the author of the Son. Whence Hilary: By the very fact that He is called Father, He is shown to be the author of the one whom He begot, having a name by which it is understood that He is not perfected from another, and from which it is taught that the one who was begotten derived His existence.
The Father and the Son Are One Principle of the Holy Spirit
It must also be acknowledged that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit, not two. For just as the Father and the Son in relation to the creature are called one Creator and one Lord, so relatively to the Holy Spirit they are one principle. And the two are called principle in relation to the Holy Spirit because the Holy Spirit proceeds from both. Nor does He proceed from the Father differently than from the Son. It can rightly be understood that the Father and the Son are called principle of the Holy Spirit by the same eternal relation, for which relation we have no name.
Distinction XXX: On Those Things Which Are Properly Said of God Temporally
There are also certain names which belong to God in time and are said of God relatively, such as creator, lord, refuge, and the like. Whence Augustine: Creator is said relatively to creature, as lord to servant; this relative appellation therefore belongs to God from time. Otherwise we would be compelled to call the creature eternal, because He would not eternally be lord unless the creature also eternally served. Just as there cannot be a servant without a lord, so there cannot be a lord without a servant. These things, however, are said of God according to accident, which exists not in Him but only in the creature. And therefore God is called these things without any change in Himself, as is evident in a lesser example.
For a coin, when it is called a price, is said relatively, yet it has not changed when it began to be a price, nor when it is called a pledge, and the like. If therefore in these smallest things matters are thus, much more should it be believed of that immutable substance of God that something is said of it in time, yet nothing in it is changed. The appellation, therefore, by which the creature is referred to the Creator posits a relation in the creature itself. But that by which the Creator is referred to the creature is a relative appellation only, denoting no property in God.
The Holy Spirit Is Said to Be 'Given' Relatively in Time
Thus the Holy Spirit is said to be given, or bestowed, relatively in time.
Whether the Holy Spirit Is Said Relatively to Himself
But if it is asked whether the Holy Spirit is said relatively to Himself, because Augustine says that what is given is referred to the one who gives and to the one to whom it is given, and the Holy Spirit gives Himself -- we respond that the Holy Spirit is not referred to Himself, because the one who gives is the Trinity, and the one to whom it is given is the creature.
Or we say there is no absurdity if He is said to be referred to Himself in this case, because the appellation of 'given' or 'bestowed,' as regards the giver, denotes no property, but only as regards the recipient. For if it denoted a property as regards the giver, then He could not be referred to Himself. For thus He would be said to be diverse from Himself. Which would not be caused by the appellation alone, but by the property.
Distinction XXXI: On the Signification of the Relatives 'Similar' and 'Equal'
In the Trinity, moreover, 'equal' and 'similar' are said relatively, since, as Hilary says: Just as nothing is similar to itself, so nothing is said to be equal to itself. But it is not said according to relation but according to substance. Whence Augustine: It is not according to the fact that He is said in relation to the Father that the Son is equal to the Father. It remains, therefore, that He is equal according to what is said of Him in reference to Himself, that is, according to substance. Therefore in these terms the appellation alone is relative; but equality and similarity, in the three persons, is the supreme and undifferentiated simplicity of the divine substance.
Another Explanation of 'Equal' and 'Similar'
Some, moreover, say that by these names nothing is posited but rather removed, so that the Son is said to be equal to the Father as if He is neither greater nor less than He. And likewise similar, as if in nothing diverse or dissimilar, which is manifestly said with sufficient faithfulness.
How Hilary Shows the Properties of the Persons in the Trinity
It must not be passed over that Hilary, intimating the properties of the persons, says: Eternity is in the Father, beauty in the Image, use in the Gift. In the word 'eternity,' however, Augustine thinks he should not be followed, except insofar as the Father has no Father from whom He exists. he named 'beauty' in the Image, I believe on account of loveliness, where there is the first equality and such congruence that it corresponds to the identity of the one whose image it is. The delight, or ineffable beatitude, of the Father and the Image (if indeed it can be worthily expressed in human speech) is what he briefly called 'use.' 'Gift' is the same as 'offering.' The Gift is the Holy Spirit. He who sees this in part or through a mirror, let him rejoice in knowing God and give thanks. But he who does not see, let him strive through piety to see, not through blindness to calumniate.
How Augustine Distinguishes the Properties of the Persons
Augustine also, distinguishing the proper characteristics of the persons, says: In the Father there is unity; in the Son equality; in the Holy Spirit the concord of unity and equality. And all three of these are one on account of the Father; all equal on account of the Son; all connected on account of the Holy Spirit. Unity is attributed to the Father according to Augustine, perhaps for the same reason that eternity was attributed to Him above according to Hilary. Or also because the Father is the one principle of the whole Godhead. Who, being one God, gave to the Son born from Him and to the Holy Spirit proceeding from Him to be one and the same God with Him. And thus all things are one on account of the Father.
Equality, however, belongs to the Son because He is the image of the Father. For if an image perfectly fills that of which it is the image, the image is made equal to it, not it to its image. The Son, however, perfectly fills that of which He is the image, whence He is made equal to it. It is also given by the Son to the Holy Spirit that He be equal to the Father there as well. Through this, therefore, both aspects become clear: how these three are equal on account of the Son, not from the Son. We pronounce these things without prejudice to a better understanding, and with reverent fear.
Concord, moreover, is attributed to the Holy Spirit, which is easier to understand. For the Spirit is the ineffable love of the Father and the Son. Whence Augustine: The Spirit is the supreme charity, joining both and subjecting us. Rightly therefore all things are said to be connected on account of Him. Hence it is said that He contains all things in wisdom.
Distinction XXXII: Whether the Father or the Son Loves Through the Holy Spirit
From these considerations, finally, since it was also said above that the Holy Spirit is He by whom the begotten is loved by the begetter and loves His begetter (Wisdom 1), it seems that the Father and Son love by the Holy Spirit. But if the Holy Spirit is said to be, since in the Trinity to be is nothing other than to love -- we say that what is said must be distinguished. 'The Father and Son love by the Holy Spirit,' that is, through the Holy Spirit -- this is rightly said, as Augustine said above, namely that through the Holy Spirit all things are connected. But if it is said 'by the Holy Spirit,' meaning 'from the Holy Spirit' they love, this is falsely said. For thus the authority of principle would be placed in the Holy Spirit.
