Bandinus Magister (Master Bandinus)
(Book of Sentences II: On the Creation of the World and the Fall of Man)
End of Book I and Introduction to Book II
...the eternal will by which He willed to condemn it. Whence Gregory openly says concerning Job (207): Many carry out the will of God; whence they contend to change it, and those resisting His counsel serve it, because that which results from human effort serves His disposition. It should also be known that He commands all to do what is to be done, and forbids what is to be avoided: although He does not will that it be so done by each individual: so that He might show His justice to all, and thus the good through obedience might obtain glory; while the wicked, inexcusable through stubbornness, might receive punishment. Finally, He personally commanded and forbade many things in both Testaments, not because He willed them to happen so, but for a hidden reason, which the diligent and pious reader will find in their proper places, with God revealing it.
Distinction 48. Sometimes a person wills something other than God wills, with a good will.
Finally, we must be admonished that sometimes the will of a person refusing what God wills is good, yet without loss of piety. Whence Augustine, speaking of the Apostle, says (208): The wills of the pious faithful appeared good, who did not want the apostle Paul to go to Jerusalem (Acts 21), lest he suffer the evils which the prophet Agabus had foretold, and yet God willed him to suffer these things. Sometimes also the will of a person is evil, willing the same thing as God, that is, indeed for the purpose of impiety: just as the Jews willed the same thing as God, namely that Christ be killed. Yet God's will in this was good, because He willed it piously; theirs however was evil, because impiously.
It should be noted here, however, that God only willed that Christ be killed by the Jews; but not that the Jews should kill Him, just as Christ willed that what He had foretold be fulfilled by Peter: but He did not will that Peter fulfill it, otherwise He would have willed that Peter deny Him.
That statement also must not be understood indiscriminately, namely 'God willed Christ to be killed by the Jews,' that is, that He suffer a death inflicted by the Jews -- this is true; but if 'He willed Him to be killed by the Jews,' that is, that the Jews should kill Him -- this is false. Or as seems better, it should be said that God willed the Lord to be killed, but not by anyone in particular, or by any particular persons, although without them it would have been impossible. Just as He wills someone to repent, yet does not will that person to have sinned at all, even though repentance cannot be without sin. If it is asked whether it ought to have pleased the saints that Christ suffer, we say certainly yes, with respect to the liberation of humanity: but by no means with respect to His torment. One of them also, shrinking from this out of piety and not out of doubt, asked as if doubting: Are You the one who is to come, or shall we expect another? (Matt. 11).
Likewise, it is asked whether the suffering of the holy martyrs ought to please us. And we say, certainly, with respect to the crown to be received that was prepared for them. Yet we may worthily not will it, we who desire out of compassion and piety that they avoid suffering and escape the hands of the wicked. Therefore we can piously both will and not will the sufferings of the saints. Whence it is pious to weep for Martin, and pious to rejoice for Martin. Therefore every good will is that which is directed toward the right end, which must be weighed solely from zeal for God, according to knowledge.
(207) Moralia, Book 6, chapter 11, on the passage Job 5, 'Who catches the wise...'
(208) In the Enchiridion, chapter 101.
End of the book on the Trinity, which is the first of Bandinus's Sentences.
MASTER BANDINUS: ON THE CREATION OF THE WORLD AND THE FALL OF MAN, WHICH IS THE SECOND OF THE SENTENCES
After Bandinus briefly and clearly expounded the power and nature of God in his first book (insofar as these things can be perceived and conveyed by man), in this second book he transfers his inquiry by a most fitting method to things created by God: and first indeed, after a preliminary discussion of the principles of things, he treats the creation, nature, state, fall, orders, and ministries of the angels: then, having explained the creation of the world (which was completed and distinguished in the work of six days), he undertakes a special treatise on man, teaching that he was formed in the likeness of God, placed in paradise, and there seduced by the woman through the envy of the devil. Finally, on the occasion of Adam's fall, Bandinus most learnedly pursues many topics: free will, grace, sin both original and actual, other varieties of sin, the seven capital vices, sin against the Holy Spirit, and venial sins.
Distinction 1. That there is one principle of things, not many.
Plato holds three principles, Aristotle three.
Those things which are known to pertain to the mystery of divine unity and Trinity, insofar as the usefulness of brevity allows, we have thus far pursued: Now let us proceed to the consideration of creatures (209). Scripture, therefore, produced by the finger of God, at its very beginning, intimating that God is the Creator of all things that naturally exist, apart from Himself, says: In the beginning God created heaven and earth (Gen. 1). By saying 'in the beginning' and not 'in the beginnings,' and by saying 'God' and 'created,' it refutes the folly of the philosophers, who held not just one -- as is here taught -- but many principles of things, without a beginning. For Plato thought there were three: namely God, the exemplar, and matter; Aristotle however said there were two: matter and form, and a third called the operative principle. He also said the world had always existed (210).
He teaches what is catholic. What a creator is. What it means to create. The difference between God and an angel. Why God made rational creatures.
Having rejected those views, therefore, we confess God alone as the one principle and Creator of things. A Creator is one who makes something from nothing, or out of nothing. For properly speaking, to create is to make something from nothing. In this God the maker differs from man and angel as makers, because what they make, they make not from nothing, but from something. Moreover, when they make something, there is a motion of operation in them, which absolutely cannot exist in God. For God works not by motion, but solely by His will, so that it may truly be said that God's making is that something newly comes into being according to His will. The goodness of this will is so great that He willed others to become participants in time of His blessedness, by which He alone has been blessed from eternity, a blessedness which He saw could both be communicated and could in no way be diminished. But because it cannot be participated in except through intelligence, God made a rational creature, which might understand the supreme good, and by understanding love it, and by loving possess it, and by possessing enjoy it.
The distinction of rational creatures. Why and for what purpose rational creatures were made. Why the soul was united to a body.
Finally, He distinguished it into the incorporeal, which is the angel, and the corporeal, which is the soul having flesh or body -- this is man. The angel therefore and man were made on account of the goodness of God. Whence Augustine (211): Because God is good, we exist. Moreover, he was made to serve and to enjoy God. Therefore, asked most briefly and rightly why and for what purpose the rational creature was made, we say: on account of God's goodness, and for the creature's benefit. That statement indeed which is found in Augustine -- that man was made for the restoration of the angelic ruin (212) -- is not to be understood as though man would not have been made if the angel had not sinned, but because among other causes known to God, when He made man, this was one of them. And if it is asked why God united the soul to a body, since it would seem more worthy persisting in its purity, it must be said that it was because He willed it. The cause of His will is not to be sought, because there is none.
Or perhaps we dare to say that He did this so that in the human condition He might exhibit an example of the blessed union which exists between God and creature in eternal life. For lest perhaps the creature should think that it could not be united to its Creator insofar as it loved Him with all its strength: it seemed fitting therefore that the most excellent creature, namely the spirit, be united to the lowest, that is, to flesh which is from the mud, with such great love that it cannot be compelled to wish to abandon it. Whence the Apostle says: We do not wish to be stripped of the body, but to be clothed over (2 Cor. 5). Or souls were united to bodies so that, serving the Lord in them, they might earn a greater crown. For through this, together with the very body in which they served, they will be made equal to the angelic nature in the future, about which it remains for us to discuss hereafter.
(209) Compare with the first distinction of Peter Lombard in Sentences II.
(210) Near the end of the second book of On Generation and Physics 8.
(211) In Book 1 of On Christian Doctrine, chapter 13.
(212) Augustine, City of God, Book 22, chapter 1, and Enchiridion, chapter 29.
(213) Augustine, on Genesis, Book 2, chapter 1.
Distinction 2. On the angelic nature in particular. The time of the angelic creation.
Being about to treat of the angelic nature, let us see when it was created, and where, and what kind of thing it was made, and what kind of thing it was perfected. Also about their orders and offices and names, and many other things. It is established that the angel was made before every other creature, as it is written: Wisdom was created first of all (Sirach 1), which must be understood of the angelic nature, which is often called life, wisdom, and light in the Scriptures. For the Wisdom of God which is God Himself is uncreated. But how can this be? Since elsewhere Scripture says: In the beginning God created heaven and earth (Gen. 1); and: In the beginning, Lord, You founded the earth (Psalm 101). Indeed, if He created the earth in the beginning, nothing was made before it. But if the angel was made first of all, then it is proved to have been made even before the earth.
How wisdom was created first of all.
Lest therefore there seem to be any contradiction in such great utterances, it seems that this must be held: that the spiritual and corporeal creation were made simultaneously. Whence Solomon: He who lives forever created all things at once (Sirach 18), that is, the spiritual and corporeal nature. Hence also Augustine (213) says that by 'heaven' and 'earth' the spiritual and corporeal creature are to be understood, and these were created in the beginning, namely of time, or 'in the beginning' because they were made first. Nevertheless, wisdom was created first of all, because even if not in time, the angel still precedes in dignity. Or 'first of all' is said not with regard to essence, but with regard to the distinction of form. For the spiritual nature is believed to have received a distinct form in its very first creation, which the corporeal creature did not, since God worked on it over the course of six days. But it was first made formless and confused, that is, without distinction of form. Whence according to the Greeks it is called chaos and hyle. This we do not assert rashly, but declare it with due reverence for the mysteries.
Where the angels were created.
Therefore the angels were created in heaven. Whence the Lord says: I saw Satan falling like lightning from heaven (Luke 10): where 'heaven' is not understood as the firmament, which was made on the second day, but the empyrean, that is, the fiery heaven, so called from its splendor, not from heat. As soon as it was made, it was filled with angels. Whence Bede (214): This higher heaven, which is separated from the revolution of the world, once created was immediately filled with holy angels, whom the Lord testifies were created in the beginning together with heaven and earth, saying: Where were you when the morning stars praised me, and all the sons of God rejoiced? He calls the morning stars and the sons of God the same angels.
But if the angels were made in heaven, how does Lucifer say: I will ascend into heaven, and I will exalt my throne, and I will be like the Most High? (Isa. 14.) But there he calls 'heaven' the exaltation of God, to which he wanted to be made equal. And the meaning is: I will ascend into heaven, that is, to equality with God.
(214) On Genesis.
(215) On the Literal Meaning of Genesis, Book 12, chapter 23.
(216) On Ezekiel, Homily 1, on the passage 'I saw as it were the appearance...'
(217) On Genesis, Book 1, chapters 2, 3, 4, and 6.
(218) On Genesis, Book 21, chapters 19 and 20.
(219) Augustine, On the Literal Meaning of Genesis, Book 11, chapter 23.
Distinction 3. What kind of beings the angels were made. That the angels were not created equal.
It must also be believed that the angels were created having received four benefits from their maker and creator: namely, that they should exist as simple in essence, distinct in person, rational in intelligence, and free in will -- that is, able to incline immediately toward either good or evil. It must not be thought that all were created equal in these things. For just as there is a certain difference in bodies even according to their first creation, so also in the spiritual creature a manifold difference befitting its condition must be believed to have existed. Hence it is that Lucifer was made more excellent than the rest. Whence Ezekiel: Every precious stone was your covering (Ezek. 28). Likewise: The fir trees did not equal his height, the plane trees were not equal to his branches (Ezek. 31).
In what respects the angels differ.
They are therefore different in subtlety of nature, in keenness of knowledge, and in freedom of will. So that those who then excelled others through natural gifts would also preside over them through the gifts of grace, being established as superior to them in dignity. But those who were created less subtle and less keen in wisdom had lesser gifts of grace, and were established as inferior, the wisdom of God ordering all things with equal moderation. Yet the differing subtlety of nature does not bring weakness, nor does lesser knowledge of wisdom introduce ignorance, nor does inferior freedom impose any necessity on anyone's will.
How the angels were created good. How they were just. There was a delay between creation and confirmation.
It must also be firmly held that the angels were created good, not indeed through the exercise of free will, but through the benefit of creation. Just also, not by the exercise of virtue, but by the innocence of nature. For they were made such that they could sin, and could not sin, if they wished. And this they did -- some by falling, others by persevering. Whence Genesis: God made all things very good (Gen. 1). Therefore He made the nature of the angels good.
It is also faithfully believed that there was some delay between creation and the fall, from what Augustine says (215): The angel, having been made first, immediately turned away from the truth, delighting in his own power. By saying 'first,' he implied a delay. Likewise Origen (216): Just as Adam and Eve did not sin immediately, so also the serpent was at some time not a serpent. For God did not make malice -- by which words he affirms that there was also a delay after the creation of good.
Furthermore, it is established that a delay intervened between creation and confirmation. Whence Augustine says (217) that the angelic nature was first called 'heaven' when it was being created; but afterwards 'light' when it was formed and turned toward the Creator, namely to praise God: whence it was first said: In the beginning God created heaven and earth. Then: God said: Let there be light, and there was light (Gen. 1), that is, the angels were confirmed.
But what the Truth says in the Gospel seems contrary: He was a murderer from the beginning, and he did not stand in the truth (John 8). But it must be understood 'from the beginning' of the created man, whom he envied as soon as he was made, and by seducing, cast down into death. Or 'from the beginning,' that is, after the beginning. Or you may understand 'from the beginning' of confirmation, not of first creation. For it can be said without irreverence that there is a twofold beginning for the angel, just as there is a twofold birth for man.
