Master Bandinus (Bandinus Magister)
(On the Incarnate Word)
Having set forth the nature of God in the first book, and the creation of the world and the fall of man in the second, he next treats in this third book, in very few words but with great clarity, the incarnation, passion, and death of Christ Jesus, the restoration of fallen man, and the recovery of the lost. He teaches much about the three theological virtues and the four principal moral virtues, as well as the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, which were abundantly present in Christ, and which must be present in us through Christ's benefit and gift, so that Christ's death may be salutary and fruitful for us. To these he appends a brief exposition of the Decalogue with a discussion on lying and perjury at the end of the book.
DISTINCTION I. On the Incarnate Word.
Above we spoke of the fall of man; now let us consider his restoration.
When therefore the fullness of time came, the Son of God was sent into the world, that is, He appeared visibly to the world in the form of a man (Gal. 4; Phil. 2).
Why the Son assumed flesh, not the Father or the Holy Spirit.
It was not the Father or the Holy Spirit who was sent, but only the Son, so that He might be the Son of Man -- lest the name of Son pass to another who was not Son by eternal generation, and thus there would be two sons in the Trinity. The Son was therefore sent through the assumption of flesh, which the entire Trinity brought about, yet neither the Father nor the Holy Spirit assumed flesh. Just as the entire Trinity descended in the form of a dove upon Jesus, and produced that voice, 'This is my beloved Son,' etc. (Matt. 3), yet only the Father spoke those words, and only the Holy Spirit descended upon Jesus (ibid.).
DISTINCTION II. Why the Son assumed humanity, and what is understood by the name of humanity.
The Son therefore assumed humanity, by which name I understand the soul and the flesh. For as Jerome says: We confess in Christ two complete substances, namely of divinity and of humanity, which consists of soul and body. He therefore assumed this whole nature with all its properties. Hence John Damascene says: Everything that God planted in our nature, the Word assumed -- namely body and rational and intellectual soul, and their idioms, that is, properties. For the whole was wholly assumed by me, and the whole was united to the whole, so that He might bestow salvation on the whole. For what is not capable of being assumed is itself incurable.
That the Word assumed flesh and soul simultaneously.
Moreover, at the very moment of conception He took on flesh and soul, so that He would immediately be a perfect man. Hence Gregory says: As the angel announced and the Holy Spirit came upon her, immediately in the womb the Word was made flesh. And John Damascene says: At once flesh, at once flesh of God the Word, at once flesh animated, rational, and intellectual. Nor does what Augustine says on that passage contradict this: 'Forty-six years was this temple in building' -- this number, he says, corresponds to the perfection of the Lord's body (John 2). For he did not say this as though after so many days, in the manner of other conceptions, the conceived flesh was animated, but since it had been animated from the very beginning, as was said, within that many days it was notably distinguished into its members.
DISTINCTION III. On the conception of Christ.
The flesh of Christ was not sinful in Christ, that is, it was not bound to any sin, because it was not born from the pleasure of the flesh, nor did it afterwards sin.
It was indeed sinful in His mother, but with the coming of the Holy Spirit, it was entirely purified. Indeed, as Augustine says, it was granted to His mother herself from that time to so overcome sin that to her alone among all the saints that saying does not apply: 'If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves' (1 John 1).
However, the flesh of Christ was similar to sinful flesh, because it hungered, thirsted, and was subject to other defects.
(345) In the Exposition of the Catholic Faith. (346) Book 3, On the Orthodox Faith, ch. 6. (347) In the Moralia, bk. 18, ch. 27. (348) Book 3, On the Orthodox Faith, ch. 2. (349) In the Letter to Jerome. (350) Augustine, Book on Nature and Grace, ch. 30.
DISTINCTION IV. How the incarnation of Christ is attributed to the Holy Spirit.