Or as it is said that the Father is equal to the Son through the Son, not indeed from the Son. Or we also say that 'to love' does not there signify being, just as 'love' in the Trinity does not always signify essence. As Augustine there proves: God is love. For it seems to be said relatively, whereas if it were said absolutely -- the Father or Son loves, or is loving, by the Holy Spirit -- then I think it would be said substantively. Since this never occurs, I think the aforesaid meaning is thereby supported. And if this is so, the question is empty, since it is one thing in the Trinity for the Father to love by the Holy Spirit, and another for the Father to love the Son by the Holy Spirit.
Two Questions: Whether the Father Is Wise by Generated Wisdom
It is asked whether the Father is wise by generated wisdom, which seems to follow from what the Apostle says -- that Christ is the power of God and the wisdom of God, that is, of the Father (1 Cor. 1). If this is so, it is consequently proved that the Father exists by it, because there to exist is the same as to be wise.
Whether the Son Is Wise by Generated Wisdom
Likewise it is asked whether the Son is wise by generated wisdom, which seems to be something that must be conceded. For otherwise He does not appear to be wise by Himself, since He alone is generated wisdom. Yet if this is conceded, the aforesaid difficulty is incurred. To which we say that neither the Father nor the Son is wise by generated wisdom, but by ungenerated wisdom, which is the Father alone. Whence Augustine (154): God the Father is wise by that which He Himself is -- His own wisdom -- and the Son, the wisdom of the Father, is wise from the wisdom which is the Father, from whom He is begotten. The same must also be said concerning the one who understands and understanding itself.
How the Son Is Called the Wisdom and Power of God the Father
Furthermore, the Son is called the wisdom and power of the Father, not because the Father is wise or powerful through Him, but because the Son is wisdom and power from the Father's wisdom and power. But lest we be thought to speak of multiple wisdoms, we confess only one wisdom in the Trinity, which, however, is not said in only one way. For it is called generated or ungenerated wisdom, and the generated is not the ungenerated, yet there is only one wisdom. Just as there is only one God. He is called both generated and ungenerated, and the generated is not the ungenerated. Only one and the same God.
Whether the Son Is Wise by Himself
Likewise it is asked whether the Son is wise by Himself, which we distinguish: if it is said 'by Himself,' that is 'from Himself,' it is falsely said; but it is truly said 'by Himself,' that is 'through Himself.' Just as it is said that the Son acts not from Himself but through Himself. Whence Hilary (155): The unity of the nature you contradict, O heretic, is such that the Son acts through Himself and yet does not act from Himself; and He does not act from Himself in such a way that He acts through Himself. By saying 'He does not act from Himself,' He removes from Him the authority of principle. But by saying 'He acts through Himself,' He confesses the unity of nature in Him.
Distinction XXXIII: Whether the Properties of the Persons Are the Persons Themselves or God
Finally, it must be held faithfully and firmly that the properties, which we have discussed until now, are in the persons, because of what is written: In the persons is property, and in the essence is unity (156). And that they are the persons themselves; otherwise there would be multiplicity in God. We plainly left it proved above by manifest truth that whatever God has from eternity is God, except for relatives. Accordingly, that persons are distinguished by properties and that the properties themselves are the persons, Jerome says openly (157): Declining the heresy of Sabellius, we distinguish three persons expressed under their properties. For we confess not only names, but also the properties of names, that is, persons.
Yet there are some who, with sacrilegious mind and ill-omened voice, do not hesitate to deny this, adding something more blasphemous: namely, that properties are indeed in the persons, but not intrinsically -- rather, attached extrinsically. We do not doubt that this ridiculous notion bursts forth from the madness of their presumption. They attempt to prove what they dream up as follows: If properties, they say, are persons, then persons do not differ by them. Against this we say that persons are also said to differ by themselves. Whence Jerome, speaking of these three, says (158): They are one in substance, but are distinguished by persons and names. The properties themselves are also the divine essence. Whence Hilary says of one of them (159): Nativity cannot fail to be the nature from which the Son is born; yet it is not by divine essence, but by properties alone that the persons differ. This is indeed truly said, but in what manner it is so, it is neither grasped nor held. For the very nature of the reality itself surpasses the capacity of words to signify.
Rivals of the truth also rise up and say: If paternity and filiation are the same reality in the divine essence, then the Father is the Son; and thus the same reality both generates and is generated. That this is spoken heretically is more than manifest. But those who say this should be reminded of what was stated above: that properties determine not natures but only persons. What was said once, it is not irksome to repeat here, so that by more frequent consideration it may become more familiar. Therefore, says John Damascene (160), the characteristic features are properties, that is, the determinative properties of the hypostasis, not of the nature. But, they say, how can properties be in the essence and not determine it, when they are in the persons in such a way that they determine them? We say, however, that this must be firmly held, but we should not be ashamed to confess that we do not know how this is so, together with Hilary who also says (161): I do not know, I do not inquire, but I will console myself nonetheless: archangels do not know, angels have not heard, the ages do not grasp it, the Prophet did not perceive it, the Apostle did not seek it, the Son Himself did not reveal it. Let the pain of complaints therefore cease.
Distinction XXXIV: Why the Father Is Distinctly Called Powerful, the Son Wise, the Holy Spirit Benign
Furthermore, it must be known that although power, wisdom, and benignity belong to all three persons, because Scripture frequently refers these names distinctly to the persons -- so that power is attributed to the Father, wisdom to the Son, and benignity to the Holy Spirit -- this is not done without reason. For these names "father" and "son," taken from creatures, customarily suggest that the father is prior to the son, and thus from antiquity a deficiency in the father; and that the son is posterior to the father, and thus an imperfection in sense is noted in him. But when these are transferred to the Creator, lest the weakness of man would measure the hidden things of God by the likeness of a creature, Scripture intervenes saying: that the Father is powerful, lest He seem prior to the Son, and therefore less powerful. And that the Son is wise, lest He seem posterior to the Father, and therefore less wise. Not that the Father alone is powerful there, or more powerful; or the Son alone, or more wise.