Likewise, an objection is raised from Augustine (218), who says it should not be thought in vain that the devil fell from the very beginning of his creation. Whence some think that he was not bent toward this malice by free will, but was created by God in it, according to that text: This is the beginning of God's creation, which God made so that he might be mocked (Job 40), that is, the devil, by his angels, namely God's. But according to others, he reveals that he said this elsewhere, saying (219): That the devil is thought never to have stood in the truth must not be taken to mean that he was created evil by the good God, otherwise it would be said that he did not fall from the beginning. For he did not fall if he was made that way. For from what would he fall? Therefore, having been made first, he immediately turned away from the truth, delighting in his own power, and did not taste the sweetness of the blessed life: which he did not reject after accepting it, but lost it by refusing to accept it. Finally, what is adduced from Job -- this is the beginning of God's creation -- is explained thus: not nature but an aerial body is signified, which God fitted to such a will; or 'creation' refers to God's own ordering, in which He made him useful to the good even against his will; or the making of the angel itself, because although God foreknew that he would become evil, He nevertheless made him, foreseeing how many good things He would produce for the elect from him. He is called 'the beginning' because he precedes in antiquity and primacy of malice.
Whence Job says: He is called king among all the children of pride (Job 41).
Distinction 4. Whether the angels were made blessed.
But it must not be admitted that the angels were made blessed. For although Augustine previously alternated in holding different opinions about the good angels, nevertheless he ultimately warned thus (220): To say, he says, concerning the angels that they can be blessed in their own kind, uncertain of damnation or salvation, for whom there was no hope that they would be changed for the better -- this is too great a presumption. But concerning the evil angels he openly denies it, saying (221): How was he blessed among the angels, who was not foreknowing of his future punishment and sin? This is proved as follows. For if he foreknew it and wished to avoid it but could not, then he was wretched. And so wretchedness preceded sin and did not follow it, which is false, since it comes from sin. Finally, if he could have avoided it and did not wish to, he was foolish, which is again false. For the angels were made knowing what they were, and from whom they were, and with whom they were, having also an understanding of good and evil, having also a love by which they loved God and themselves, which was not a love of charity but of nature, by which love, once possessed, we love without fault, as we love a horse or a book.
On confirmation and the fall. Perfection is spoken of in many ways. What integrity is. What blessed clarity is. The highest perfection.
But it must be held that the angels were perfect according to one thing, but created imperfect according to another. For something is perfect according to its condition, as for instance that to which nothing of the right of its condition is lacking, as when a man is born whole -- and in this respect the angels were made perfect. There is also the perfect according to progress, namely that to which nothing of progress is lacking. In this way the angels will be perfect only after confirmation, and the saints only after the resurrection. There is also the perfect from which nothing has ever been lacking nor ever will be, and this is God alone. The first perfection, then, is of created nature, and is called integrity. The second is of glorified nature, and is called blessed clarity. The third is of uncreated nature, and is called the supreme and universal perfection.
(220) On Genesis, Book 11, chapter 14.
(221) Book 11, on Genesis, chapter 17.
Distinction 5. On the confirmation of those who stood and the fall of those who fell.
Finally, using the freedom of will -- which is the free power and capacity of the rational will -- some chose good and were converted to God, while others chose evil and were thus turned away from God. To be converted to God was to cling to Him in charity. To be turned from God was to be envious of charity. For cooperating grace was given to those who stood, aiding their free will, by which they might be effectively helped to will and act well, and to persevere in this, which was to be converted to God. Indeed, they did not need operative grace, for that is the grace by which the impious person is justified so as to become pious. But those angels were not evil; therefore they did not need to be justified.
Whether the turning away from God is to be imputed to the evil angels.
But since they could not be converted to God without grace, it is thought by some that it should not be imputed to the fallen that they were not converted. For it was not their fault, they say, that grace was not given to them, since no fault had preceded it. But we say that no preceding fault impeded grace, but only the fault that was in the act of falling itself. For they could have stood like the rest, since nothing hindered them from standing and nothing impelled them to fall. The fall, therefore, was a manifest fault, the reason why grace would not be given.
On the blessedness of those who stood, and whether they merited it.
And so, once confirmed, they immediately became blessed. But it is customary to ask whether any merit preceded the reward of blessedness. Some think so -- if not in time, at least in cause -- saying that the holy angels simultaneously received the grace of merit and of reward. But we think it must be more faithfully believed that merit followed, and that they then received only the grace by which they might live blessedly; and that afterwards, through services continually rendered to the Creator, they merit and have merited the reward received from the beginning.
Distinction 6. Among the falling angels, Lucifer was the highest.
Those who fell were immediately made wretched. Among them, one, as it were the head of malice, was more excellent. Whence Job says: He is the beginning of the ways of God (Job 40). And Ezekiel: You were the seal of likeness, full of knowledge and perfection, beautiful in the delights of the paradise of God (Ezek. 28). Hence it is that in Isaiah he is called Lucifer: How, he says, have you fallen, O Lucifer, you who rose in the morning? (Isa. 14).
Whence and how they fell. The demons are near to us.
Cast out from the empyrean heaven where they had been made, they fell into this dark air. Whence the Apocalypse: The dragon falling from heaven drew a third part of the stars with him (Rev. 12), because that Lucifer fell with all who consented to his malice, into this air. Whence the Apostle: Our wrestling is against the princes and powers of this air, and the spiritual forces of wickedness in the heavenly places (Eph. 6), because the demons, spiritual by nature and wicked in their malice, exist in this air near to us. Hence also Peter: They are kept in the dark air, which is appointed for them as a prison until the time of judgment (2 Pet. 2). But then they will be thrust down into the pit of hell according to that saying: Depart, you cursed (Matt. 25). Moreover, this is all for our sake, so that with them placed in our path, tested by them as through fire and water, we may pass through to refreshment.
Evil angels descend daily to hell.
That some demons descend daily to hell, leading souls there to be tormented, is most true. And that some are always there, taking turns by lot in detaining and tormenting souls, is not far from the truth. That the souls of the wicked descend there is established by the fact that Christ, descending to the underworld, led out the righteous, leaving the wicked there. For He bit hell, He did not swallow it (Hosea 13).
Demons once conquered by the saints cease to tempt others.
It should also be known that from unclean spirits who are conquered by the saints living justly and chastely, the power of tempting is taken away. Origen (222): I think indeed that the saints, fighting against these inciters and conquering them, diminish the army of demons; or that they destroy as many of them as possible, and it is no longer permitted for that spirit who was conquered by some saint living chastely and modestly to attack another person again. Some understand this to mean that it is not permitted for him to tempt a person regarding the vice in which he was defeated.
(222) Volume 1, Homily 65, on the book of Joshua.
Distinction 7. Neither can good angels will evil, nor evil angels will good.
Furthermore, it should be known that the good angels are so confirmed through grace that they cannot will or do evil. Likewise, the evil angels are so hardened through malice that they cannot will or do good. Against this, an objection is raised from Jerome, who says (223): God alone is the one into whom sin cannot fall. All other things, since they possess free will, can be bent in either direction. However, he must be understood to have said this according to the simple nature of the will, according to which even angels can be changed, not according to the consolation of grace or its deprivation, according to which they absolutely cannot be changed. Whence Isidore (224): Angels are changeable by nature, but unchangeable by grace. Augustine also (225): God alone cannot sin not by any grace but by His own nature. Therefore, for whatever rational creature it is granted that it cannot sin, this belongs not to its own nature but to the grace of God. According to this we also say that whatever rational creature cannot act well does not have this from its nature but from its own malice.
The confirmed good have freer will than before. On the hierarchies of the angels.
But the good do not therefore lack free will, as Augustine says (225*), because they cannot will evil; for much freer is the will that cannot serve sin, by which good is voluntarily chosen and evil rejected. So too the evil have free will, so corrupted by malice that they cannot serve justice, by which they voluntarily avoid good and always pursue evil. The angels are also set over one another, both good and evil. They are also set over cities, provinces, and persons, as Scripture attests in Daniel and in very many other places. The evil angels are also each set over particular vices. Whence we speak of the Spirit of pride and the Spirit of lust. Hence it is that riches are called by the name of the demon Mammon, not because they belong to him, but because one of them uses them more specially than the rest for the deception of mankind. So too it must be believed that the good angels are individually set over particular virtues.
On the knowledge of the demons. The threefold knowledge of demons. Magical arts come from demons.
But although the evil angels are so hardened through malice, yet they are not entirely deprived of keen sense. For as Isidore (226) and Augustine (227) relate, they possess a threefold sharpness of knowledge, namely: subtlety of nature, experience of time, and reports from the higher spirits. By their knowledge and power, magical arts are also practiced. Just as Pharaoh's magicians made serpents and frogs through them in Egypt (Exod. 8). But they must not be thought creators of these things, just as neither are parents the creators of children, nor farmers of crops. For there is one Creator of all things alone, by whom all these things, which come forth to our eyes when opportunities are received, have been created in a certain weaving of elements, as if with certain seeds placed there, from which as from original patterns they take the beginnings of progress and the increase of due magnitude and distinction of forms.
These seeds, then, known by the subtlety of sense to both good and evil angels alike, they bring forth as suitable things from hidden seeds (and then nature operates through the fitting blending of elements), scatter them secretly, and thus provide occasions for the generation of things and the acceleration of growth; yet the power of God always works from within. Whence He alone is Creator.
Why knowledge and such great power of working was given to the demon.
This knowledge and power was given to the demons by God, as Augustine says (227*): either for deceiving the deceitful, as the Egyptians themselves; or for warning the faithful, lest they desire to do such things as something great; or for exercising and proving the patience of the just.
The power of the demons is restricted.
Furthermore, it should be known that they cannot do -- on account of the superior power of God or the angels not permitting -- whatever they could do through the subtlety of their nature. For, as Augustine says (228), no other reason presents itself why those who made frogs and serpents could not make gnats, except that the greater dominion of God prohibiting through the Holy Spirit was present: which even the magicians confessed, saying: The finger of God is here (Exod. 8).
(223) In the treatise On the Prodigal Son, to Pope Damasus, at the end.
(224) On the Supreme Good, Book 1, chapter 12.
(225) Against Maximinus, Book 3, chapter 12.
(225*) In the Enchiridion, chapter 105.
(226) On the Supreme Good, Book 1, chapter 12.
(227) On Genesis, Book 2, chapter 17.
(227*) On the Trinity, Book 3, chapter 7.
(228) On the Trinity, Book 3, same chapter.
Distinction 8. Whether angels have bodies. Even if angels had bodies, they are not corporeal.
Whether angels have bodies is also customarily asked. Although it is thought by some that they do not have bodies, Augustine nevertheless seems clearly to hold that they do have bodies, namely where he treats of the ancient bodily forms by which God was shown to human eyes. For he says among other things (229): Angels were sent to speak in the person of God. But I confess this exceeds the powers of my understanding: whether, while the spiritual quality of their own body remains, they assume something from the lower, more corporeal elements, or whether they transform their own prior bodies into what they wish, adapted to what they are doing.
He also seems to say the same thing in his commentary on Genesis (230), that all angels had bodies at creation in which they could not suffer, which were preserved for the good angels after confirmation; but were changed for the transgressors, so that they could suffer. Finally, even granting that angels have bodies, it does not therefore follow that they are corporeal, because our souls also have bodies and yet are not corporeal.
Whether demons fill the heart of man substantially. God alone enters the mind. How Satan is said to fill the heart.
Finally, it should be known that demons enter the bodies of men by God's permission, to oppress and vex them. Whence the Gospel records that demons entered into certain people and were cast out by Christ (Matt. 4 and 8; Mark 1; Luke 4, 9, and 11). But they do not substantially enter into anyone's heart. Whence Augustine says (231): We do not believe that demons substantially enter into the soul through energetic operation, that is, through inwardly effective action, but are united to it by application and oppression. But to enter into the mind is possible only for Him who created it. Likewise Bede (232): It should be noted that nothing can fill the mind of man in substance except the creating Trinity; for the soul is filled according to operation only, and the justice of the will, from those things that are created. Satan fills someone's heart not indeed by entering into him and into his understanding -- for this is the power of God alone -- but by drawing the soul into the inclination of malice through cunning deception, through thoughts and incentives to vice, in the manner in which he filled the heart of Ananias and Judas (John 13; Acts 5).
(229) On the Trinity, Book 3, chapter 1.
(230) On the Literal Meaning of Genesis, Book 3, chapter 10.
(231) Augustine, On Ecclesiastical Doctrine, chapter 33.
(232) On that passage Acts 5: Why has Satan tempted your heart?
Distinction 9. On the orders of angels. The nine orders of angels. Dionysius establishes only three orders.
Now it remains to see how many orders of angels there are, and what an order is and whence it derives its name, and whether they were thus distinguished from their very creation. Scripture frequently proclaims that there are nine orders of angels: angels, archangels, principalities, and powers, virtues, dominations, thrones, cherubim, and seraphim. Some, however, like Dionysius (233), hold only three orders, placing three in each, so as to suggest that the image of the Trinity exists in the order of the angels.
What an order is, and the reason for each name.
An order is a multitude of heavenly spirits who are alike among themselves in some gift of grace, just as they also agree in the reception of natural endowments. Thus the Seraphim, which is interpreted as 'burning' or 'kindling,' are those who burn with charity above the rest. The Cherubim also, which is interpreted as 'fullness of knowledge,' are those who excel above the rest in knowledge. And so on for the others.
The individual orders. How they are named from the gifts of grace.