The work of the incarnation is attributed especially to the Holy Spirit, as in the Creed: 'And was incarnate by the Holy Spirit.' And in the Gospel: 'She was found to be with child of the Holy Spirit' (Matt. 1) -- this is not because the Holy Spirit served the Virgin as seed, but because through the operation of the Holy Spirit, what was united to the Word was taken from the flesh of the Virgin. For what is from something is either from its substance, as the Son is from the substance of the Father, or from its power, as all things are from God -- in which way the Holy Spirit is called the author of the incarnation. And although this also belongs to the Father, it is attributed to the Spirit, who is called benignity, because it is a work of surpassing benignity.
How Christ is said to be conceived and born of the Holy Spirit.
Nor is it rightly inferred that the Son is the Son of the Holy Spirit because He was born from Him. For not everything that is born from something is a son of it, as a Christian is born from water; nor is everything that is someone's son born from him, as an adopted son.
DISTINCTION V. Who assumed and what was assumed. That the person assumed a nature.
Finally, it must be known that both person and nature assumed a nature, but neither did person assume a person, nor did nature assume a person. For Augustine says in On the Faith, to Peter (ch. 2): The Only-begotten God took up human nature in the unity of a person. Likewise: The Only-begotten Son of God was incarnated by the assumption of flesh and a rational soul. Behold, the person assumed a nature.
That nature assumed nature.
That nature assumed nature, Augustine says as follows (ibid.): That nature which always remains begotten from the Father, assumed our nature without sin. Likewise: The Only-begotten Son of the Father in the form of a servant and of God is one and the same, because the form of God received the form of a servant. But form is nature. For Hilary says: To be in the form of God is nothing other than to remain in the nature of God. Behold, nature assumed nature.
But if it is said elsewhere that the form of a servant was assumed by the Son alone, it must be understood that there not nature but another person is excluded. However, in the Council of Toledo the contrary seems to be found. For it says: The Son alone received man in the singularity of person, not in the unity of the divine nature. But how this is to be understood is explained subsequently in the same text, namely, that what is proper to the Son, not what is common to the Trinity -- that is, the proper person of the Son assumed man, not the three persons in common. This might have seemed otherwise because he had said above that the entire Trinity brought about the formation of the assumed man. The divine nature therefore assumed flesh, whence it is also called incarnate. For John Damascene says: We say that the divinity was united to flesh, and we confess one incarnate nature of God the Word.
That the nature of God is not said to have been made flesh.
It is not said, however, that the divine nature was made flesh, as the Word was; because neither does authority say this, nor does the usage of speech admit it. Perhaps because otherwise the convertibility of nature into nature would thereby be signified.
That no person was assumed.
A person, however, was never assumed, because there was no person already constituted from that flesh and soul for the Word to receive. Furthermore, it is not rightly said that a person was assumed simply because a soul was assumed. For the soul is not of individual nature, or a person, so long as it is personally united to something else, but only when it exists by itself. But if it is said somewhere that the man Christ Jesus, or that man, was assumed by the Word of God, as it is said in the Psalm: 'Blessed is he whom you have chosen and assumed' (Ps. 64), determine it thus: This is true of the nature of man, but false of the person.
(350) Book 12, On the Trinity. (351) On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 6.
DISTINCTION VI. What is the meaning of the statement, 'God is man.'
In order that what is said in these propositions -- 'God is man' and 'man is God' and similar ones -- may be more easily understood, it must first be briefly stated that from those things which the Son of God assumed, namely soul and flesh, no human person was constituted. For a person is composed from these two things only when they come together principally in that which is not yet a person, as happens in all other human beings apart from Christ. But if they come together in that which is already a person, as was the case in Christ, they do not constitute a person, but are merely possessed by that person -- just as walls, roof, and foundation, if added to an already completed house, do not make a house but are merely held by the house to which they were added. Just as baptism does not cleanse one already baptized, and consecration, ordination, or dedication, applied a second time to things that already participate in them, do not add anything -- that is, they confer nothing and change nothing, but are merely applied. So therefore soul and flesh were applied to the Son of God, as a garment to limbs.
For the Son of God was made man, yet not made man so essentially and truly as you are, who are the very composite essence of your soul and body; rather, He was made man essentially and truly according to a habitus (manner of possession). Hence Augustine says: God the Son was made a true man for us, because He has a true human nature. Augustine discusses this in his treatment of the passage: 'He was found in outward appearance as a man' (Phil. 2).