Likewise: This name "Spirit" customarily denotes fierceness and severity. But lest man think something of this sort about God, through which he would fear to approach God, Scripture tempered its language, naming the Spirit benign -- not that the Spirit alone is benign, or more benign.
On Names Said of God by Metaphor
Finally, it should be known that "mirror," "splendor," "figure," and similar terms, which are said of God by way of metaphor, are in no way said to express the proper meaning of those names, but to convey some spiritual understanding, which the piety of the reader may gather from the reasons for speaking, each in its own place.
Distinction XXXV: On the Knowledge of the Unbegotten God in Itself
The Knowledge of God Has Many Names
Although many things have been set forth above concerning what is said of God according to substance, nevertheless a special treatment must be given of certain of them, namely the knowledge, will, and power of God. The knowledge of God, therefore, since it is one and simple, receives diverse names on account of the diverse effects of created things. For it is called foreknowledge, disposition, providence, and predestination. Foreknowledge and providence concern future things only, both good and evil; disposition concerns things to be done, providence concerns things to be governed, predestination concerns those to be saved and their good things, by which they are freed here and will be crowned in the future. Whence the Apostle says: He chose us before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and blameless (Eph. 1). And the prophet: Eye has not seen, O God, apart from You, what You have prepared for those who love You (Isa. 64; 1 Cor. 2).
But if this is so, it seems that if future things did not exist from eternity, neither foreknowledge nor any one of the others would be in God, and thus neither would His essence. Because in God essence is the same as foreknowledge. Likewise, if future things did not exist from eternity, God would not foreknow, and thus He would not exist, since for Him to foreknow is the same as to exist. To this we say that this name "foreknowledge," and each of the aforesaid, designates the essence and is said relatively to future things. And because they are thus twofold, the statement must be distinguished when it is said: "If there were no future things, there would be no foreknowledge in God" -- that is, "there would be no knowledge in God which is foreknowledge" -- this is false.
But if it is said that there would be knowledge in God, but one that would not comprehend future things, this is true.
Similarly also this: "If there were no future things, God would not be foreknowing." You must distinguish: And so you should say concerning the rest, for even if nothing of the sort were said of God, since there were no future things from eternity, there would nonetheless be knowledge in God, which concerns all things, both good and evil, temporal and eternal.
Whence Ambrose, namely (162): The whole plan of the heavenly and eternal wisdom is in Him, because His immense wisdom comprehends all wisdom and essence. Therefore all things are said to be in God from eternity. Whence Augustine (162*): These visible things, before they were made, both existed and did not exist; in God's knowledge they were, but in their own nature they were not. For He made known things; He did not come to know things already made. Hence it is said: What was made, in Him was life (John 1) -- not that the creature is the creator, but because it always exists in His knowledge, which is life.
Distinction XXXVI: How Things Are in God
According to this it is said that He calls those things which are not as though they are. Whence Augustine (163): And the beauty of the field is with me. All things are with Him, by a certain ineffable knowledge of God's wisdom.
But since the knowledge of God and His nature or essence are the same, the question is asked whether all things are in the nature of God. No, since Augustine says (164): He holds the elect in Himself, not however in His nature, but in His foreknowledge. But since the nature and knowledge of God are entirely the same, what is it that all things are said to be in His knowledge, and not in His nature? Perhaps this is one of the reasons: because the name "nature" posits essence simply; but "knowledge" posits the same being indeed, yet is not said entirely without reference to knowable things.
Hence also, not everything that is in God's knowledge is said to be in His love, because these names -- love, knowledge, and the like -- since they have been transferred from creatures to the Creator on account of the various states of things, are said with different respects toward the things themselves. On account of these differences, not everything we say through one name should we also say through another: for example, all things are in God's knowledge, because nothing escapes the fullness of His awareness. But not all things are in His love, because He is not recognized as conferring the gift of grace upon all.
Whether Evil Things Should Be Said to Be in God
But since all things are in God through knowledge, it is asked whether we should grant that evil things are in God. For God knows all things, both good and evil. Surely, who but a madman would grant that evil things are in God? Therefore this expression "God knows" must be distinguished according to the variety of knowable things. For God knows certain things merely to exist or to have been past or to be future, such that He neither approves them nor are they pleasing to Him. Whence He is said to know them from afar. As it is written: And He knows the lofty from afar (Ps. 138). According to which He will say to some: I never knew you (Matt. 7). Things of this sort are not said to be in God, because He does not grant them the authority to exist.
Therefore only those things are said to be in God of which He is the author, namely good things which are from Him, and in Him, and through Him, as Scripture says (Rom. 11). These three, as Ambrose says (165), are one as regards the authority of things that exist, so that they may exist. Certainly this should not be taken confusedly, for the Apostle set it down for the distinction of the persons. Saying "from Him" on account of the Father; "through Him" on account of the Son; "in Him" on account of the Holy Spirit. Yet you should believe this in such a way that you refer all things to each one. For from the Father, and through the Father, and in the Father are all things. So also of the Son and the Holy Spirit. It should be noted, however, that "from Him" (ex ipso) is said more generally than "of Him" (de ipso). For heaven and earth are from Him, but not of Him, since they are not of His substance. Just as from a man both a son exists and a house made by him, but only the son is of the man.
Distinction XXXVII: How God Is in Things and in Bodily Places
Having said how things are in God, it seems necessary to ask how God is in things. It must be known, therefore, that God was only in Himself before created things existed. And so when heaven and earth were created, He filled them. Whence: I fill heaven and earth (Jer. 23). Augustine also says (166): God is everywhere; we draw near to Him not by places but by actions.
How God Is Generally in Things and Specially in the Saints
God is therefore presentially, potentially, and essentially in all things in common: but in the saints specially, namely through indwelling grace, whence Gregory (167): Although God is present to all things in a common way by His presence, power, and substance, He is more intimately present through grace in those who consider the magnificence of God's works more keenly and faithfully. Whence they know Him and love Him. And on account of this, God is said to dwell in them. Hence: Heaven is My throne, and the earth is the footstool of My feet (Isa. 66). And elsewhere (167*): The throne of wisdom is the soul of the just. It is for this reason, therefore, that we do not say: Our Father who art everywhere -- though this too is true -- but rather: who art in heaven, that is, in the saints.