The individual orders are also named from the gifts of graces which were given to them not singly but excellently. Whence Gregory (234): In that heavenly city, each order is reckoned by the name of that thing which it possesses more fully as a gift. 'More fully,' however, understand either in comparison to the orders beneath it, or in comparison to the other gifts which the same order received less fully. Moreover, just as in the order of apostles or martyrs not all are equal, so also it must be understood in the orders of angels.
Whether they were thus distinguished from their very creation.
It seems, however, that they were thus distinguished from their very creation, because Scripture says that some fell from each of the orders. But this cannot stand. For if they burned with charity, as the seraphim, and excelled in knowledge, as the cherubim, and God sat in them, as thrones, and so on for the other orders, they could not have fallen. Indeed, it should be known that the angels from their very creation had different degrees, both in subtlety of nature and in clarity of form, so that some were higher, others lower, and others in between. According to this, therefore, it is said that some fell from each of the orders. Or it is said because, if those who fell had persevered, some of them would have been confirmed in each of the orders.
In what sense it is said that a tenth order is completed from human beings.
Scripture also says that a tenth order is completed from human beings. But how is it called a tenth order, when we have stated above that there are only nine? Especially since Gregory says (235) that humans are to be assumed into the order of both the lower and higher angels. It is not therefore said as though there is a tenth order of humans and nine of angels, but because the loss of angels will be restored from humans, of whom so many fell that they could make one order, as it were a tenth; or as many fell as remained in any one order. Whence the Apostle says that all things are restored in Christ, things in heaven and things on earth (Eph. 1).
Humans will be saved according to the number of those who stood, not of those who fell.
Yet it is believed that humans will be saved not according to the number of those who fell, but of those who remained. Whence Gregory (236): That heavenly city is made up of angels and humans, to which we believe as many of the human race will ascend as it is established that angels remained there. As it is written: He established the boundaries of the peoples according to the number of the angels of God (Deut. 32).
(233) On the Celestial Hierarchy, Book 1.
(234) Homily 34, on the Gospels.
(235) Homily 34, on the Gospel of Luke 15.
(236) At the place cited above.
Distinction 10. Angels are sent from each of the orders. Confirmation from the lesser.
It can also be faithfully believed that heavenly spirits from every order are sent to announce these outward things. Whence the Apostle: All are ministering spirits, sent for service (Heb. 1). And in the Psalm: Who makes His angels spirits (Psalm 103). Isaiah also says: One of the seraphim flew to me (Isa. 6), which is the highest order. Nor should it seem unworthy if even the higher ones are sent, since the Son of God Himself was sent to these lower things.
Others, however, think differently, because in Daniel it is written: Thousands of thousands ministered to Him -- as if in these outward things, which they say is said of the lower orders. And ten thousand times a hundred thousand stood before Him (Dan. 7): this refers to the higher orders, as those who never depart from God through ministry. Whence Dionysius (237): In the celestial hierarchy, which is called the sacred principality, those higher hosts never withdraw from the innermost, since those who are preeminent never have the function of external office. But this should be understood of ordinary office. For their order is not reckoned by office. Sometimes indeed, when a cause arises outside the common dispensation, they are sent for the eminence or significance of a greater matter.
(237) Chapter 7, and Gregory's Homily 34 verbatim.
Distinction 11. A guardian angel is assigned to every person from birth.
Furthermore, it should be known that to every person one good angel is assigned for protection, and one evil angel for testing. Whence Gregory says that each person has one good angel assigned to him for protection, and one evil angel for testing. Concerning the good angels, the Truth, forbidding the scandal of the little ones, says: Their angels always see the face of the Father (Matt. 18). Where Jerome says (238): Great is the dignity of souls, that each one has an angel delegated for its protection from the moment of birth.
Whether one angel is assigned to each individual person or to several.
Finally, it can be believed without offense either that individual angels are assigned to individual persons, or that one angel is assigned to several persons, at the same or at different times. Nor should it be wondered at that one angel is assigned to the protection of several persons, since even to one man the custody of many persons is assigned or committed.
Whether the angels advance in merit or reward. He reconciles the apparent controversy among the doctors.
Finally, it should be known that it is faithfully said that the good angels advance in merit until the day of judgment, because they daily serve the needs of men and devote themselves to their progress, through which they merit. And they also advance in reward, that is, in love. For they advance in knowledge, and the more they know, the more they love. That they do know more, Isaiah testifies, speaking in the person of the angels who knew less of the mystery of the incarnate Word, saying: Who is this who comes from Edom, in garments stained from Bozrah? (Isa. 63.) And the Psalm: Who is this king of glory? (Psalm 23.) The Apostle also says: What is the dispensation of the mystery hidden from the ages in God, that the manifold wisdom of God might be made known through the Church to the principalities and powers in the heavens (Eph. 3).
Where although Augustine says (239) that the mystery of the kingdom of heaven was not hidden from the angels, yet they did not understand it fully. Whence Jerome says in the same place (240) that the angelic dignities understood the aforesaid mystery only imperfectly, until the preaching of the apostles was extended to the nations: through this, therefore, it is clear that the angels advance in knowing. Nor does what Gregory says (241) contradict this: What is there that they do not know, where they know Him who knows all things? For he says that they are ignorant of nothing, namely of those things without which there is no blessedness. And those things are what pertains to the mystery of the unity and Trinity.
(238) On Matthew, at the place cited above.
(239) On Genesis in the original sense, Book 5, chapter 16.
(240) Jerome, on the Epistle to the Ephesians, chapter 3.
(241) Dialogues, Book 4, chapter 3, and Moralia, Book 20, chapter 3.
On the distinction of the works of the six days. What is signified by 'earth.'
After the treatise on the angelic nature, it now remains to see about other things. For God created in the beginning not only heaven, that is the angels, but also earth (Gen. 1), that is, the confused matter of the four elements, which, I say, was called 'earth,' as Augustine says (242), because among the elements it is the least beautiful. It was also called 'the deep,' as it is written: And darkness was upon the face of the deep (ibid.), because it was conjoined, lacking distinct and clear form. The same was also called 'water,' over which the Spirit of the Lord was borne, as the will of a craftsman over prepared material. It was also called water because whatever is born on earth begins to be formed and nourished from moisture. This was created before any day. But then it was distinguished, with individual things receiving their proper forms. This was indeed not done all at once, as some of the Fathers seem to teach, but through the course of six days, as the Catholic faith holds.
Why it was called formless earth.
Being about to examine this distinction, therefore, let us first explain why that matter is called formless, and where it came into being, and how high it extended. Matter was therefore called formless, not because it entirely lacked form. For this could not be, since it was a body; but because it had not yet received a beautiful, fitting, and distinct form, such as we now see. It was therefore first made and arranged in the form of confusion, and secondly in the form of distinction.
On the modes of divine operation.
Finally, it seems worth noting what Alcuin handed down concerning this passage. God operates, he says (243), in four modes: first, by disposing all things in the Word; second, by creating uniformly in matter; third, by distinguishing through the works of six days; fourth, by reforming -- not new things but known ones -- repeatedly lest they perish.
Where that matter came into being, and how high it extended.
Accordingly, if it is asked where the confused matter came into being -- we think it must be faithfully believed that it was where it now subsists in formed state. And it extended upward to where the summit of corporeal nature now reaches. Indeed, as some hold, beyond the firmament.
(242) On Genesis against the Manichaeans, Book 1, chapter 7.
(243) On Genesis.
The firmament -- that mass was extended, which in its lower part was denser, but in its upper part was thinner and lighter: and from that part, they say, come the waters which are said to be above the firmament. Such, therefore, was the appearance of the world in the beginning, before it received the distinction which was made in six days.
Distinction 13. The Distinction of the First Day.
And so the work of the first day was the formation of light. Whence Scripture consequently says: God said, Let there be light, and there was light, and He divided the light from the darkness (Gen. 1). Fittingly, moreover, the adornment of the world began from light, through which the other things that were to be created might be seen (244).
What that light was. This light can be understood as spiritual, namely the angelic nature, as Augustine says (245); which previously was darkness, when it was created formless; but it was made light when turned toward the Creator, and clinging to Him by charity. Or it can also be understood to have been corporeal: which is more probable, like a luminous cloud, with which the day began.
Where the light was made. It can be believed to have been made there where the solar body is now located. For it held the place of the sun until the third day, and by its motion turning around it distinguished night and day, just as the sun is now carried in its daily course, and distinguishes the same things. And He called the light Day, and the darkness Night.
In how many ways 'day' is understood. The order of computing the days. Finally, 'day' is understood in many ways. For 'day' means the light itself, as was stated above, and the illumination of the air, as often occurs, and a span of twenty-four hours, according to what is said: And there was evening and morning, one day (Gen. 1), which is to be understood thus: Evening came first, while after the completion of the daytime course the light was declining toward its setting, and afterward the morning of the second day, the same light having returned by its nocturnal course to its rising. For the first day did not have a morning, which is the dawn, but began from full light, and was terminated at the morning of the second day: thus it was reckoned, so that day preceded and night followed, which continued until the time of the Lord's burial. This is not without mystery. For man fell from the light of justice through sin into the darkness of ignorance. But from the Resurrection of the Lord, the day is reckoned from evening to evening, so that night precedes and day follows. This too is a mystery, because through Christ man returns from darkness to light. Whence the Apostle: You were once darkness, but now you are light in the Lord (Eph. 5).
Why the sun was made. How that saying should be understood: God said. How God works in the Word and through the Word. But if it is asked why the sun was made, when that light was making the day? It can be said that that light illuminated the upper parts but not the lower, and therefore the sun was made, so that either in the same part the body of the sun was formed from it (246). It must be known from this that God did not speak temporally so that light would come to be, because not changeably, as Augustine says (247): Nor with a sound of voice, since there was no tongue with which to speak. It is therefore referred to the nature of the Word, as if He spoke not with a sound of voice, but in the Word co-eternal with Himself; that is, He begot the Word, in whom He disposed from eternity what He was going to make in time, in that same Word. For the Father works in the Word and through the Word, as Scripture frequently says, not as a craftsman through an instrument, but because He begot the maker of all things. Whence Chrysostom (248): Just as the Father is said to judge through the Son, because He begot the Judge, so also to work through the Son, because it is established that He begot the Maker. Or to work through the Son means with the Son. Yet the Son is not similarly said to work through the Father, although He works with the Father, in order to preserve the authority of the principle in the Father. The same things are to be understood of the Holy Spirit.
(244) Ambrose, Hexameron, book 1, ch. 9.
(245) On Genesis, De Genesi ad Litteram, 1, ch. 3-5.
(246) Augustine, De Genesi ad Litteram, book 1, ch. 11.
(247) On Genesis, book 1, ch. 2 and 9.
(248) In the exposition of the Epistle to the Hebrews, homily 2, ch. 1.
Distinction 14. On the Distinction of the Second Day, on Which the Firmament Was Made.
From what material the firmament was made. God also said: Let there be a firmament in the midst of the waters, and let it divide the waters from the waters (Gen. 1). Namely the waters which are in the air and on the earth, from the waters which are above the firmament. Of which it is said: Who covers its upper parts with waters (Ps. 103): it is here a question of the starry firmament, which can be believed to have been made from waters, in the manner of crystal, as Bede testifies (249): although others say that the heaven which exceeds the extent of the air is of a fiery nature. Augustine also seems to agree with these (250): Yet whatever is believed, it does not harm the faith. But what kind the waters above the firmament are, and for what purpose they were established, He alone knows who established them.
Why it is called the firmament. Finally, it is called the firmament, not on account of its standing still, but on account of its firmness, and the impassable boundary of the waters.
Why God was silent about the goodness of the creatures of the second day. It should also be noted that on this day, unlike the others, we do not read: God saw that it was good. Not that it was not so, but on account of some mystery to be commended. For perhaps it was done on account of the abhorrence of the number two, which is the principle of otherness and division.
On the distinction of the third day. The distinction of the third day was the gathering of the waters into one place. For God said: Let the waters be gathered together into one place, and let the dry land appear (Gen. 1). For it could have happened that the earth, subsiding, provided hollow parts where it might receive the surging waters, and dry land suitable for plants might come to be.
Where the waters were gathered. All the waters are said to have been gathered into one place, on account of the great sea, from which they go out and to which they return. They are also called gatherings of the waters, on account of the many-branched gulfs and their very many derivations from the same sea.
So there you have how on the first day light was created, which would illuminate all things, and on the second the firmament was made, which would divide the waters from the waters. Then on the third day, when the masses of waters had been collected within their receptacles, the earth was revealed and the air was made clear. In the first three days, therefore, the elements were distinguished; in the following three they were adorned, which we must now consider.
On the adornment of the fourth day when the luminaries were made. The adornment of the heavens, therefore, on the fourth day was the creation of the luminaries. For God said: Let there be luminaries in the firmament of heaven, and let them divide the day and the night (Gen. 1). For by these it was provided for men that, as the sun went around, they might enjoy the alternation of day and night. They were also consoled by the moon and stars, lest the night remain unbeautiful. Of which it is also added: And let them be for signs and for seasons, and for days and years (ibid.). This was said not because the seasons first began on the fourth day, but because they serve as signs of fair weather and storms, and for the customary distinction of days and years, and of the four seasons of the year, namely spring, summer, winter, and autumn.
(249) On Genesis, in various places. Damascene, De Fide Orthodoxa, book II, ch. 6.
(250) Augustine, De Genesi ad Litteram, book II, ch. 3.
Distinction 15. On the Adornment of the Fifth Day.
The adornment of the fifth day was the creation of living creatures from the waters. For thus God said: Let the waters produce creeping things of living soul and flying things over the earth (Gen.). By these two elements were adorned, namely the air with flying creatures, and the waters with swimming creatures.