Four kinds of habitus.
For he says that things approach something else to be possessed by it in four ways. Something approaches something else either so that it changes the other but is not itself changed, as wisdom approaches a fool; or so that it changes the other and is itself changed, as food approaches the stomach; or so that it neither changes nor is changed, as a ring on a finger; or so that it does not change the other but is itself changed, as a garment on a body -- and this last kind fits the present comparison. For God the Son emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant (Phil. 2), not changing His own form, and thus was made in the likeness of man by assuming a true man, and was found in outward appearance as a man, that is, by having a man He was found to be as a man. He says 'as a man,' however, not simply 'a man.' Just as that flesh is called not the flesh of sin but similar to sinful flesh (Rom. 8).
When therefore it is said, 'God is man,' the habitus is predicated, so that the meaning is: God has a man, or is one having a man -- or even the humanated person is predicated. Cassiodorus indicates this, saying: The Son of God was made, so to speak, a humanated God. But when it is said, 'man is God,' the habitus is made the subject and nature or person is predicated, so that the meaning is: Man is God, that is, the one having a man is God. But if 'made' is placed in the proposition, as 'God was made man,' understand it thus: God began to have a man, or to be a humanated God. Likewise, 'man was made God,' that is, that third person began with a man to be God.
DISTINCTION VII. On the predestination of Christ.
According to this, therefore, it is easy to understand the passage: 'Who was predestined as the Son of God in power' (Rom. 1). For the Son of God was predestined, that is, it was prepared for Him by grace, not that He should be the Son of God, but that together with a man He should be the Son of God, so that grace is attributed to Him according to the nature of the person -- as if we were to say: This advocate is given a favor, not so that he may speak before the judge, but so that he may speak while seated, so that the favor is his not with respect to his speaking, but with respect to his being seated. So grace was given to Christ, not with respect to His sonship, but with respect to His being called Son together with His humanity. So also Augustine says: The name which is above every name was given to Him according to the form of a servant, that is, so that together with the form of a servant He would be called the Only-begotten Son of God. Thus therefore that person is said to be predestined, or even His human nature is said to be predestined, to be personally united to the Word of the Father, and then that passage is explained thus: 'Who was predestined,' that is, 'whose nature was predestined.'
Similarly, according to this, understand that saying of Augustine: So great, namely, is the union of both natures, that the whole is called God and the whole is called man -- that is, that person with all of this, namely divinity, soul, and flesh, and their properties, is God and man.
DISTINCTION VIII. That Christ is not 'something' insofar as He is man. The multiple meanings of the term 'according to.'
It must be known, however, that the Son of God, from the fact that He assumed a man, was not made into something, that is, into a person or a nature, because there is neither a quaternity in the Trinity nor is Christ two natures; yet although it is written that Christ subsists in two and from two natures or substances, it is not said that He is two, but rather that He became of a certain nature which He was not before. According to which that saying of Origen must be understood: He was made, without doubt, that which he was not before, that is, of that nature. Likewise that saying: 'The Son of God is one thing, the son of man is another,' that is, of one and of another nature, according to whether He was born from God or from man. Understand everything said in this manner accordingly.
Therefore the Son is not 'something' insofar as He is man, unless the phrase 'according to' denotes the unity of the person. For this expression 'according to' in this mystery sometimes denotes the person -- as in 'according to which He is man, that is, He who is man, gave gifts to men.' Sometimes it denotes nature -- as in 'according to which He is man, He suffered, that is, His humanity itself.' Sometimes it denotes state or habitus -- as in 'according to which He is man, He was predestined, or a name was given to Him,' as was said above.
DISTINCTION IX. On the adoration of Christ's humanity.
Since, however, the humanity was assumed into one person by the Word of God, it must be adored together with the Word. Hence John Damascene says: We adore Christ with the Father and the Spirit in one adoration together with His uncontaminated flesh. And Augustine says: I adore the humanity in Christ because it is united to the divinity. For if you separate the man from God, I will never believe in Him or serve Him -- just as if someone were to find the purple robe or royal diadem without the king, he would not adore it; but with the king, he adores it.