How God Dwells in Some Who Do Not Know Him
God also dwells in some who do not yet know Him, such as little children confirmed by the sacrament of Christ, whom He Himself builds into a most beloved temple for Himself by the grace of His goodness.
How God Is in Christ
God is also in the man Christ in a more excellent manner -- not through adoption but through union, since in Him the fullness of divinity dwells bodily. In Christ, therefore, God dwells excellently; in the saints, mercifully; everywhere, ineffably. But how this is so, we cannot explain. For we understand many things about God that we are utterly unable to express in words. So also we say many things that we are not fit to understand.
How God Is Everywhere, and Yet Is Not Defiled by Impurities
Indeed, since God is everywhere, how is His nature not stained by impurities? But how frivolous this objection is, is proven even in the case of a created spirit, and is manifestly refuted by the rays of the sun.
That He Is Not Changed through Places and Times
Although God is everywhere and in all time, He is nevertheless not moved through places and times, which belongs to creatures alone. Whence Augustine (168): The Almighty, unchangeable in eternity, will, and truth, always the same, moves the spiritual creature through time; but the bodily creature through time and place; yet His substance, by which He is God, is not changed by times and places. To be changed through time is to be varied according to qualities. Through place, however, that which is local is changed, which happens in two ways.
For something is called local which by its interposition creates distance among surrounding things on account of dimensions, which is proper to a body. Whence Augustine (169): A place is in space, which is occupied by the length, height, and breadth of a body. Something is also called local which is merely bounded by a place, that is, it is somewhere such that it is not everywhere, which also applies to an angel. Whence also Bede (170): An angel is a circumscribed spirit. But the Supreme Spirit is uncircumscribed, within whom the angel runs, wherever it may be sent. Likewise Ambrose (171): The Seraphim pass from place to place, for they do not fill all things; but none of these things apply to God. Indeed, He neither creates distance by His interposition, nor is He somewhere in such a way that He is not everywhere. For it has been proven above that God is everywhere.
Yet He is not to be thought of as spread through all things by spatial magnitude, like light or soil, but rather as in two equally wise men, of whom one is larger in body than the other, yet the same wisdom is in both -- neither greater in the larger, nor lesser in the smaller, nor less in one than in two: so God is wholly in heaven, wholly on earth, and in both, and wholly everywhere (172).
God is therefore not changed through places and times, because He is not varied by any qualities. Nor is He moved on account of the fact that He is in more creatures today than yesterday. For in this, it is not He Himself who changes, but the creatures alone, by beginning to exist or by ceasing to exist.
Distinction XXXVIII: Whether the Foreknowledge of God Is the Cause of Future Things
Now returning to the above, let us ask whether the knowledge, foreknowledge, and providence of God are the cause of future things. It seems so, because it is impossible for things foreknown not to come about: for it is impossible for God's foreknowledge to be deceived. But it would be deceived if foreknown things did not come about. Augustine also says (173): He does not know all creatures because they exist; rather they exist because He knows them. Likewise elsewhere (174): These things which have been created are not known by God because they were made, but rather they were made because they are immutably by God known.
Whether the Knowledge of God Is the Cause of Evils
Indeed, if this is said, the knowledge of God also seems to be the cause of evils. Since He also knew them before they came about, which is absurd. To this we say: "It is impossible for foreknown things not to come about," that is, it never happened otherwise. The word "therefore" as used by Augustine is not causal but consecutive, so that the meaning is: Not because they exist, therefore He knows them; but they exist because He knows them -- that is, God's knowledge did not follow upon the existence of things, but the existence of things followed God's knowledge. He himself makes this clear when he subsequently adds: For He was not ignorant of what He was about to create. Or Augustine understood this (175) concerning good things, of which God is indeed the cause, not concerning evil things, which He comprehends only by knowledge and of which He is not the author, inasmuch as they are not His own. Whence God does not therefore compel anyone to sin because He foreknew the future sins of men. For He foreknew their sins, not His own.
Whether Good Things Were Created by God Necessarily
But since God is the cause of good things so that they exist, do good things come about by necessity? If so, they have no merit, since all merit rests with the will. And the Prophet says: I will sacrifice to You willingly (Ps. 53). We say that God is the effective or dispositive cause of good things so that they exist, but not imposing necessity. For what would it be if, with free will destroyed, He were to produce any good things even against our will?
That Future Things Are Not the Cause of God's Knowledge
It is therefore clear how God's knowledge is not the cause of future things. Furthermore, future things are in no way the cause of His knowledge, since neither is the temporal the cause of the eternal, nor is the creature the cause of the Creator. Origen, however, says (176): Something will not exist because God knows it to be future; but because it is future, it is known by God before it happens. But understand this as follows: it would not be known by God as future unless it were going to be future.
Whether the Foreknowledge of God Can Be Deceived
Although the foreknowledge of God cannot be deceived, the opposite is nevertheless attempted to be proven by some in this way. Because something could not occur when it was foreknown to occur, or could occur when it was not foreknown to occur. If this were so, God's foreknowledge would be deceived. But although the objection is answered in many ways, we say nevertheless that something was foreseen only in that way in which it would come about. Moreover, this statement: "It is impossible for it to happen otherwise when it has been foreknown" -- "foreseen" and the like -- must be determined according to composition and division. For if you understand it thus: both cannot simultaneously be the case, that God foreknew this to happen thus and it happens otherwise, this is true. But if you say it thus: this cannot happen otherwise than as God foreknew it would happen, this is false.
Distinction XXXIX: Whether God's Knowledge Can Be Increased or Diminished
Similarly it is asked whether the knowledge of God can be increased or diminished. This seems provable thus: He could do what He would never be going to do, and if He were to do it, He would know it. Likewise, God could not do what He is going to do; and if He never did it, He would not know it either. But we say that the knowledge of God, which is the divine essence, since there is nothing other in it than to know, can neither be increased nor diminished. The things known, however, can be increased and diminished, without any change in God's knowledge. The reason why it cannot be increased or diminished is this: because God's knowledge would only be increased or diminished if God began to know or to not know something, which is impossible (177).
Indeed, some say: If God can know something that He never knew, He can begin to know something. But we say this does not follow, and that statement should not be accepted without the division of composition and division. As if you should say: He can know what He never knew, that is, He can now know this in such a way that He never knew it -- this is false, as though both could be the case simultaneously. But if you say it divisively -- in this way God can know, and yet this is something that He never knew -- this is truly proposed.