On the adornment of the sixth day. On the sixth day also the earth was adorned with beasts. Whence God said: Let the earth produce a living soul, cattle, creeping things, and beasts of the earth, according to their kinds (Gen. 1), all of which were created harmless, but on account of sin most became harmful.
On the creation of man. When all things had therefore been arranged as we have briefly touched upon, man was made last, and was brought into the world as the lord and possessor of all things. Whence it follows: God saw that it was good, and said: Let us make man in our image and likeness (Gen. 1): let us now treat of his creation, but let us first finish with the seventh day.
On the adornment of the seventh day. It is therefore written: God completed His work on the seventh day, and rested from all the work which He had done (Gen. 2), that is, had completed.
How it is to be understood that God rested. Finally, God is said to have rested, not as though weary from working, but by ceasing to make new creatures. Just as it is also understood in the Apocalypse: They had no rest, it says, saying: Holy (Rev. 4), that is, they did not cease saying Holy.
How it is to be understood that God completed His work on the seventh day. The blessing of the seventh day. But in what way is He said to have completed His work on that day, when on it He is read to have made nothing; unless perhaps because on it He blessed and sanctified, as Scripture testifies: He blessed, it says, the seventh day, and sanctified it (Gen. 2), which was a kind of working. Just as Solomon performed a work when he dedicated the temple. He is said to have sanctified that day because He endowed it above the others with a mystical blessing. Whence in the law: Remember to sanctify the sabbath day (Exod. 20): or, God completed His work on the seventh day, that is, He saw it as perfect and consummated.
(251) In the book De Quantitate Animae, ch. 2.
Distinction 16. On the Creation of Man.
How man was made. Having run through the above matters concerning the creation of man, let us now inquire how and of what kind man was made, then how man fell, and thirdly how he was restored. In Genesis, therefore, we read: Let us make man in our image and likeness (Gen. 1). By saying 'let us make,' the one work of the three Persons is shown: by saying 'our,' the equal substance of the three Persons is shown or demonstrated. For this is spoken from the Person of the Father to the Son and to the Holy Spirit, not to the angels, because God and the angels do not share one image or likeness.
Of what kind man was made. In what things the image and likeness are considered. Thus man was made according to the mind in the image of God on account of memory, understanding, and love. In the likeness, however, on account of innocence and justice, which are naturally in the mind of man. Or the image is in all other things. The likeness, however, is in the essence of the soul, because it is both immortal and indivisible. Whence Augustine (251): The soul was made similar to God, because God made it immortal and indissoluble. The image, therefore, pertains to form, the likeness to nature.
How man is called the image of God. Man is also called the image of God. Whence the Apostle: Man is the image and glory of God (1 Cor. 11): which is properly said of the mind, and yet it is said of man, in whom is the very likeness, he is called the image.
Man is called image and 'to the image' of God: but the Son is called image only. It should also be noted that man is called image, and 'to the image'; but the Son is called image only, and Augustine explains why (252): Man is called image in such a way that he is also 'to the image,' because he does not equal by parity but approaches by a certain likeness; but the Son is the image, yet not 'to the image,' because He is equal to the Father. Thus according to the property of the mind man is similar to God, but even his body indicates this, in that it is erected toward heaven.
(252) De Trinitate, book VII, ch. 6, at the end.
Distinction 17. On the Creation of Adam's Soul.
Therefore the making of Adam's body and soul is described when it says: God formed man from the slime of the earth, as regards the body. Likewise: And He breathed into his face the breath of life (Gen. 2), as regards the soul.
Or according to others, He blew or breathed upon, not that we should understand this to have been done with bodily hands or with a mouth, but by willing and commanding it to be done. For God is a spirit, not a body, who made whatever He willed. He breathed in, that is, He made a breath, yet not from His own substance. For to breathe is to make a breath, that is, a soul. Whence through Isaiah (47): Every breath, that is, every soul, I have made.
How the soul was created. For God made Adam's soul according to Augustine (253), with the angels without a body; but according to others, it was created in the body, so as to animate the whole body. He specifically mentioned the face, because above the other parts of the body, it is adorned with the senses. But whatever may have been the case with Adam's soul, regarding others it must be held that they are created in the body; for God infuses them by creating, and creates by infusing.
At what age Adam was created and where? Whether paradise is corporeal. Description of paradise. The tree of knowledge of good and evil. How man knew good and evil. How disobedience is best considered. Adam was created at a mature age, as Augustine says on Genesis (254). Man was not made in paradise, but outside it, and was then placed in paradise, as Scripture teaches: The Lord took man, it says, and placed him in the paradise of pleasure, which He had planted from the beginning (Gen. 2). By which it was signified that man ought to advance toward better things. This paradise is understood to be a local place, which can be taken as planted from that beginning when God commanded the earth to produce grasses and trees (254*). Or 'from the beginning' means in the east. Whence the ancient text says 'toward the east.' There is a most pleasant place there, fruitful with a great spring, and adorned with trees of diverse kinds and fruits. Among them is one tree, called the tree of life, because it received this power by divine gift: that whoever ate of its fruit would have his body strengthened with stable health and perpetual solidity, and would not decline toward deterioration and death. There is also there the tree of knowledge of good and evil, so called not because the tree was bad, but because on account of the prohibition there would be a transgression in it, by which man through experience would learn what the difference was between the good of obedience and the evil of disobedience. For man, before he touched this tree, knew good through experience and prudence; but evil through prudence only. But when the forbidden thing was taken, he also knew evil through experience. Nor is it better considered how great an evil disobedience is, than when man is understood to have been made guilty because he touched a thing that was forbidden, which would not have harmed the one who touched it, if it had not been forbidden. For if you touch a poisonous thing that is forbidden, the punishment seems to follow not so much from the prohibition as from the nature of the thing. But when you touch a good thing that is forbidden, the punishment comes from disobedience alone, just as the reward is demonstrated to come from obedience.
(253) Ch. 57, according to the Septuagint translation. On Genesis, book VII, ch. 25 and 27.
(254) De Genesi ad Litteram, book VI, ch. 13.
(254*) Augustine, De Genesi ad Litteram, book VII, ch. 3.
Distinction 18. On the Formation of Woman.
Then in paradise God formed woman from the substance of man, as Scripture says: God sent a deep sleep upon Adam, it says. And when he had fallen asleep, He took one of his ribs, and built it into a woman (Gen. 2).
Why was woman made from the side of man? Woman was therefore made from the side of man, not from the head or from the feet, because she was prepared to be neither a mistress nor a servant to him. For if she had been made from the head, she would have seemed to be preferred over man for domination; and if from the feet, to be subjected to servitude; but she was made from the side, so that through this it might be shown that she was created for the fellowship of man's love, and as an aid for generation (255).
Why Adam was created first and Eve not simultaneously? She was not made at the same time as the man, but the man alone first, from whom she came afterward, so that through this the image of God might appear in man. For just as God is the principle of all creation, so Adam is the principle of generation. In this also the pride of the devil is blunted, who wickedly wished to usurp being the principle.
Why was woman made from the sleeping man? That the soul is not from propagation? The fact that woman was made while sleep was sent upon Adam was a sacrament of Christ and the Church. For just as woman was formed from the side of the sleeping man (256), so the Church from the sacraments which flowed from the side of Christ sleeping on the cross (John 19), washed by water and blood from sins, redeemed from punishments. Thus the body of the woman was derived from the body of the man; which cannot similarly be understood of the soul, which is not from propagation. For Jerome (257) binds with the bond of anathema those who say that souls come from propagation, bringing in the authority of the prophet: Who fashioned their hearts one by one (Ps. 32); here, he says, the prophet sufficiently indicates that God does not make a soul from a soul, but creates souls one by one from nothing.
(255) From Augustine, De Genesi ad Litteram, ch. 13.
(256) From Augustine, De Civitate Dei, book XII, ch. 26.
(257) On Psalm 32.
Distinction 19. On the State of Man.
On the first state of man, namely before the fall. On the state of man after the fall. Here a threefold consideration of the state of man presents itself: what kind of being man was before sin, after sin, and will be in the resurrection. In the first state, therefore, man had the ability to die and the ability not to die. In the second state, namely after sin, he had the ability to die and the inability not to die. In the third state he will have the ability not to die and the inability to die. Whence Augustine (258): First from the slime of the earth was formed an animal body, not a spiritual one, with which kind we also shall rise. For before sin it was mortal and immortal, because it could die and could not die, which sin was going to make dead, as the Apostle says: For this body is not mortal as the first man's was, but worse, because it has the necessity of dying (Rom. 5; 1 Cor. 15). Which will be changed into a spiritual body, and will no longer be able to be dissolved, when it has put on immortality. For the children of the resurrection will no longer be able to sin or to die.
Whence Adam's immortality before sin. The flesh of Adam appears to have been immortal before sin from the condition of nature, needing to be aided partly by the nourishment of food, and partly to be perfected through eating of the tree of life. Whence Augustine (259): The flesh of Adam before sin was so created as immortal that it would be preserved by the nourishment of the other trees which he was commanded to eat, until, having been brought to the age pleasing to the Creator, at His command he would take from the tree of life, by which, made perfectly immortal, he would no longer require the sustenance of food. Nor does what Augustine says (260) cause difficulty, namely: In a certain way man was created immortal, which was his from the tree of life, not from the condition of nature. With this meaning the words of the Lord speaking about Adam after sin agree: See lest perhaps he take from the tree of life, and live forever (Gen. 3).
But some still object, thinking that the first parents did not need food before sin, and they say: If they had not sinned, they would not have died; but they would not have sinned if they had not eaten, because they could have lived without nourishment. To which it is said that they would have sinned not only by eating of the forbidden, but also by not using what was permitted. For both had been commanded, namely to use these things, and to abstain from that one. Whence Augustine (261): Both were contained in the commandments, that they should eat of the permitted things and abstain from the forbidden.
Likewise, if they had not sinned, they would not have felt hunger, since it is a punishment of sin. But without hunger they would have eaten superfluously. To which it is said: Hunger is truly a punishment of sin. For it is an immoderate appetite for eating. Man would not have been subject to this if he had not sinned, but he would still have had a natural and moderate appetite, which it was also necessary to satisfy before sin.
(258) On Genesis, book VI, ch. 19 and 24.
(259) Book of Questions on the Old and New Law, ch. 10.
(260) On Genesis, book VI, ch. 25.
(261) In the place cited above in the Questions on the New and Old Testament.
Distinction 20. Why the First Parents Did Not Have Intercourse in Paradise.
The first parents, though created in paradise, did not have intercourse. Because after the woman was created, they soon transgressed and were expelled: or because God had not yet commanded them to come together, and the divine authority could be awaited, where concupiscence did not press upon them.
Where the first parents begot children. How they would have begotten before sin? Having been sent forth from paradise, they begot children. For them, honorable marriage and an undefiled bed could have been there without the burning of lust, without the labor of giving birth. Because it must be believed that before sin they could have commanded their reproductive members, just as the other members in any work, without any itch of pleasure. But after sin, they merited that movement which marriage truly orders and continence restrains. For weakness prone to the ruin of shameful behavior is received by the honor of marriage, and what would have been a duty for the healthy is a remedy for the sick.
What the children begotten before sin would have been like. What should be held about the mind of the soul. It can be questioned whether, if they had begotten before sin, those begotten would immediately have been perfect in bodily stature and mental faculties, like Adam when he was created, or whether they would have progressed through intervals of time, as happens now? Certainly nothing determined by authority on this matter presents itself, except that perhaps it was necessary for infants to be born small, as Augustine says (262), on account of the necessity of the womb. But this is certain: what corresponds to the proper weakness of the mind, this the weakness of the flesh also shows: namely that for a newborn human, neither are the feet suitable for walking, nor are the hands even capable of scratching, which is otherwise in the young of many animals, who run immediately after birth and follow their mother.
Finally, if anyone said that they would have progressed in soul through an interval of time, he would not thereby be forced to confess that ignorance, which is a punishment of sin, could have existed in them before sin. For not everyone who does not know something, and knows less perfectly, is immediately ignorant; because ignorance is not spoken of unless what ought to be known and not be unknown is not known: such ignorance is a punishment of sin. Such, however, was the state of man before sin, as has been said, from which, if he had not sinned, he was to be transferred with all his posterity to the love of perpetual happiness.
(262) De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione, 37.
Distinction 21. On the Envious Temptation of the Devil.
The devil, therefore, seeing that man could ascend through humility to where he himself had fallen through pride, envied him, and therefore approached to tempt and cast him down. But because his malice is timid in attacking virtue, he targeted not the man, in whom he knew more reason flourished, but the weak woman.
Why the demon came in another form? On the manner of temptation. Lest his fraud be detected, he wished to come not in his own form, but in another's. And so God permitted him a form fitting to his malice, namely that of the serpent, through which he might tempt, which the devil, filling with his own spirit, as Augustine says, made the wisest of all beasts. Hence the serpent is called more cunning than all the animals of the earth (Gen. 3). Not indeed from a rational soul, but by the spirit of the devil, by which it was filled, who is the most cunning. In this form, therefore, he stood before the woman saying: Why has God commanded you not to eat of every tree of paradise? The woman replied: Lest perhaps we die (ibid.). By which saying she opened the way for seduction, and therefore he immediately added: You shall not die at all. For God knows that on whatever day you eat of it, your eyes shall be opened, and you shall be as gods, knowing good and evil (ibid.).