DISTINCTIONS X and XI. Whether Christ is a creature or was made.
Although Christ is man, He should not be called simply a creature, or made. For He by whom all things were made was not Himself made, as Augustine says. Nor is He a creature, because from this it would follow that He is not God. For Augustine indicates that God and creature are immediately opposed with respect to substance, saying: Every substance that is not God is a creature; and what is not a creature is God. Likewise: If the Word is not a creature, it is of the same substance as the Father. From which it is rightly inferred: If He is a creature, He is not God; and if He is God, He is not a creature; and: If He is of the same substance as the Father, He is not a creature. Therefore we do not say simply that He was made, but in a qualified sense, that is, according to His humanity.
Hence Ambrose says: The Apostle said the Son of God was 'made of a woman,' so that the making is attributed not to the divinity but to the assumption of the body (Gal. 4). For Augustine says that distinction is necessary when speaking of Christ: When we speak of Christ, let the diligent and devout reader understand what is said, and according to what, and about what, and for what reason. This -- God -- He always was; but according to the fact that He is man, He began to exist.
(352) On the Faith, to Peter. (353) In the Gloss on Rom. 1. (354) Origen, on the Epistle to the Romans. (355) Augustine, to Felicianus. (356) Book 3, On the Orthodox Faith, ch. 8. (357) From the Lord's sermon, 'Let not your heart be troubled.'
DISTINCTION XII. Whether Christ could sin.
It is asked whether Christ could sin. It seems so, because the ability to sin, as we proved above, is a good of our nature, which He assumed in its entirety apart from sin, in order to heal it entirely. But if this is the case, it seems that He could not be God, because being God and being able to sin are incompatible. To this we say, according to the distinction given above, that Christ could sin insofar as He was man; yet we do not say this without qualification, but add 'naturally.' For from the very moment of conception the assumed man was so confirmed by grace (which He received without measure) that He could not sin; naturally, however, He could have.
Whether an angel can sin.
We say the same also of the angel, who received a lesser grace of confirmation, that he simply cannot sin, but naturally could. Much less therefore could the Lord of angels sin, who was a perfect man from the very womb, not only on account of His soul and flesh, but also on account of His wisdom and grace.
DISTINCTION XIII. How Christ advanced in wisdom.
To this, however, what is read in the Gospel seems contrary: 'Jesus,' it says, 'advanced in age and wisdom and grace before God and men' (Luke 2). But according to what has been said, we understand this also. For Gregory says: According to His human nature He advanced in age, from infancy to youth. According to the same nature He also advanced in wisdom and grace -- not because He was wiser or more full of grace through the passage of time, but because the same wisdom and grace with which He was full from the first hour of His conception, He gradually demonstrated more fully over time to others. He advanced, therefore, that is, He caused others to advance, just as a teacher is said to advance in his students.
As for what Ambrose says -- 'He advanced in human understanding, just as He hungered with human appetite' -- this must be understood as meaning that, as far as human perception was concerned, Christ's human understanding was said to have advanced. According to this also, the prophet is said to have been ignorant of his father and mother in infancy, because he so conducted and bore himself at that time as though he were devoid of knowledge (Isa. 8).
DISTINCTION XIV. That the soul of Christ knows all things that God knows.
On this point, it must be known that the soul of Christ has knowledge of all things that Christ knows, because the spirit of knowledge was not given to Him in measure (John 3). For if He knew some things and not others, He would not have knowledge without measure. Fulgentius proves this by that authority: 'In whom are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge' (Col. 2). It is established by reason, because no one knows anything that His soul is ignorant of.
But what is said seems contrary: 'In nothing is the creature equal to the Creator'; and the Prophet: 'Your knowledge is made wonderful' (Ps. 138). Expounding this, Cassiodorus says: The assumed man cannot be made equal to the divine substance in knowledge or in anything else. But this must be understood as meaning 'in all respects' or 'perfectly.' For although the soul of Christ knows all things that God knows, it does not grasp all things as clearly and distinctly as God Himself does. Or: in nothing is the creature made co-equal with the Creator, that is, there is nothing that makes the creature equal to the Creator.