Therefore God has knowledge of all things, both present, past, and future. Nor should it trouble us that Jerome says (178): It would be absurd to reduce the majesty of God to this, that He should know at every single moment how many gnats are born, how many die, and what the number of fleas or flies may be. For he said this not to remove this from the knowledge of God, but to admonish us lest we think that the providence of God over rational and irrational beings is the same.
Distinction XL: On Predestination and Reprobation
Finally, something must be said about predestination. Predestination, therefore, is the preparation of grace, which cannot exist without foreknowledge. And it belongs only to those who are to be saved, and is called election. Foreknowledge, however, without predestination concerns those to be damned, and is called reprobation.
Whether the Predestined Can Be Damned, or the Reprobate Saved
Then it is asked: can one who is predestined be damned, or one who is reprobate be saved? No. Because the number of the elect can neither be increased nor diminished. Whence Augustine (179) on that passage of the Apocalypse: Hold fast what you have, lest another receive your crown (Rev. 3). If another would not be going to receive it unless this one had lost it, the number of the elect is certain, that is, it cannot be increased nor diminished.
But it is objected: All salvation is from grace; and what is given freely could not be given. If this were so, the number of the elect would be diminished. Likewise: Grace for meriting can be given to each person and preserved until the end; if this were to happen, the number of the elect would be increased. But this is impossible; therefore neither does the former follow. Take note wisely that in objections of this kind, the antecedent is frequently possible while the consequent is impossible. For example: If God now knows what He never knew, He undoubtedly begins to know something in time. Finally, the antecedent is possible, the consequent by no means so. You will find the same regarding Providence and similar cases.
Moreover, the reason is plain why the number of the elect cannot be increased or diminished. Because it would only be increased if someone now began to be predestined. And it would only be diminished if someone then began to be reprobated. But both of these are impossible for God. Yet these statements are found according to the sense of composition and division. As: "It is impossible for one who is predestined to be damned" -- that is, for both of these to be the case simultaneously, that he is predestined and is damned -- this is true. But if you say: "It is impossible for this man to be damned," and this man is among the predestined, this is false. The same judgment applies to similar cases.
The Effects of Predestination and Reprobation
Furthermore, predestination is considered with respect to two things: Grace, namely by which we are now justified, and glory by which we are made blessed. So also reprobation concerns two things, of which God foreknows one and does not prepare it, namely iniquity; but the other He also prepares, namely eternal punishment. Whence Augustine (180-81): Predestination is properly the preparation of God's benefits. So too the reprobation of God is the foreknowledge of wickedness that will not end in some, and the preparation of punishment that will not terminate.
But just as the effect of predestination is mercy, so the effect of reprobation is hardening. Whence the Apostle: He has mercy on whom He wills, and He hardens whom He wills (Rom. 9). By mercy he means the bestowal of grace; by hardening, the privation of that same grace. Augustine to Sixtus (182): God hardens not by imparting wickedness, but by withdrawing grace. Whence Augustine (183): Just as the reprobation of God is the unwillingness to show mercy, so hardening is the unwillingness to show mercy, so that what would make a man worse is not inflicted by Him, but only what would make him better is not bestowed.
Distinction XLI: Whether Predestination and Reprobation Are from Our Merits
Finally, there is no merit for the mercy of God, lest grace be emptied of meaning if it is not given freely but rendered for merits. The merit for hardening, however, is sin. Whence Augustine (184-85): He shows mercy according to grace, which is given freely. But He hardens according to judgment, which is rendered for merits. Moreover, there is no merit for eternal election and reprobation, which the Apostle says openly concerning two men, namely Jacob the chosen and Esau the reprobate: not from works but from Him who calls, when they had not yet been born, it was said: The elder shall serve the younger (Mal. 1; Rom. 9).
Augustine indeed seems to contradict the foregoing when he says (186): He has mercy on whom He wills, and He hardens whom He wills. But this will of God cannot be unjust: For it comes from the most hidden merits, because even sinners themselves, although on account of the general sin they have formed one mass, there is nevertheless some diversity among them. Therefore something precedes in sinners, by which, although they have not yet been justified, they are made worthy of justification. And likewise something precedes in other sinners, by which they are worthy of being blinded.
But we say that he retracted this when he also retracted the following (187): God chose faith in His foreknowledge, knowing also that faith itself is found among the gifts of God, which he had not previously known. But if he did not retract this, with pardon begged, we dare to say that he perhaps called the most hidden merits the deep and profound judgments of God, which merit for each person, before he exists, either God's hatred or love.
Just as we are accustomed to say that the death of Christ benefited even those not yet born, and merited salvation. But those on whom they merit hatred -- these are the most just judgments of God, removed from our senses; those on whom they merit love -- this is grace alone. Whence Jerome: God did not act unjustly, with Esau spontaneously held in hatred; nor was Jacob loved without the grace of merit, because it was not without a certain most hidden merit that Esau himself merited God's hatred and Jacob His love, while they themselves had not yet merited anything, since they were not yet born.
Love and Hatred Immediately in Sinners
These two things are immediately in sinners: by one, namely love, they are worthy of justification, though not yet justified; by the other, namely hatred, they are worthy of being blinded, though not yet blinded. If this is well said, we praise God. If we fall short of understanding Augustine here, we are not ashamed to confess it.
The Distinction between Predestination, Foreknowledge, and Related Terms
It should be known indeed that predestination, knowledge, election, foreknowledge, and reprobation are from eternity only; mercy, justification, blinding, and hardening are from time only; but the love and hatred of God signify neither from eternity nor from time. Finally, it should be known that reprobation is not the cause of evil coming into being in the same way that predestination is the cause of good. For foreknowledge is for many the cause of standing firm; but for no one is it the cause of falling.
That God Always Knows What He Once Knows
Because indeed the foreknowledge of God concerns only future things, from the moment they cease to be future, God also ceases to foreknow them. This does not pertain to a defect in God's foreknowledge, but rather to the defect or change in the things of which it is. Therefore He foreknew many things in the past which He does not foreknow now. For it must be most firmly believed that everything He once knew, or will know in the future, He also knows now.