Man was tempted in three ways. What is gluttony? Vainglory? Avarice? Here the devil tempted man in three ways: by gluttony, vainglory, and avarice. By gluttony, persuading about food, saying: On whatever day you eat; by vainglory, promising divinity, saying: You shall be as gods; by avarice, promising knowledge, saying: Knowing good and evil. Gluttony, moreover, is an immoderate craving for food; vainglory is an excessive regard for one's own excellence; avarice is an enormous desire for possessing, which is not only for money, but for everything that is desired beyond measure.
On the order and progression of human perdition. Note also here the order of human perdition. First God affirmed, saying: On whatever day you eat of it, you shall surely die. Then the woman said doubtingly: Lest perhaps we die. Thirdly the devil denied, saying: You shall not die at all. The doubter, therefore, departed from the one affirming, and, so as to perish, drew near to the one denying.
Distinction 22. On the Sin of Man.
Then seeing the tree, that it was beautiful to behold and sweet to eat, believing the words of the serpent, she ate, and gave to her husband (Gen. 3), in which, at the devil's suggestion, both sinned.
Whether pride of mind preceded man's fall? It seems, however, that their sin preceded the temptation, in that Augustine says on Genesis (263): It must not be thought that man would have been cast down unless a certain pride needing to be suppressed had preceded in him. Likewise (264): How would the woman have believed the words of the tempter, unless there had been in her mind a love of her own power, and a proud presumption about herself? If this is so, man did not sin first by the suggestion of another. Since authority teaches that the sin of the devil is incurable because he fell not by suggestion but by his own pride; but man's sin is curable because he fell not through himself but through another, and therefore could rise through another (265). But to this we say that the pride did not precede the temptation, but the act of eating the forbidden fruit. For this was the order of events: First came the temptation of the seducer, second followed the pride of mind in man, and third came the transgression of the disobedient.
What the pride of mind of each was? In what Adam was deceived. Such was the pride of the woman: that she wished to have the likeness of God, thinking that what the devil had said was true: You shall be as gods. This pride was by no means in the man, nor was he seduced, as the Apostle says: he did not believe to be true what the devil was suggesting (1 Tim. 2), namely that God had forbidden touching the tree because He knew they would become like gods if they touched it. Yet when Adam saw that the woman, having taken that food, had not physically died, as he had believed, immediately some pride attached itself to his mind, whereby he too desired to try the forbidden tree. For Adam was not seduced, as the Apostle says (1 Tim. 2): Not, I say, in that in which the woman was, namely to believe that it was true that 'you shall be as gods'; but he was deceived in this, that he thought that sin was venial. Whence Augustine (266): Adam, inexperienced in divine severity, could be deceived in this, that he believed that offence to be venial.
The opinion of some that Adam also desired to be like God. Moreover, it seems that the man also wished to be like God. For where it is said: What I did not seize, then I was paying back, Augustine says (267), Adam seized and Eve, presuming like the devil, wished to seize divinity from the divine nature, and they lost happiness. Likewise Augustine on that text: O God, who shall be like You? (Ps. 82): He who of himself wishes to be like God, perversely wishes to be similar to God, like the devil, who did not wish to be under Him: and man, who as a servant did not wish to be held by a commandment, but wished that, with no one ruling over him, he might be as God. Likewise on that saying of Paul to the Philippians (2): He did not consider it robbery to be equal to God. Because He did not usurp what was not His own, as the devil and the first man did (268). To which they say that Adam wished this because the woman taken from him wished it. But how did sin enter the world through one man? They respond: Because it entered through the woman made from the man. For the woman sinned before the man.
Which of them sinned more? But it seems better to some that Adam also desired to be like God, but because he did not believe that this could happen, he was not so inflamed as the woman, who thought this could happen: and therefore she was more proud in her ambition. The man therefore sinned less than the woman.
That the man sinned less than the woman. The man is also understood to have sinned less because, as Augustine says (269): He thought about pardon and about penance, and about God's mercy: for he thought both could happen, that he might accommodate his wife, and through penance have forgiveness. The same also appears from this, that the woman sinned against herself, against God, and against her neighbor. But the man sinned only against himself and against God. From this also it appears that the woman was more severely punished, to whom it is said: In sorrow you shall bring forth children (Gen. 3).
He objects against what was said, that the man sinned less. But Augustine (269*) seems to be contrary to this when speaking of those who excuse their sin. For, he says, Adam does not confess his sin, but says: The woman whom You gave me, gave to me and I ate (ibid.). The woman likewise does not confess, but referring it to another says: The serpent deceived me, and I ate (ibid.): they sinned with unequal sex but equal pride. That is: distinguish three sins of the parents in the affair of our perdition: the sin of transgression and the sin of excuse, in which they sinned equally with equal knowledge and pride; and the sin of pride, in which, on account of unequal ambition, as was said, one sinned more or less than the other.
It is also objected that since sin is committed in three ways, as Isidore says (270): namely by ignorance, weakness, and deliberation; and it is graver to sin by deliberation than by ignorance: Adam seems to have sinned more, because he sinned knowingly, for he was not seduced. But the woman was seduced, as was said, so that she might seem excusable through ignorance. To which it must be said that the ignorance of Eve cannot be excused, because she could have known but did not wish to. For she was endowed with reason and knowledge, especially since she knew she had received a commandment against the devil's persuasion. For she herself says: God commanded us (Gen. 3). But the excuse of ignorance is taken away from them, as Augustine says (271): who know God's commandments.
On the threefold ignorance. Ignorance is of three kinds. One is affected, as of those who can know but do not wish to, in whom it is itself a sin. Another is unwelcome to its possessors, namely of those who wish to know but cannot, in whom it is a punishment of sin, and not sin. Another is simple, as of those who simply do not know: in whom it is also sin. Whence Augustine (272): It is one thing to have not known, another to have not wished to know, because in those who did not wish to understand, ignorance itself is sin. In those who could not, it is a punishment of sin. The ignorance of those who simply do not know excuses no one so that he does not burn in eternal fire, but perhaps so that he burns less. Affected ignorance is vincible; unwelcome ignorance is invincible; simple ignorance is partly vincible, and thus is imputed for punishment; partly invincible, and thus excuses from greater punishment.
(263) Book II, ch. 5.
(264) De Genesi ad Litteram, 11, ch. 30.
(265) Augustine, De Genesi ad Litteram, in the place previously cited.
(266) De Genesi, book 11, ch. 42.
(267) On Psalm 68, on that passage: What I did not seize.
(268) Augustine, tract. 16 on John 5: but he also called God his Father.
(269) On Genesis, book II, ch. 24.
(269*) On Genesis, book II, ch. 35.
(270) De Summo Bono, book VI, ch. 17.
(271) To Valentinian.
(272) In the place cited above.
Distinction 23. Why God Did Not Make Man Better, As Men Inquire.
Here someone asks why God made man such that he could be seduced? In this let him recognize that things were done more magnificently with man. For thus man, having been made, had in his nature the ability, and in his power the will, not to consent to the persuader, with God's help; and it is more glorious not to consent than not to be able to be tempted.
It is also asked why God created those whom He knew would be evil? Precisely because He foresaw what good He would bring about from their evils. For He knew they would be of benefit to the good, and therefore He did not create them in vain.
Why God did not create man impeccable. It is also asked why God did not make man such that he would not sin? Or if he sinned, why He did not restore him to a better state when He could? To these and similar questions, which even the sluggish ask too curiously, answer thus: He truly could have. But why did He not do it? Because He did not wish to. Why did He not wish to? He Himself knows. Do not inquire, because of what is written: Do not be wiser than you ought (Rom. 12). For the vessel does not say to the potter: Why have you made me thus? (Rom. 9).
On man's threefold knowledge before the fall. How man had knowledge of the Creator. That man had knowledge of creatures. He had knowledge of himself. Man before the fall was endowed with a threefold knowledge: of the Creator, of created things, and of himself. For he knew the Creator, yet not so perfectly as the saints will know Him in the future, with face unveiled. Nor in an enigma, as we now see, but by a certain closer understanding, by which he contemplated the presence of God. He also had knowledge of things, which is evident from the fact that he gave names to all living creatures, which had been created for him and were to be ruled by him. He likewise had knowledge of himself, understanding what he owed to his superior, to his equal, and to his inferior. For he would not have been guilty of transgression if he had not known this.
Whether man had foreknowledge of his fall. But if it is asked whether he foreknew things future concerning himself? We say that things to be done were rather prescribed to him, than things future revealed. Man was therefore not foreknowing of his fall, just as we also say of the angel.
Distinction 24. On the Grace and Power of Man Before the Fall.
On the help given to man at creation by which he could stand. Here it must be known that man was created with a right will, and help was given to him by which he could stand in that righteousness, but not merit salvation, unless another grace were given to him. Whence Augustine (273): If man was made upright so that he could remain in that righteousness, yet not without God's help: which if it had been lacking to the angel or to man when they were first made, they would certainly not have fallen by their own fault. That help, moreover, was freedom of will, immune from all corruption, also the rectitude of the will, and the integrity and vitality of all natural powers. But against what we said, that man through these things could not advance without another grace, there is an objection. Through that help of the grace of creation, man could remain in the good; he could therefore resist evil; and if he had done so, it would have been progress for him and merit for life. To which we say that resisting evil is a merit for life only when there is a cause present which urges us to do it, such as is now the corruption of sin, which was not then in man. Otherwise, what appears in the angels would not be merit, for whom standing firm was not merit. For declining from evil always avoids punishment, but does not always merit the reward.
(273) In the Enchiridion, ch. 107.
Distinction 25. On Free Will.
What is free will? Why 'free'? Why 'will'? Now let us consider free will, discussing where it is, and what it is, and whence it is so called, whose it also is, and to what it pertains. Free will is in the will and in reason. For it is a faculty of will and reason; it is called 'free' on account of the will, which cannot be coerced; and 'will' on account of reason, which judges and discerns between good and evil. It is therefore called free will because it is led freely and spontaneously, either to choosing good, yet not without the help of grace, or to evil, for which it suffices of itself.
That the above description does not apply to God or the glorified. Moreover, according to these considerations, free will would not seem to be in God, since God cannot choose evil. Whence Jerome also says (274): God alone is He in whom sin cannot fall; the rest, since they are of free will, can be bent in either direction. Similarly, neither in the glorified, who cannot will evil. Whence Augustine (275): The first free will was to be able not to sin; the last is not to be able to sin; the middle, however, is to be able to sin and to be able not to sin.
That free will is in God. In the glorified there is free will. The will shall be freer when it cannot sin. Indeed, free will is in God. Whence Ambrose (276) on that text: Distributing to each as He wills (1 Cor. 12), that is, by the judgment of free will, not by the compliance of necessity. Therefore the divine will itself, which does all things not by necessity but freely, as He wills, is in God free will. In the glorified also there is free will. Whence Augustine (277): Man will not lack free will, because he will be such that he cannot will evil. For the will shall be much freer which will in no way be able to serve sin, nor should the will be said not to exist or not to be free, because we so wish to be happy that we not only do not wish to be miserable, but can in no way at all wish it. Therefore, so that free will may be fitting for God and for men, both now and in the future, it seems to be called such because without coercion it can choose whatever reason has decreed should be chosen.
General description of free will. On the fourfold state of free will. Note here the four states of man in free will. Before sin, namely, when nothing impelled toward evil and nothing hindered toward good. After sin but before restoration, where he is pressed by concupiscence and conquered. After restoration but before confirmation, where he is pressed by concupiscence on account of weakness, but is not conquered on account of grace. After confirmation, however, where he will be neither pressed nor conquered. When weakness has been utterly consumed and grace consummated, there he will receive complete liberty.
On the threefold liberty. Liberty from necessity. Liberty from sin. Liberty from misery. For there is liberty from necessity, from sin, and from misery. Liberty from necessity is that by which free will is always free: since it is in the will, which cannot be coerced. Liberty from sin is that by which we are made servants of justice; whence the Apostle: Having been freed from sin, you have been made servants of justice (Rom. 6). Liberty from misery is that of which it is said: And creation itself shall be freed from the slavery of corruption, into the liberty of the glory of the children of God (Rom. 8). Free will had all this liberty before sin. But corrupted through sin, retaining the first liberty which belongs to nature, it lost the subsequent ones which belong to grace. For free will is that man who, going down from Jerusalem to Jericho, was wounded in his natural endowments, and stripped of his gratuitous gifts (Luke 10). Whence Augustine (278): Man, using free will badly, both destroyed himself and subjected the whole of it to the slavery of sin.
On the inequality of the liberty of the will. That there are two liberties. Bad liberty. Good liberty. It is therefore clear from the above reasoning that free will exists always and in everyone; yet it is not equally free in everyone. In the wicked it is simply free, through that liberty which is from necessity. In the redeemed it is freer, on account of the same liberty and also that which is from sin: whence in them it is called liberated. In the glorified, however, it will be most free, having every kind of liberty for good things, not for evil. With respect to itself, therefore, it is free, but not equally for good and evil. For it is freer for evil, which it can do by itself, than for good, which it cannot do without the help of grace. From this, therefore, it is clear that there are two liberties of free will, namely bad and good. Bad and not true liberty, then, is when reason dissents from the will, judging that what the will desires ought not to be done. Good and true liberty, however, is where reason agrees with the will. Yet we are discussing this not as many things essentially, but as one and the same liberty. For we do not divide it into the two things mentioned except by their functions. Just as a man who is singularly one and the same is sometimes good and sometimes evil, as though he were one person and another.