Nor is this passage contrary to it: 'For no one knows the things of God except the Spirit of God' (1 Cor. 2), who alone searches all things, namely by Himself, because He also gives others the ability to search. Hence it is added in the same place: 'But we have the Spirit of God,' as if to say, through whom we know the deep things of God. Much more therefore did that soul know all deep things, which had the Spirit of God above all others.
That Christ did not have all the power of God.
He did not, however, have all power, lest through this He would be omnipotent, and thus would be thought to be God. But what Ambrose says on that passage seems contrary: 'He shall be great, and shall be called the Son of the Most High' (Luke 1) -- 'Not because,' he says, 'He was not great before the Virgin's delivery, but because the power which the Son of God naturally has, the man was going to receive in time.' Since this does not seem to be said of the person, nor could the flesh receive it, it remains to understand it of the soul. But he spoke only of the person, who began to have with a man through grace the power which He had from eternity, just as we said above concerning predestination.
DISTINCTION XV. That Christ assumed our defects.
We also add that He assumed our defects, such as hunger, thirst, sadness, and fear, and the other general ones, none of which was sin. We say this on account of the tinder of sin. He did not, however, assume all defects, as Pope Leo says, but only those which it was fitting for Him to take upon Himself for our sake, and which were not unbecoming. For He did not assume invincible ignorance or difficulty in doing good, which, as Augustine says, every man suffers from the beginning of his birth. He also did not accept these because they are contrary to what He had from the first state of man.
DISTINCTION XVI. Whether there was in Christ a necessity of suffering and dying.
For there are four states of man, from each of which Christ received something. The first is before sin, from which He received immunity from sin. The second is after sin, before grace, from which He received punishment. The third was under grace, from which He received the fullness of grace. From the fourth, which will be in glory, He received the inability to sin. But He assumed these defects, like the flesh itself and death, not by the necessity of His condition -- that is, not from the corrupt law of birth which is the necessity of our condition -- but by the will of His compassion.
According to this, therefore, understand what Augustine says: The Lord did not truly fear to suffer, because He did not have a true cause of fear. Hence Hilary says: Christ had a body for suffering, but not a nature for feeling pain.
Or He did not truly fear, that is, not in such a way that fear dominated His soul so as to move Him from righteousness. For there was in Him a pre-passion, not a passion, as Jerome says; He truly feared, that is, with a true fear, not a feigned one.
Christ had the necessity of dying.
He also had the necessity of dying; for just as it is appointed for all men to die once, so also Christ, by the same necessity and law of nature, was offered once.
(358) Book 1, On the Trinity. (359) Book 1, On the Trinity, ch. 6. (360) Book 2, On the Trinity. (361) Book 1, On the Trinity, ch. 43. (362) Cited in the Gloss under the name of Gregory, but it is from Bede's Homily 2 on Luke. (363) Book On the Sacrament of the Lord's Incarnation, ch. (364) In a certain sermon. (365) Otherwise Bede's Homily 23 on Luke. In the Gloss, however, it is cited under the names of Ambrose and Bede. (366) Book 3, On Free Will, ch. 18. (367) On Psalm 21: 'I will cry out and you will not hear.' (368) Book 10, On the Trinity, before me.
DISTINCTION XVII. Whether Christ's will was always fulfilled.
Furthermore, it must be known that just as Christ had two natures, so He also had two wills. Hence Augustine says: Christ in His passion expressed in Himself two wills, according to His two natures. For He says: 'Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me' (Matt. 26). Behold the will of the man, which He immediately directs to the divine will, saying: 'Nevertheless, not as I will, but as you will' (ibid.). He therefore asked for the cup to pass, but did not obtain it -- which seems contrary to that Psalm: 'May the Lord fulfill all your petitions' (Ps. 19).
The human will of Christ is twofold.