Yet against this the following objection is made: If whatever He knew and will know, He also knows now, therefore He knows Christ to be about to be born, and the Antichrist to be alive, since He knew the former and will know the latter. But we say that God now knows exactly the same thing about the birth of this one and the life of the Antichrist as He knew or will know. The change of times, indeed, forces us to express God's knowledge about these things in different words, as appears in a similar case. For we signify the same day, on account of changed times, by saying: tomorrow, today, yesterday. Just as also the same faith held by ancient and modern fathers is expressed in various statements according to the change of times. For the one whom they confessed as about to come, we confess as having come, but the faith is the same. Whence Augustine: The times have changed, and therefore the words have changed, not the faith. Or we say the objection is not properly inferred: God knew this man would be born, therefore He now knows this man will be born. He should rather infer: Therefore God now knows that this man was at some time going to be born. The same judgment applies to similar cases.
Distinction XLII: On the Omnipotence of God
Now let us consider the omnipotence of God, which is considered with respect to two things, namely that He does all things He wills, and suffers absolutely nothing He does not will. For Scripture says: Whatever He willed, He did (Ps. 113). Augustine also says (188): He is not truly called Almighty for any other reason than that whatever He wills He can do, nor is the effect of the Almighty's will impeded by the will of any creature. The same author (189): He is Almighty not because He does all things, but because He can bring about whatever He wills.
He cannot commit sin, nor lie, and similar things, because to be able to do these things pertains more to impotence. Hence Augustine says (190): It is a great power of God not to be able to lie. Similarly, He cannot suffer what He does not will, because He can neither be deceived nor be made miserable, and the like, because to be able to do these things belongs to impotence.
Finally, walking, eating, and the like are not entirely foreign to Him. For although these things do not at all belong to the divine essence, God nevertheless works them in creatures. But beware how you understand the aforesaid word of Augustine, namely "He can bring about whatever He wills." For if you say "whatever He wills," that is, to do or to be able to do, then in this way an angel or any of the blessed could be called almighty, since they will to do nothing except what they do and will, nor can they do anything except what they can. Therefore, so that this may apply to God alone, say: He can bring about whatever He wills to be done, either by Himself, as heaven and earth, or through a creature, as good works and artifacts -- which none of the saints could do or has been able to do.
Distinction XLIII: That God Can Do More Than He Wills
It should be known, moreover, that God can do more than He wills. Whence: Do you think that I cannot ask My Father, and He will furnish Me at once with more than twelve legions of angels? (Matt. 26.) Where it is plainly clear that the Son could have asked what He did not ask, and the Father could have furnished what He did not furnish. Augustine also says (191): The will of the Almighty can do many things which He neither wills nor does. For He could have made twelve legions fight against those who seized Christ. Likewise (192), what the faith of the pious now holds will then be seen in the clearest light of wisdom: how certain and immutable the will of God is, which can do many things yet does not will them, but wills nothing that it cannot do. Likewise we say (192): He raised Lazarus in body; could He not have raised Judas in mind? He could indeed, but He did not will it.
Another Opinion Set Forth and Refuted
But against this truth, so manifest, certain people attempt to confine God's power to a measure, saying that God cannot do anything other than what He does, nor omit anything of those things He does, in this manner: God cannot do anything except what is good and just to be done. But nothing is just and good to be done by Him except what He does.
Another way: He cannot do anything except what His justice demands. But His justice does not demand that He do anything except what He does. Therefore He cannot do anything except what He does. And the same justice demands that He not do what He does not do. But He cannot act against His justice. Therefore He cannot do any of those things which He leaves undone.
These statements are indeed equivocal, as: "God cannot do anything except what is good and just to be done" -- that is, He cannot do anything except that which, if He were to do it, it would be good and just for Him to do -- this is true. But if one says: He cannot do anything except what He does, which indeed is good and just for Him to do, this is false. We also divide the other proposition -- although the word "demands" is not without suspicion when applied to God -- thus: He cannot do anything except what His justice demands that He do -- that is, except that which, if it were done, would accord with His justice -- this is true. But if stated as: He cannot do anything except what He does, which indeed accords with His justice -- this is false. The same applies to similar cases.
Likewise they say: God cannot do anything except what He ought; but He ought to do nothing except what He does. We say, however, that "ought" is said of God improperly, because He owes us absolutely nothing except from His promise. But what He promised was entirely not of necessity but of grace. Therefore divide according to this: "He cannot do anything except what He ought" -- that is, except what He promised -- this is false. But thus: He cannot do anything except that which, if He were to do it, would accord with His justice -- this is true.
They add further: He cannot do or omit anything except what there is reason for Him to do or omit. But this is only what He does or omits. But divide this also after the pattern of the above: He cannot do or omit anything except that which, if He were to do or omit it, there would be reason for Him to do or omit it -- that is, whatever things are not subject to His will are among the number of things not willed -- this is true. But if stated as: He cannot do or omit anything except what He does or omits, which indeed there is reason for Him to do or omit -- this is false.
In short, let us be advised that all such doubtful propositions, when resolved conditionally, are true, but taken absolutely, are false.
Some, laboring more than fruitfully, still argue: If God can do other than what He does, He can therefore do what He did not foreknow. If this is so, He can act without foreknowledge, which is absurd. This indeed has been made known according to the mode of composition and division determined above: "He can act without foreknowledge" -- that is, He can do that which He did not foreknow -- this is true. But if "without foreknowledge" means that He can do something in such a way that He did not foreknow it and yet does it -- this is false.
They also misuse the authority of Augustine, who says (193): God alone cannot do what He does not will; through which it seems He cannot do anything except what He wills. But He does not will anything except what He does; and so it seems He cannot do anything except what He does. But let them know that this was said as though the discussion were only about those things which God does not will, not about all things. As if Augustine had said: Whatever God cannot do, He does not will. From which it does not follow: therefore whatever He does not will, He cannot do. Just as if we should say: Only what is not an animal is not a man. Yet not everything that is not a man is not an animal.
Or we say this more simply: He alone cannot do what He does not will -- that is, He does nothing unwillingly -- that is, whatever things are not subject to His will are among the number of things not willed -- this is true. Whence Augustine (195): You are not forced unwillingly to anything, because Your will is not greater than Your power. Understand this as true according to what subsists, not according to the objects of His power and will.