To what free will pertains. Now it must be known that free will pertains neither to present things nor to past things: for what is or was, is so determined that it is not within free will, at the time when it is or was, that it be or not be, that it was or was not. It pertains, therefore, only to future things, yet not to those over which it has no power as to whether they occur or not, but only to those which it can choose by the liberty of good or bad will, so that they may be or not be.
(274) In the homily On the Prodigal Son, to Damasus.
(275) De Civitate Dei, book XXII, ch. 30.
(276) In De Fide, book II, ch. 3.
(277) In the Enchiridion, ch. 105.
(278) In the Enchiridion, ch. 30.
Distinction 26. What the Will Is. On Operating and Cooperating Grace.
The will is a movement of the mind, with nothing compelling, toward not admitting something or toward attaining something. But so that it may not admit evil and may attain good, the grace of God precedes it and follows it. Whence the Apostle: It is not of him who wills nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy (Rom. 9). This is not said as though man's will alone without God's mercy were insufficient for good. For conversely it could be said: It is not of God's mercy alone, but of man's will, since God's mercy alone does not accomplish it. It was therefore said so that the whole might be attributed to God, who both prepares the good will of man to be helped, and helps it once prepared. For He precedes the unwilling that he may will, and follows the willing that he may not will in vain.
That the good will accompanies grace. It is therefore established from these things that man's will of itself does not to will the good efficaciously without the grace of God. The will follows this grace: for grace precedes, with no merit calling it forth, as Augustine says (279): No human merit precedes God's grace, but grace itself merits to be increased, so that once increased it may merit to be perfected as well, with the will accompanying, not leading: as a handmaid, not as a guide.
What is the grace that precedes the will. This grace is the faith of Christ, which obtains what the law commands. Which also justifies, as the Apostle says: Justified by faith, let us have peace with God (Rom. 5). It precedes, and so frees from the slavery of sin, that one may live piously in Christ. Whence Augustine (280): The will itself after the fall must be freed from the slavery of sin. And not at all through itself, but only through the grace of God, which is placed in the faith of Christ, is it freed, so that the will itself may be prepared. From these things it is established that the good will comes from faith.
That faith seems to proceed from the will. Yet faith seems to come from the will, because of what the Apostle says: With the heart one believes unto justice (Rom. 10). Augustine says (281): He does not simply say 'one believes,' but 'with the heart one believes,' because other things a man can do unwillingly, but believe only willingly. Likewise on Genesis, where Laban and Bethuel said: Let us call the girl, and ask her will (Gen. 24); a certain commentator on Genesis says (282): Faith is not of necessity but of the will. But these and similar statements are not said because faith comes from the will, but because faith does not come except to him who wishes to believe, whose good will it precedes, not in time, but in authority and efficacy.
This question is further burdened by the words of Augustine discussing that text: Not that we are sufficient to think anything as from ourselves (2 Cor. 3). Who, he says, does not see that thinking comes before believing? For no one believes anything unless he has first thought that it should be believed. From this it clearly follows that the thought of good, which belongs to the will, precedes faith, and thus the good will precedes faith and is not preceded by it, which seems to contradict what was said before. To which we say that the thought of the good, or the will, certainly precedes faith, but not that faith by which one lives rightly, which is reached by this order: first comes the understanding of the good, then follows the desire for the same, and thirdly comes the good will or delight. Augustine distinguishes this where it says: My soul has longed to desire Your justifications (Ps. 118). It longed to desire, he says (283), it did not yet desire. For sometimes we see by reason how useful the justifications of God are, but we do not desire them. Understanding therefore flies ahead, and the affection follows slowly or not at all. We know the good but it does not delight us to do it, and we wish that it would delight us. He shows, therefore, by what steps one arrives at them. The first is that you see how useful they are.
Then, that you desire their desiring: lastly, that as grace advances, their operation may delight you. If you attend to this, therefore, the whole question dissolves. For in order to live piously, first you understand the good; second you think about what is not from you but from God; third you delight in working, when the will has already been made good through faith and charity, by which alone one lives rightly, and which is the companion of faith, not its precursor. Yet the same good will precedes certain gifts of grace, namely those which follow the justified person. Whence Augustine (284): The good will of man precedes many gifts of God, but not all. Those which it does not precede -- it is itself among them, and itself helps, because it is not preceded in time by them, and it consents with them to the good.
On the threefold kind of goods. So that what has been said may become more evident, it must be known that among goods, some are the greatest, some the least, and some are in between. The greatest are those by which one lives rightly and which no one uses badly; the least are those without which one can live rightly; the middle goods are those without which one cannot live rightly, and which we use both well and badly. Whence Augustine (285): The virtues by which one lives rightly are great goods. The beauties of bodies, without which one can live rightly, are minimal goods. The powers of the soul, without which one cannot live rightly, are middle goods. No one uses the virtues badly: but other goods one can use both well and badly. Moreover, no one uses virtue badly because the work of virtue is the good use of those things which we also use badly. But no one by living well uses things badly.
Among which goods free will is found. Moreover, free will is among the middle goods, because we can use it badly, and it is that without which we cannot live rightly. The good use of it, therefore, is the work of virtue. But wherever it is read that the good use of free will is a virtue, virtue there is taken for its work.
(279) Augustine, Epistle 106 to Boniface.
(280) In the Enchiridion, ch. 106.
(281) On John, tract. 26.
(282) De Praedestinatione Sanctorum, book 1, ch. 2.
(283) Augustine, on Psalm 118.
(284) In the Enchiridion, ch. 32.
(285) Retractationes, book II.
Distinction 27. On Virtue and Its Merit.
Faith is not from man but from God. Virtue, therefore, as Augustine says, is a good quality of the mind by which one lives rightly, and which no one uses badly, which God alone works in man. As Augustine says about justice in that passage (286): I have done judgment and justice. Justice is a great virtue, which none but God brings about in man; and therefore when he says 'I have done justice,' he wished to be understood not as the virtue itself, which man does not make, but as its work. So also it is said of the other virtues. For according to this, concerning faith the Apostle says: By grace you are saved through faith, and this not from yourselves (Eph. 2). For it is the gift of God; that is, faith is not by the power of your nature, because it is purely the gift of God. This grace is called operating, because it heals the will and prepares it for good; and cooperating, because it helps the will in doing good. From this also come merits. Whence Augustine to the priest Sixtus (287): What is the merit of man before grace, since grace alone, and nothing else, produces all our good merit?
How good merit is established in man. For merit comes from grace and free will in this manner: just as from faith and free will a good act or disposition of the mind is produced -- namely, to believe, which is the first merit -- similarly, from charity and free will comes the act of loving, and so with the rest, through which the virtues merit both increase for themselves, justification for us, and eternal life.
On the gifts of the virtues. These merits, however, are given on account of the authority of the principle similar to grace. Hence they are themselves also called grace. Whence Augustine (288): When He crowns our merits, He crowns nothing other than His own gifts. Hence eternal life, which is rendered for merits, is called grace, because it is given freely -- not freely in the sense that it is not given for merits, but because through grace are given the very merits for which it is given.
The opinion of others concerning virtue. Their reasoning. Others, however, say that virtues are the good uses of natural powers, both interior and exterior, which are carried out through the body, calling them the works of the virtues. They are moved to this position because Augustine says (289) on John: What is faith? To believe what you do not see. Likewise (290): I call charity a movement of the soul. From this they say: If charity and faith are movements of the soul, then virtues are movements of the soul. But this must be understood as spoken by way of cause -- that charity is a movement of the soul, that is, the virtue by which the soul is moved to love. Likewise, faith is to believe what you do not see, that is, the grace by which one believes what is not seen. But what is believed is one thing, that by which one believes is another, and the act of believing itself is yet another. Finally, if virtue were a movement of the mind, then it would no longer be from God alone, as was proved above. Rather, it would also be from free will, from which every movement of the mind proceeds, as is shown from the words of Augustine (291). Souls, he says, if they lack the movement of the soul by free will for doing or not doing, if indeed no power of abstaining from their work is granted to them, we cannot hold them guilty of sin. Therefore virtue is not a movement of the mind. For if it were, then free will would no longer be good by virtue -- which is true -- but rather virtue would exist by the goodness of free will, which is false.
(286) De Libero Arbitrio, book II, ch. 18.
(287) Epistle 105.
(288) To Sixtus the priest, Epistle 105.
(289) Tractate 40.
(290) Book III of On Christian Doctrine, ch. 10.
(291) In the book On Two Souls, ch. 12.
Distinction 28. On the heresy of the Pelagians.
Finally, we must address the Pelagian heresy, which opposes grace. This, the most recent of all heresies, arose from Pelagius the monk. Hostile to grace, it believes that man can fulfill all divine commandments without grace, and says that grace is given to men only so that what they are commanded to do by free will, they may accomplish more easily through it. It also destroys the prayers that the Church makes, whether for unbelievers that they may be converted, or for the faithful that they may persevere, teaching that men have this not from God but from themselves. It also asserts that infants are born without the bond of original sin.
The disputation of the Pelagians against Augustine. The Pelagians, therefore, saying these things, disputed against Augustine himself from his own words (292), arguing thus: If man cannot do what is commanded, it should not be imputed to him unto death, as you yourself say, Augustine. Who, he asks (293), sins in that which cannot be avoided? But sin does occur, therefore it can be avoided.
But Augustine says he spoke this concerning the will, as if saying: Who sins unto death by necessity, not by will? For it is by the will that one sins and lives rightly, but unless it is freed by God's grace, one cannot live rightly by it (294).
Likewise: To hold anyone guilty of sin because he did not do what he could not do, he says, is the height of madness. Why then are infants, and those who do not have grace without which they cannot fulfill the commandments, held guilty?
But Augustine had said that specifically against the Manicheans (295), who claimed there are two natures in man: one good, from God, and another evil, from the race of darkness, to such a degree that one could not will the good. If that were so, it would not seem imputable why one did not do good. In fact, Augustine seems in many places to oppose this doctrine of grace. For he says (296): It is in man's power to change his will for the better. Likewise (297): It is in our power that we may merit. Likewise: It is ours to believe and to will; but that we do good works is God's. But how we should understand these statements, he himself explains with these words (298): The same rule applies to both willing and doing. For both are God's, because He Himself prepares the will. And both are ours, because it does not happen unless we are willing. Therefore, with all perfidy eliminated, let us hold this without doubt concerning grace and free will, as Jerome teaches (299): namely, that free will exists in such a way that we say we always need God's help; that those err who say with Mani that man cannot avoid sin, as do those who assert with Jovinian that man cannot sin. Each of these destroys the freedom of the will. We, however, say that man can always both sin and not sin. This is the faith we have learned in the Catholic Church.
(292) In the book On Free Will III, canon 18.
(293) Book of Retractions, Book 1, ch. 9.
(294) Augustine in the book On Two Souls, ch. 12.
(295) In Book 1 of the Retractions, ch. 15.
(296) In the book Against Adimantus, disciple of Mani, ch. 26.
(297) Same book, ch. 27.
(298) Augustine, Book of Retractions 1, ch. 23.
(299) In the Exposition of the Faith to Pope Damasus, whose beginning is: We believe in God.
Distinction 29. Whether man before sin needed operating grace.
After these matters, it must be known that man before sin also needed operating grace, not so that he might be freed from sin by it, but so that he might be prepared for effectively willing the good. Whence Augustine (300): Not even then could there have been any merit without grace, because even if sin was constituted in free will alone, nevertheless free will was not sufficient for having or retaining justice, unless divine assistance was provided.
Whether man before the fall possessed virtues. Likewise, it must be known that man possessed charity and virtues before sin, as is proved by these authorities. For Augustine says (301): Adam, having lost charity, was found to be evil. Likewise: Adam before sin was endowed with a spiritual mind. Likewise: When Adam was alone, he did not transgress, because his mind clung to God (302). Likewise: Man before sin enjoyed the most blessed ethereal air (303). He therefore possessed virtues which he lost through sin, on account of which he was cast out of paradise, the Lord saying: See that he does not perhaps take from the tree of life and live forever (Genesis III) -- which is not said as though he would live forever if he ate, but the Lord spoke in the manner of one angered concerning a proud man, and the meaning is: Beware, you angels, lest he eat from the tree of life, of which he is unworthy -- from which, had he persevered, he would both have eaten and lived forever.
On the flaming sword before paradise. And lest he be able to approach it, God placed before paradise the Cherubim and a flaming, revolving sword. This can be taken literally, because by the ministry of angels a fiery guard was placed there. But spiritually it is given to be understood that except through charity, which is the fullness of knowledge, one does not return to life through temporal punishments, which are also revolving, because they turn with time.
(300) In the Enchiridion, ch. 10.
(301) In a certain homily on Genesis.
(302) Ambrose to Sabinus.
(303) Ambrose on the Psalms.
Distinction 30. That the sin of Adam made all men guilty.
Finally, when Adam sinned, sin and likewise punishment passed through him to his posterity. Whence the Apostle: Just as through one man sin entered this world, so also death passed to all men (Romans 5). The Pelagians wrongly thought this was said concerning the sin of imitation. For the Apostle would have named not Adam but the devil, his prince, if he had understood it of the one of whom it is said in Wisdom: By the envy of the devil, death entered the world (Wisdom 2). For those who are on his side imitate him. Therefore the Apostle speaks not of that, but of the sin of propagation or origin, which passed through Adam to all who are generated through concupiscence.
What is original sin.