But the human will of Christ must be distinguished according to the affection of sensuality, by which He willed not to die, and according to the affection of reason, by which He wholly willed to die, according to which He speaks in His spirit. Nor did the flesh of Christ in this matter lust against the spirit, because He asked this according to the will of God and of His spirit -- not indeed so that He might obtain what He asked, but so that He might express the truth of His humanity. He also asked this so that He might give to His members, when placed in tribulation, a model for crying out to God and subjecting their own will to the divine will. Both things therefore that He willed were good, but that was better which He committed to execution.
Hilary's opinion, different from the foregoing.
Hilary, however, understands by the cup the terror of death, to which all flesh except that which is Christ's was subject by the necessity of its condition -- a terror that was to be removed at last through the virtue of glory after the death of Christ. With this in view, he says that Christ prayed and feared not for Himself but for His own. For He Himself, as was proved above, did not fear as others feared. Hence it is that He did not say: 'My soul is sorrowful because of death,' but 'even unto death' (Matt. 26), since He saw that the scandals arising from apostolic weakness were about to cease.
DISTINCTION XVIII. On the merit of Christ and what He merited for Himself.
After which death, and also through which death, He merited for Himself glory and impassibility. Hence Augustine says: In order that Christ might be glorified through the resurrection, He was first humbled through the passion; humility is the merit of glory, glory is the reward of humility. By glory he means the manifestation of the name given to Him which is above every name (Phil. 2). For it was not then for the first time that that name was given to Him. Yet it is said to have been given to Him then by that figure of speech by which a thing is said to happen when it becomes known to have happened.
He also merited the impassibility of soul and flesh through that same death, which He had nonetheless merited from the time He became man, through charity and the other virtues. For Christ had nothing by which He could advance according to the merit of the soul, that is, according to the power of merit -- although He could advance with respect to the number of bodily merits, that is, of works.
Whether Christ was more blessed after death.
If it is asked whether His soul was more blessed after death than before, we say that it was more blessed with respect to immunity from misery, not with respect to the contemplation of God.
DISTINCTION XIX. On the manner of our redemption, and what Christ merited for us.
But if the preceding merits sufficed for these things, why then did He wish to die? For your sake, not for His own, so that He might instruct you in humility and thus lead you into paradise. For through His death He merited for us the entrance to paradise, which He had merited for Himself through His preceding merits, and redemption from sin, punishment, and the devil. For since God was going to reconcile the world to Himself through a sacrifice, no other sacrifice sufficed to reconcile it, since all had sinned. God had decreed, as Ambrose says, that no one be admitted to paradise, that is, to the contemplation of God, nor could the humility of any man avail as much as the pride of the first man had harmed. No one, therefore, was found except the Lion from the tribe of Judah, who by dying freed us from sin and the devil, since through that death charity is stirred up in our hearts (Rom. 5).
For gazing upon Him as upon the bronze serpent (Num. 21), and seeing with what great charity He loved us, so that He would die for us, we are admonished and set on fire to love Him who did such great things for us, and thus freed from sin and the devil we are justified. Finally, bearing our sins upon the wood, that is, the punishment of sins, He redeemed us from eternal punishment, by releasing the debt from temporal punishment, in hope, not yet in reality; from which He will completely free us when the last enemy, death, is destroyed. And so Christ properly became our redeemer by the display of humility; but in common the whole Trinity is called redeemer by the effect of power.
Christ alone is the mediator.
Christ alone, however, is the mediator between mortal sinners and the immortal just one (1 Tim. 2). For He alone is God and man, made mediator insofar as He is man, drawing near to us through weakness, yet not thereby through justice. Indeed, insofar as He is the Word, He is not a mediator but one God with the Father.
(369) On Matt., ch. 26. (370) On Psalm 33. (371) Book 10, On the Trinity. (371*) On those words, 'Christ was made obedient for us.' (372) On the Epistle to the Hebrews.
DISTINCTION XX. That God could have freed us in another way. Why Christ chose to free us in this manner instead.