Distinction XLIV: Whether God Can Make Better Things Than He Makes
Those same people also say that God cannot make better things than those He makes. Because if He could and did not, He would be envious. In this they misuse what Augustine says (196): God was bound to beget Him whom He begot as an equal. For if He willed it and could not, He is weak. If He could and did not will it, He is envious. Indeed, He blessed, because when He begot from His own substance, He could beget neither one better than Himself nor one less good.
But other things that He makes from elsewhere, He could have made better and less good. Whence Augustine (197): God could have made man such that he could not sin nor would will to sin; and if this had been the case, who would doubt that he would have been better? Finally, if it is asked whether God could make better things in another or better way than He does, we say: if the "way" refers to God, as though He could make them with another or better wisdom, this must be denied. But if it refers to the created things themselves, as though He could make other or better things, this must certainly be granted, as has been said above. Whence Augustine (198): There was another way of our liberation possible for God, but none more fitting for healing our misery.
Whether God Can Now Do Whatever He Once Could
Furthermore, it is asked whether He can now do whatever He once could. It seems not, because He once could die and rise again, which He now cannot do. Here we must say what we said above about knowledge: namely, that He can now have once died and risen; for changed times force us to change our language, while the meaning remains entirely the same. We confess, therefore, that God can always do whatever He once could -- that is, He possesses all the power He once had -- yet He cannot always do what He could at some time. Just as He has all the knowledge and will that He ever had, yet He does not now know all things to exist and will them which He once knew to exist and willed.
Distinction XLV: On the Will of God
Now something must be said about the will of God. It should be known, therefore, that willing is said of God according to His essence, for whom it is the same to be willing as to be God. Nor is the will in God an affection or movement as in a creature, but only the divine essence. Yet not everything God wills is God Himself, just as although being and knowing are the same for God, nevertheless God is not everything He knows.
What Is the Meaning When It Is Said: God Knows, God Wills
Yet understand the meaning of these statements: God wills and knows and is willing and knowing -- that is, God is He whose essence is His will and His knowledge. Likewise, God knows all things -- that is, God is He to whose knowledge, which is His essence, all things are subject. Just as God wills this or that -- that is, God is He to whose will, which is His essence, this or that is subject.
The Will of God Is the First Cause of All Creatures
This supremely good will, therefore, is the cause of all things that naturally have been, are, and will be. But of this will itself there is no cause. Whence Augustine (199): The will of God is the first and highest cause of all forms and movements. For where does the wisdom of God not work what it wills, which reaches from end to end mightily and sweetly disposing all things? (Wis. 8.) It is therefore the first cause of health, sickness, rewards, punishments, graces, retributions, and indeed of all wonderful things, and of those which come about wonderfully, as ancient miracles, without our astonishment.
What the Will of God Is
This is properly called the will of God, which, since it is the divine essence, is immutable and cannot be unfulfilled. Whence: Whatever the Lord willed, He did (Ps. 113); and the Apostle: Who shall resist His will? (Rom. 9.) This is rightly called the good pleasure of God.
That Many Things Are Called the Will of God
Moreover, there are many things, each of which is called the will of God not according to proper usage but according to figures of speech: such as command, prohibition, counsel, permission, and the operation of God. According to this, the Prophet says in the plural: Great are the works of the Lord, sought out in all His wills (Ps. 110). So also on account of the many effects of God's mercy and justice, although there is only one, which is the divine essence, it is said in the plural: I will sing of the mercies of the Lord forever (Ps. 88). And elsewhere: The judgments of the Lord are right (Ps. 18).
Command, prohibition, and counsel, therefore, are called the wills of God because they are signs of the divine will, just as the future judgment and God's scourge are called the wrath of God because they are signs of wrath, although wrath does not apply to God.
Finally, "will" can be taken in this way in the passage: Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven (Matt. 6). And: Whoever does the will of My Father who is in heaven, he is My brother, sister, and mother (Matt. 12). This kind of will, however, is changeable and often unfulfilled. For God commands many things that people do not do, prohibits things they do not avoid, and counsels things they do not heed. Hence Augustine (200): The unfaithful act against the will of God when they do not believe His Gospel.
God Does Not Always Will That What He Commands Be Done
Indeed, God Himself does not always will that what He commands be done. For He did not will Isaac to be sacrificed, which He had commanded, but only to test Abraham's faith (Gen. 22). So also He does not always will that what He prohibits be avoided. For after the healing He told him not to tell anyone (Mark 1), not willing him to be silent, but rather to give an example of declining one's own praise.
Distinction XLVI: On the Permission and Operation of God
Permission and operation are also called the will of God. Thus Augustine says (201): Nothing happens unless the Almighty wills it to happen -- either by permitting it, as evil things, or by doing it Himself, as good things. These are therefore called the wills of God because He permits them. God permits evil things to happen, willing to bring good from them. But He brings about good things as what He wills to exist.
Whether the Will of God Is Always Fulfilled
But the will of God does not seem to be always fulfilled, since the Apostle says: God wills all men to be saved (Rom. 9; 1 Tim. 2), yet not all are saved, being unwilling to do that by which they are saved. Likewise the Lord says, addressing the impious city: How often I wished to gather your children, as a hen gathers her chicks, and you would not! (Matt. 23) -- as if, by her refusal, the will of God were not fulfilled.
But that statement of the Apostle is not to be understood as though there is no man whom God does not will to be saved; but rather that no one is saved except whom He wills to be saved. Understand also this in the same way: God illuminates every man coming into this world (John 1) -- not that there is no man who is not illuminated, but that no one is illuminated except by Him.
But that passage of the Gospel is not understood as though your will had impeded My will, but rather: as many as I gathered by My ever-efficacious will, I did so despite your unwillingness (Matt. 23).
Whether God Wills Evil Things to Exist
It is asked whether God wills evil things to exist. Some think so, proving it as follows: God either wills evil things to happen or not to happen. If He wills them not to happen, they do not happen -- for nothing resists His will -- yet they do happen. Therefore He wills evil things to happen. Another way: God wills everything that is good. But for evil things to exist is good. Whence Augustine (202): Not only good things, but also that evil things exist, is good. For unless it were good that there also be evil things, they would in no way be permitted to exist by the All-good Almighty.