Concerning which many have thought variously. Some have considered it to be neither fault nor punishment, but guilt, or debt, or liability, by which right we are sentenced to punishment for the sin of the first man, as by a law of the age: sometimes children exult on account of the crime of the father, which they did not contract. Moreover, that it is both fault and punishment is proved by these authorities. Gregory says (304): All of us who were conceived from the delight of the flesh have contracted original guilt with us. Augustine also says (305): The sin of the first man destroyed not only himself but the entire human race, because from him we received both damnation and guilt together. The same: No one is born without bearing both punishment and the desert of punishment, which is sin (305*).
Original sin is called the fuel of sin, that is, concupiscence. This is not a movement or act of the soul or body, but the fuel of sin, which is called concupiscence, the law of the flesh and of the members, the weakness of nature, and the tyrant that dwells in our members. Whence Augustine (306): There is in us a concupiscence that must not be permitted to reign. Just as also its desires, which are actual concupiscences, come from the weakness of nature. This weakness is a tyrant that stirs up evil desires.
What is understood by concupiscence. How original sin passes from parents to children. That on account of the corruption of the flesh, sin is said to be in the flesh. This concupiscence, however, is not the act of desiring itself, but the defect with which we are born. Whence Augustine (307): What is the concupiscence in which we were born? It is indeed a defect that makes an infant prone to desire and an adult actually desiring. Therefore we do not transgress merely by imitating Adam, but we are even born sinners from him. Whence Augustine (308): Adam, beyond the example of imitation, by the hidden corruption of his carnal concupiscence, caused all who were to come from his stock to decay within himself. Hence the Apostle says: In whom all have sinned (Romans 5), that is, in which man, in whom as in a material source all existed, or in which, that is, in which sin. Whence the Apostle consequently says that many were constituted sinners through the disobedience of one man. This must be understood thus: because from the actual disobedience of Adam, original sin -- that is, carnal concupiscence -- came about, so that it was both in him and passed through to all, by transmission, namely of the flesh, not of the soul, in which sin itself dwells through the cause of corruption, not through fault. Whence Ambrose (309): How does sin dwell in the flesh, when it is not a substance but a privation of good? Behold, the body of the first man was corrupted through sin, and that corruption remains in the body, by whose companionship the soul is stained with sin. Therefore, because the cause of the deed remains in the flesh, sin is said to dwell in it. Likewise, sin does not dwell in the soul but in the flesh, because the cause of sin is from the flesh, and not from the soul, because the flesh is from the origin of sinful flesh. For through transmission all flesh becomes the cause of sin, not the soul (310).
But the objection is raised: if only the flesh is from transmission and not the soul, which is infused some time later, it does not seem that sin is drawn in the flesh, because what has been contracted is not sin, especially since sin cannot exist in an irrational thing -- which the flesh is before the soul is joined to it. But it must be known that sin in the flesh exists before the soul is joined as a cause, not as an effect. Nor does it follow that if what is drawn in the flesh is not sin, therefore sin is not drawn in the flesh -- because neither is what is conceived in the womb a man, and yet a man is conceived in the womb. Nor is what is sown in the field a crop, and yet a crop is sown in the field.
Whether the cause of original sin is punishment or fault. Therefore sin exists there only as a cause, which is not fault but punishment -- namely, the pollution and foulness contracted from the heat of intercourse. By whose contagion the soul, as soon as it is infused, becomes guilty, just as a liquid immediately turns sour or goes bad from a defect in the vessel.
How sin passes through transmission. Through these things it now clearly appears how sin passes through transmission. For we are not born sinners because flesh is drawn from Adam, but because it is drawn viciously through lust. When man and woman are joined to one another, their intercourse cannot be without lust. On this account the conception of children born from them cannot be without sin. Here it is not propagation but lust that transmits sin to infants -- not the fecundity of nature but the foulness of lust. From these things it is clearly indicated why the Lord's flesh was not sinful, because it descended from Adam by a different law than ours. For it was conceived not through the corruption of lust but by the power of the Holy Spirit from the Virgin.
(304) These words are found in the gloss on Exodus 13: The firstborn, etc.
(305) On Nature and Grace.
(305*) Augustine on Psalm 50: Behold in iniquities.
(306) On the Words of the Apostle, Sermon 12.
(307) Book 6 Against Julian, ch. 7.
(308) In Book 1 On the Baptism of Infants.
(309) On chapter 7 of Romans.
(310) In Book 1 of the Retractions, ch. 15.
Distinction 32. How original sin is said to be voluntary.
This sin is indeed voluntary, because it proceeded from the will of the first man. Whence Augustine (310): That which in infants is called original sin is not absurdly called voluntary, because contracted from the evil will of the first man, it has become hereditary. It is also necessary, because it cannot be avoided. Whence the Prophet: Deliver me from my necessities, O Lord (Psalm 24).
What sort of pure soul is joined to the body. Although the soul is created by God without defect, it is never entirely such before baptism. For as soon as it is infused, it is stained -- as if, having polluted hands, you never had the fruit in such condition as I gave it to you with clean hands.
Why God joins an innocent soul to a harmful body. Whether souls from creation are equal in natural gifts. Nevertheless, God is not to be blamed for joining an innocent soul to the body, knowing that it will thereby be stained and condemned if it is not regenerated: for this belongs to His hidden justice.
Moreover, it is not implausibly said that some souls are created more excellent than others in natural gifts, since it is established that this was so among the angels -- which is nevertheless neither a merit for punishment nor for life, because sharpness or dullness of intellect does not determine reward or punishment in the future.
How original sin is remitted in baptism, and yet concupiscence remains afterward. This sin, however, is dissolved in baptism with respect to guilt. Whence Augustine (312): Grace through baptism accomplishes this, that the body of sin is destroyed, so that the concupiscence sprinkled in the flesh, which was present in the one born, does not harm the one who has died. Yet it is not entirely consumed in baptism: for it remains in the members after the act. Whence Augustine (313): Concupiscence of the flesh is forgiven in baptism, not so that it does not exist, but so that it is not imputed as sin. Therefore, just as other sins pass away in act and remain in guilt -- such as murder and the like -- so conversely it can happen that concupiscence passes away in guilt and remains in act. For it remains in the oldness of the flesh, not to reign, but to lie as though overcome, and it is daily diminished in those who progress and are continent, until it is destroyed -- unless it revives through illicit consent. It also remains because it produces desires against which the faithful fight. That which therefore was both punishment and fault before baptism, after baptism is only punishment.
How offspring contracts original sin from purified parents. This concupiscence, although it is not imputed to the regenerated, nevertheless whatever offspring is born is bound by original sin, drawn from parents even though they are cleansed. Nor is this surprising: for just as the foreskin is removed by circumcision, yet it remains in those whom the circumcised have begotten; and just as the chaff, which is separated with such diligence, remains in the fruit that is born from purified wheat -- so the sin that is cleansed in parents through baptism remains in the children whom they have begotten.
(311) Book On the City of God XIV, ch. 3.
(312) On the Baptism of Infants, Book 1, ch. 39.
(313) On Marriage and Concupiscence, Book 1, chs. 25-27.
Distinction 33. That not the sin of other parents but of Adam is imputed to the children.
Finally, it must be known that only the sin of Adam, not of other parents, is imputed to children, which is proved from the fact that those to whom the grace of regeneration is not conferred, but who die as soon as they are born, are owed the mildest punishment. For Augustine says (314): The mildest punishment will be for those who have added no other sin beyond original sin. If this is so, then one is not bound by the sins of all parents. For if they were punished for those sins as well as for their own original sin, their punishment would not be lesser but perhaps greater than that of those same parents. With this understanding the prophet agrees, saying: The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, but the soul that has sinned, it shall die (Ezekiel 18).
But what the Lord says in the law seems contrary to this: I am the Lord, a mighty and jealous God, visiting the iniquities of the fathers upon the children, to the third and fourth generation (Exodus 20). Yet one who diligently attends to what is added in the same place understands that these are not contradictory -- namely, the words: of those who hate me. By which, as Jerome says (315), it is clearly shown that children are not punished because the fathers sinned, but because, similar to them in a certain hereditary evil, they have hated God. The law speaks of children who imitate their wicked fathers, whom it specifically named because children are especially accustomed to imitate the fathers whom they particularly love (316).
He also said only the third and fourth generation: because fathers sometimes live until they beget third or fourth generations, who, seeing the iniquity of their fathers, become heirs of their impiety by imitation.
That this must also be understood mystically is shown from the fact that a parable is spoken of in Ezekiel: What is it among you that you turn this parable into a proverb? (Ezekiel 18). The father, therefore, as some say, is the first impulse of thought; the son is the conception of sin -- namely, the consent and delight of the woman. The grandson is the completion of the work or the determination of consent to complete it -- namely, of the man -- or the perpetration of sin; the great-grandson is perseverance in what you have done. But God will not eternally punish all the first and second impulses of thoughts, which the Greeks call propatheiai, without which no one can exist. But if someone determines to carry out what he has thought, or refuses to correct what he has done -- these are mortal sins, and the third and fourth generation.
Nor does what is said present a difficulty: I was conceived in iniquities, and in sins did my mother conceive me (Psalm 50) -- as if in multiple sins. For as Augustine says (317): The plural is put there for the singular, according to the manner of Scripture. As there: Those who sought the life of the child are dead (Matthew 2:2), speaking of Herod alone; just as conversely the singular is put for the plural, as where it says: Pray therefore to God that He take the serpent from us (Numbers 21), when the people were suffering not one but many serpents.
Whether the actual sin of Adam is graver than all others. Finally, it seems worth asking whether the sin of Adam's transgression was graver than all others. This seems to be the case because it changed and corrupted all human nature, which no other sin did, and it harmed more than any other sin. For it subjected man to manifold misery and finally to both deaths, which was done by no other sin. To this we say that this sin must not be thought greater than the sin against the Holy Spirit. For it is not greater because it corrupted our entire nature, but because it was committed by man when the whole of human nature was in him. Nor should it be considered greater because it did more harm, since lesser evils sometimes do more damage, just as conversely lesser goods are sometimes more beneficial. Or as the Apostle, when pressed, chose the lesser good of two options, yet one that would benefit more people. Just as also the sacrament of baptism benefits more people than the sacrament of the altar, yet it is not greater.
(314) In the Enchiridion, ch. 93.
(315) Jerome on Exodus.
(316) On Ezekiel, ch. 48.
(317) In the Enchiridion, ch. 44.
Distinction 34. On actual sin according to its causality.
After the foregoing, let us now treat of actual sin, considering what was the origin of sin, in what thing sin exists, what sin is, and in how many ways it is contracted. It must be known that, since before sin nothing existed that was not good, therefore a good thing -- namely, the nature of man or angel -- was the origin of sin. Whence Augustine (318): Whence do you say the evil will arose, if not from good? For if from an angel or a man, what were these two before the evil will arose in them, if not a good work of God, a praiseworthy nature? Therefore evil arises from good, nor was there any other source from which it could arise except from good.
The evil will was the secondary cause of evils. In what thing evil exists. Moreover, from the evil will, as from an evil tree, all evils that pertain to us are produced, as evil fruit.
Similarly, evil exists in no other thing except in what is good, which is proved from Augustine (319). Evil is nothing other than the corruption or privation of good, which exists only in good -- that is, in nature. Therefore, as long as nature is being corrupted, there is in it a good of which it may be deprived, and thus, if there were no good in which evil could exist, there could be no evil at all. In this the rule of the dialecticians fails, by which they say that two contraries cannot coexist in the same thing. For since no one doubts that good and evil are contraries, not only can they coexist, but evils absolutely cannot exist without goods, and cannot exist except in goods. Whence a remarkable conclusion is reached: since every nature, insofar as it is nature, is good, when a vitiated nature is said to be evil, nothing else seems to be said than that what is good is evil. Hence also, when a man is called evil, what is said except that a good thing is evil? But good because he is a man, evil because he is wicked. In saying this, however, we do not fall into that prophetic condemnation: Woe to those who call good evil (Isaiah 8), or evil good. For that must be understood concerning the things of goodness and wickedness by which men are good or evil -- as if someone were to say that adultery is good, or that nature insofar as it is nature is evil.
(318) Against Julian the heretic, Book 1, ch. 3; in sense, but Book 2 of On Marriage and Concupiscence, ch. 28.
(319) In the Enchiridion, chs. 11 and 12.
Distinction 35. What sin is.
Sin, however, as Augustine says (320), is every word, deed, or desire that is done against the law of God. The same (321): Sin is the will to retain or obtain what justice forbids. Ambrose also says (322-323): What is sin but the transgression of the divine law and disobedience of heavenly commandments? From these it is clear that an evil act, both interior and exterior -- namely, evil thought, speech, and deed -- is sin. Nevertheless, sin principally consists in the will, from which, as from an evil tree, evil works proceed like evil fruit.
(320) Against Faustus the Manichean, Book 22.
(321) On Two Souls, ch. 27.
(322-323) In the book On Paradise.
Distinction 36. On the variety of sins.
It must be known that some sins are such that they are also punishments of sins. Whence Augustine (324): Between the first sin of apostasy and the final punishment of Gehenna there are intermediate things that are both sins and punishments of sin. Gregory also says (325): A sin that is not quickly destroyed through penance is either a sin and a cause of sin, or a sin and a punishment of sin, or a sin that is simultaneously both cause and punishment of sin. A sin is called a cause of sin with respect to the following sin, and a punishment with respect to the preceding sin. For when a sin is not washed away through penance, it soon drags one by its own weight to another, which is not only a sin but also a punishment of sin, because by just judgment God darkens the heart of the sinner, so that by the merit of the preceding sin he falls into others as well. Whence John: Let him who is filthy be filthy still (Apocalypse 17). Through this it indeed seems that some sin -- namely that which is a punishment of sin -- is just, because, as Augustine says (326), every punishment of sin is just. But it should be noted that sin is called a punishment and corruption or privation of good not by essence but by efficiency. Just as riches are said to be joy, not because they are joy, but because they produce joy. So also in the Epistle of Peter: An unjust suffering is said to be grace, not because it is grace, but because it makes one pleasing before God (1 Peter 2) -- I speak of suffering patiently endured. So also sin, as soon as it is committed by someone, separates from God and darkens the natural goods. This separation or darkening is essentially the corruption and punishment of sin, and this is from God; but sin itself is not.
Which Augustine says thus (327): God foreknows, but does not predestinate those things which He is not going to do -- that is, all evils, even if some are both sins and punishments according to that text: God gave them over to shameful passions, etc. (Romans 1). Yet it is not God's sin, but His judgment, that is, punishment.
(324) On that passage of Psalm 57: Fire fell upon them.
(325) On Ezekiel, homily 21, around the words 'but even if converted.'
(326) Book 1 of the Retractions, ch. 9.
(327) Book 1 of On the Predestination of the Saints, ch. 10.
Distinction 37. That God is not the author of sins.
Of all these things, God is not the author, because by God as author man does not become worse. Evil is spoken of both as fault, which He in no way causes, and as punishment, which He certainly does cause. Whence the prophet: There is no evil in the city that God has not done (Amos 3). Concerning this, however, Augustine says (328) that God is not the author of evil; but what he said, he said causally, for he says: I said this same thing just as it was said: God did not make death (Wisdom 1), because He does not do that for which death is inflicted -- that is, sin.
That all things insofar as they exist are good. There are, however, those who think that every will and act is from God, because they suppose that these things, insofar as they exist, are good. For Augustine says (329): Everything that is, insofar as it is, is good. And elsewhere: He supremely is who is entirely unchangeable. All other things that are cannot be except from Him; and they are good insofar as they have received existence. The response according to Augustine: That universality must be attributed to the genus of things. For it embraces only substances and natures, as is clear from his own words. For he says: If some things happen by chance in the world, then the whole world is not governed by providence. But if it is, then there is some substance or nature that does not pertain to the work of providence. See how he explains the term 'universal world' as natures or substances. By natures, however, he understands those things that substances naturally possess, such as intellect, memory, etc.
Moreover, it is easily proved that an evil act, insofar as it is, is not from God, because insofar as it is, it is a corruption of good. Whatever corrupts good is not from God, because, as was said, nothing is done by God as author by which man becomes worse. Otherwise: Everything that God makes is nature; but an evil act is not a nature, but an accidental act, corrupting nature by a deficiency of good. Likewise: The works of the devil, which are called vices, are acts, not things. Likewise: An evil act is sin, and every sin is iniquity, which act is not from God; for iniquity was not made through Him, but is a perversion that man made. Likewise: An evil act such as envy neither was, nor is, nor can be good from God; therefore it is not from Him. For iniquity was not made through Him. Likewise: If an evil act that is sin is not from God, then it is false that it was done without Him. For when it is committed, God gives it being; therefore it is not done without God (330).
How it is understood that sin is nothing. But when we said above that sin is the act itself, or the will, which are something: we may seem to dissent from the saying that sin is nothing. But sin is said to be nothing, not because it is not something, but on account of the deficiency to which it leads and because it leads away from true being, which God is. For in this sense, men themselves, who are undoubtedly something, are sometimes said to be nothing. For Augustine says (331): Sin is nothing, because men become nothing when they sin. So also an idol, though it is gold, is said to be nothing in the world.
(328) In the book of 83 Questions, q. 21, which he explains in Book 1 of the Retractions, ch. 26.
(329) In the Enchiridion, ch. 14.
(330) Book 83, question 3. In the commentary on Psalm 68, on the verse 'There is no substance.'
(331) On John, ch. 1.
Distinction 38. On the will and the end by which it is judged.
It must be known that the will is judged by its end: whether it is upright or depraved. The upright end is charity, as the Prophet says: I have seen the end of all perfection; your commandment is exceedingly broad (Psalm 118). The depraved end is contrary to this. Whence Augustine (332): That which God commands or counsels is rightly done when it is referred to the love of God and neighbor. But what is done in such a way that it is not referred to charity is not yet done as it ought to be done, and then it is not rightly done. There are also many other ends of the will, all of which are referred to one supreme end. As in this example: I wish to prepare food so that I may refresh a poor man -- with this end, that I may please God and that I may have eternal life, which is the end of all good ends. The end, moreover, as Augustine says (333), is the delight that one strives by care and thought to attain. Intention, however, is sometimes taken for the will, sometimes for its end, which the diligent reader, wherever he encounters it, should carefully discern.
(332) In the Enchiridion, ch. 121.
(333) On the passage 'Searching the hearts.'
Distinction 39. How the will is understood to be evil.
It must be carefully noted that when the will is said to be evil or sin, this is not understood of that natural power by which we will, but of its act, which is the willing. That is, the evil use of the will, which concerning evil things can never be anything but evil -- which does not apply to the acts of other powers. They are evil if they are against charity, as remembering or understanding evil not in order to avoid it but to do it. The natural power itself, however, which exists even in infants, is always good, as Augustine says (334) concerning the image in which we were created: that even among vices, nature is good.
Distinction 40. On works, when they are good or evil.
For we say that works are to be judged according to their end, whether they are good or evil, except for certain things that are so evil in themselves that they cannot be good from any cause. As Augustine says (335): Those things that are not sins in themselves are now good, now evil, depending on whether they have good or bad causes. For instance, providing food for a poor man is good if it is done out of mercy and with right faith. And conjugal intercourse, if it is done with the faith that children may be begotten for regeneration. These same things, on the other hand, are evil if a poor man is fed for the sake of boasting, and if one lies with a wife out of wantonness.
Not only the reason why, but also what is done must be considered. But when works are themselves sins -- such as thefts, defilements, and blasphemies -- who would say they should be done for good reasons, or that they are not sins? As if theft were committed against a rich man so that something could be given to a poor man, or false testimony were given to free an innocent person? For what we do cannot be rightly done if we once concede that in evil acts we should not inquire what is done but why it is done, so that whatever is done for good reasons would not be judged evil (336).
(334) Book Against Lying, ch. 7.
(335) Book 15 of On the Trinity, ch. 7.
(336) Augustine has this in the book Against Lying.
Distinction 41.
Therefore, with the exception of those things that are evil in themselves, all others are judged generally by their end. Concerning which Ambrose says (337): Your disposition imposes the end upon your work. And Augustine (338): Let no one count his works as good before faith, because where there is no faith, there is no good work. For intention makes a work good, but faith directs the intention. Do not pay too much attention to what a man does, but to what he intends when he does it.
Augustine indeed seems to contradict himself, who elsewhere says (339): Good is sometimes not done well; no one does well unwillingly, even if what he does is good. To resolve this, distinguish the multiple senses of this word 'good.'
Good is said in many ways. For something is called good by condition, as whatever God makes; and by permission, whatever He commands or counsels; and by sign, as the sacraments of the Old Testament; and by utility, whatever benefits anyone in any way; and by end, as what is done for the sake of having eternal life, which is properly and truly called good. With this word thus distinguished, someone sometimes does something that is rightly denied to be good in one of the aforementioned senses and rightly affirmed to be good in another. As if someone offers a sacrifice for the sake of profit -- what he does is good by permission, but it is not good by end. That is, it is good by the law of its kind, not by the privilege of its particular instance.
What is frequently said -- that every sin is voluntary, and that no one sins except by the will -- is said of mortal and actual sin. This is true because no such sin occurs without the will, either of the sin itself or at least of that which constitutes the sin (340).
(337) On Duties, Book 2, ch. 30.
(338) On Psalm 31.
(339) On the Spirit and the Letter, Book 14, and Book of Sentences, prologue ch. 272; also Book 1 of the Confessions, ch. 12.
(340) Book 1 of On Free Will, ch. 12; similarly Book of Retractions 1, ch. 9.
Distinction 42. Whether the will and its work are the same.
The will, moreover, as Augustine says in Book 1 of the Retractions, is the first cause of sinning. This will together with its work is the same sin, because one contempt is in both. It is lesser, indeed, when one sins by the will alone; but greater when the deed is also added to the will. Yet they themselves are diverse. Just as it is one commandment to love God and neighbor, yet they themselves are diverse things. Just as also the blood and the body are one sacrament, yet they themselves are diverse. And 'I love' and 'you love' are one word, even though they are two persons. A committed sin, if it is actual, passes away in act and remains in guilt -- that is, in the obligation of punishment. Original sin, however, when forgiven, passes away in guilt and remains in act (341).
The difference between sin and offense. On the seven mortal sins. Sin is properly said, as Augustine says, to be the perpetration of evil. An offense, however, is the abandonment of good, as if a forsaking -- though they are used indifferently for one another.
Note also that there are seven principal vices, as Gregory says (342): namely, vainglory, anger, envy, sadness, avarice, gluttony, and lust. These, as Chrysostom says, were signified in the seven peoples holding the promised land. They are called capital or principal because from them all evils arise -- not indeed in all collectively but in each individually (342*). Nevertheless, all evils are said to arise from pride, whence: The beginning of all sin is pride (Ecclesiasticus 10), which is the love of one's own excellence. Similarly also from cupidity, whence the Apostle: The root of all evils is cupidity (1 Timothy 6). These seem contradictory unless you understand that the aforementioned universality does not gather individual sins in all, but individual or diverse sins in each person. For there are some who become proud from cupidity, and some who become covetous from pride, by which it is clear that sometimes pride arises from cupidity and sometimes cupidity from pride.
(341) In the Questions on Leviticus, Book 3.
(342) Question 20, Book 26 of the Moralia, ch. 31.
(342*) Lombard has it somewhat more clearly.
Distinction 43. On the sin against the Holy Spirit. What obstinacy is. What despair is. What it means that this sin is not forgiven.
There is moreover a certain sin more damnable than all others, namely to sin against the Holy Spirit, which, as the Truth says, will be forgiven neither in this life nor in the future. Someone commits this sin when, after the knowledge of God through the grace of Christ, he attacks the brotherhood, driven by the torches of envy -- if, however, he ends this life in this wicked perversity. For an impenitent heart cannot be judged as long as a person lives here. This sin, as some say, is obstinacy or despair.
Obstinacy is the stubbornness of a mind hardened in malice, through which a man becomes impenitent. Despair is that by which one utterly distrusts the goodness of God, thinking his own malice exceeds the divine goodness -- like Cain. This sin is said not to be forgiven, not because the sinner should not be pardoned if he repents (Genesis 4), but because the stain of that sin is so great that he cannot undergo the humility of entreating. Therefore John rightly says: There is a sin unto death (1 John 5) -- as if hardened -- I do not say that anyone should pray for it, because he who sins thus cannot be helped by any prayers either here or in the future.
What is said -- that there is sin against the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit -- is not to be understood as though the offense of three persons were divided. Rather, three kinds of sins are shown there, though not all are distinguished, but two are of the forgivable kind and one of the unforgivable. For to sin against the Father, to whom power is attributed, is to sin through weakness. To sin against the Son, to whom wisdom is attributed, is to sin through ignorance, and these two are forgivable. But the third, which is unforgivable, has been explained.
On venial sins. What destroys venial sins. There are also venial sins, that is, light sins, which merit only temporal punishment. We commit these daily through ignorance or forgetfulness, or surprise, or necessity, or weakness of the flesh, either unwillingly or willingly. Concerning these it is said: The just man falls seven times (Proverbs 24), that is, he will frequently sin. For Solomon says this about light sins, without which this life is not lived. These, on account of great charity, are immediately forgiven as soon as committed. Whence it is added in the same place: and he shall rise again. For those who are less perfect, a light penance is needed. For the Lord's Prayer and mutual confession suffice; otherwise after death they are burdened, but they are forgiven if a man has merited in life by good acts that they be forgiven him.
Distinction 44. That the power of sinning is from God.
Finally, it must be known that just as memory and understanding of evil are from God, so also the power of evil. Whence Augustine (343): The will to harm can come from the human soul, but the power to harm only from God. And therefore the devil, before he took anything from Job, said: Put forth your hand (Job 2), that is, give the power. All power, as the Apostle says, is from God, and whoever resists it, resists the ordinance of God (Romans 13).
Whether power should sometimes be resisted. Lest it seem from this that the devil or any tyrant should not be resisted, it must be known that we should not resist when they do not abuse their power. Whence it is also said in the same place: he resists the ordinance of God. For a just man, if he serves under a sacrilegious king, rightly obeys him if what is commanded is certainly not against God's precept, or if it is uncertain whether it is. But if someone abuses power, namely against God's command, then he should not be obeyed. Which Augustine proves through the grades of human affairs (344). For one should not obey a procurator if he commands against the proconsul, nor him if against the prince, nor even the prince if against God. No one, moreover, sins because he has power, but because he abuses power.
End of the book on the creation of things and the fall of man, and other matters pertaining thereto: which is the second book of Bandinus's Sentences.
(343) Book 2 of On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, ch. 3.
(344) See Augustine on the grades of human authority.