To these objections, others respond that one should not say: God wills evil things to happen, or wills them not to happen, but only: He does not will evil things to happen. And as for what they cite from Augustine, namely that for evil things to happen is good, they say "good" is there placed for "useful," as Jerome also says: The evil of Judas was good for the good, that is, for those to whom the benefit of salvation came through him. For God produces good things from evil things.
Whence Augustine (203): God judged it better to bring good out of evil things than to permit no evil things to exist. Thus, for evil things to exist is good -- that is, useful. Yet only for those who are called saints according to His purpose: for to such as these, as the Apostle says, all things work together for good (Rom. 8), even evil things; which if they befall them, advance them toward good, because they return more humble after a fall and become more cautious, as Peter did.
Evil things inflicted by the wicked also benefit them for the correction of sins and the exercise and preservation of justice, as Job felt the hand of God, and the Apostle felt the thorn of Satan, and each progressed because he bore evil well.
Finally, God does not will evil things to happen; because if this were so, God would also be the author of evil things, since His will is His authority. Whence Augustine (204): When it is said "by Him as author," it means "by His will." The Evangelist also, declaring God the author of good things, says: All things were made through Him (John 1). Removing this from evil things, he adds: Without Him was made nothing -- that is, sin. But he did not say "against His will" or "by His will" or "unwillingly," but "without Him" -- that is, without His authority.
Likewise (205): God is not the cause by which a man becomes worse, which He would be if He willed evil things to happen by which a man becomes worse. But God is the cause only of good things.
Distinction XLVII: That the Will of God Is Always Fulfilled Concerning Us or by Us
It should also be known that the eternal will of God is always fulfilled regarding what we do. Whence Augustine (206): That will is always fulfilled -- either concerning us, or by us. It is fulfilled concerning us, but we do not fulfill it, when we sin. It is fulfilled by us when we do good. For we do it because we know it pleases God.
Therefore man does nothing concerning which God does not work what He wills. For if he has sinned, He wills to spare the penitent so that he may live; and to punish the impenitent, so that the rebel may not escape the power of His justice. And so through that same will of the creature, by which was done what the Creator did not will, He Himself fulfills what He wills, making good use even of evil things. For by the very fact that the creature acted against His will, His will was accomplished from that action.
Indeed, lest there be room for error in these matters, recall the distinction of the will stated above, so that one may say: Through the fact that a creature acted against God's command, His eternal will was fulfilled, by which He willed to condemn it. Whence Gregory on Job says openly (207): Many carry out the will of God from the very source by which they strive to change it, and those who resist His counsel submit to it, because what issues from human effort serves His plan.
It should also be known that He commands all to do what ought to be done, and forbids what ought to be avoided, even though He does not will it to be done in this way by each individual: so that He may show His justice to all, and thus the good may obtain glory through obedience, while the wicked, inexcusable through stubbornness, may receive punishment.
Finally, in both Testaments He personally commanded and forbade many things, not because He willed them to happen thus, but for a hidden reason, which the diligent and pious reader will discover in their respective places, with God revealing it.
Distinction XLVIII: Sometimes a Man with Good Will Wills Something Other Than What God Wills
Lastly, we should be reminded that sometimes the will of a man who does not will what God wills to happen is good, yet not without piety. Whence Augustine, speaking of the Apostle, says (208): The wills of the pious faithful appeared good, who did not want the apostle Paul to go to Jerusalem (Acts 21), lest he suffer there the evils that the prophet Agabus had foretold; and yet God willed him to suffer this.
Sometimes also the will of a man is evil, willing the same thing that God wills -- that is, indeed on account of an impious end: as the Jews willed the same thing as God, namely that Christ be killed. Yet in this, God's will was good, because He willed it piously; but theirs was evil, because they willed it impiously.
It should be noted here, however, that God willed only that Christ be killed by the Jews; but not that the Jews should kill Him, just as Christ willed that what He had foretold be fulfilled by Peter; but He did not will Peter to fulfill it, otherwise He would have willed Peter to deny Him.
This also must not be understood without distinction: namely, God willed Christ to be killed by the Jews -- that is, that He should suffer a death inflicted by the Jews -- this is true. But if it means He willed Him to be killed by the Jews -- that is, that the Jews should kill Him -- this is false. Or, as seems better, it should be said that God willed the Lord to be killed, but not by someone or by certain people, even though without them this could not happen. Just as He wills someone to repent, yet does not will that person to have sinned at all, even though repentance cannot be without the prior sin.
But if it is asked whether it should have pleased the saints that Christ suffer, we say yes, with respect to the liberation of mankind; but by no means with respect to His torment. This one of them, shrinking back from it -- out of piety, not doubt -- asked as if in hesitation: Are You the one who is to come, or shall we look for another? (Matt. 11).
Likewise it is asked whether the suffering of the holy martyrs should please us. And we say yes, with respect to the crown to be received that was prepared for them. Yet we can worthily not will the same, we who desire out of compassionate piety that they avoid suffering and escape the hands of the wicked. Therefore we can piously both will and not will the sufferings of the saints. Whence it is pious to weep for Martin, and pious to rejoice over Martin.
Therefore all that will is good which is directed toward a right end, which must be weighed solely according to zeal for God and knowledge.
End of the book on the Trinity, which is the first of the Sentences of Bandinus.
Book II: On the Creation of the World and the Fall of Man
Summary. -- After briefly and clearly expounding (as far as it can be perceived and conveyed by man) the power and nature of God in the first book, Bandinus in this second book transfers his inquiry by a most fitting method to things created by God. First indeed, having prefaced a brief discussion about the principles of things, he treats the creation, nature, state, fall, orders, and ministries of the angels. Then, having explained the creation of the world (which was completed and distinguished by the work of six days), he undertakes a special treatment of man, teaching that he was formed in the likeness of God, placed in paradise, and there seduced by the woman through the envy of the devil. Lastly, taking occasion from the fall of Adam, Bandinus most learnedly treats many topics: free will, grace, sin both original and actual, and other varieties of sins, the seven capital vices, sin against the Holy Spirit, and venial sins.
Distinction I: That There Is One Principle of Things, Not Many