There was indeed another way of our liberation possible to God, but none more fitting for healing our misery. For this manner most effectively frees us from the death of despair and raises our minds to heavenly things, when we see that He valued us so highly that He Himself, unchangeably good, preferred to die bearing our evils. And also because in this way the devil is overcome by justice, not by power. For God could have freed His servant by power, whom the devil had fraudulently led away and violently held, but He did not wish to, lest man seem to be taken from him by force. But humbled through death, He did this justly. For it is just that the debtors whom the devil held should be set free, those who believe in Him whom the devil killed without any debt.
The death of Christ was brought about by the Trinity, Judas, the devil, and the Jews. Whether the Jews did something good.
Finally, it must be known that the death of Christ was the work of the Trinity, of Judas, of the devil, and of the Jews. Of the Trinity, because it was done by God as author, that is, willing it (Rom. 8); of Judas, because he betrayed Him (Matt. 26); of the Jews and the devil, because they instigated it. And so one thing, that is, the death of Christ, was accomplished by all of these; but the deeds from which it resulted were diverse, namely: the Father's handing over, the Son's willing encounter, Judas's betrayal, and the instigation of the Jews and the devil. The Jews therefore did something good with respect to what was accomplished, that is, the effect, but something evil with respect to the act.
DISTINCTION XXI. Whether the Word, from the time it became man, ever ceased to be man.
It must be firmly held that the Word, as was said above, is true man, because He has a soul and flesh in the union of person. He is a living man because He has those two things joined together. He never therefore ceased to be man from the time He became man, because He never ceased to have those things. Hence Augustine says: The Word, from the time it assumed man, that is, flesh and soul, never laid aside the soul so that the soul was separated from the Word.
Of the flesh he also says: So also in the tomb Christ did not abandon His flesh by dying together with it, just as He formed it in the Virgin's womb by being born together with it. The divinity was not therefore separated from the man, but understand this with respect to the union of person, not with respect to the protection of nature, according to which it was separated. Hence Ambrose says: The man cries out as He is about to die from the separation of divinity, namely with respect to protection. The divinity separated itself by withdrawing its power, as is understood here (Matt. 26): 'Why have you forsaken me?' But it did not dissolve the union. Outwardly it separated itself from protection, but inwardly it was present for the union.
As for what Athanasius says under anathema, that the whole man was assumed again in the resurrection, understand this not with respect to possessing, but with respect to joining those two together again, so that the flesh, which had properly died, might live from the soul -- the flesh in which, not in Himself, Christ is said to have died. Hence Augustine says: Far be it that Christ experienced death in such a way that, as far as He is in Himself, life lost life.
DISTINCTION XXII. In what sense God is said to have suffered.
Whatever the flesh suffered, it cannot be said that God did not suffer. Just as you cannot say that you did not suffer an injury if your garment is drenched or torn, even though it is not you. Much more therefore, whatever the flesh united to the Word suffers, God must be said to suffer, even though the Word could neither die nor suffer. Of this therefore Ambrose says: The same one was dying and was not dying; was rising and was not rising -- He was rising according to the flesh, He was not rising according to the Word.
DISTINCTION XXIII. Whether Christ had faith and hope, just as He had charity.
Since Christ was full of grace, it is asked whether He had faith and hope. To explain this better, let us first see what faith and hope are. Faith, then, is to believe what you do not see; for the Apostle says: 'Faith is the substance of things hoped for by us, the evidence or conviction of things not seen' (Heb. 11). For through faith the things to be hoped for subsist now in us, and they will subsist in the future through experience.
DISTINCTION XXIV. On the faith of the ancients.
If there is doubt about these things, they are proved through faith, in this way: because the patriarchs and other saints believed thus. Properly, therefore, faith is about things not seen. For about things seen there is not faith, but recognition. This faith is said by the Apostle to be one by way of similarity, not singularity -- just as the will of those who will the same thing is called one will, and the face of two most similar persons is called one face. Therefore our faith and that of the ancients is one. But the manner of believing is different. Hence Augustine says: The same faith of the Mediator that saves us was saving the ancients. For just as we believe that Christ has come in the flesh, so they believed that He would come; as we believe that He died, so they that He would die; as we believe that He has risen, so they that He would rise and come to judgment.
On the faith of the elders and the simple.
These things, however, were revealed distinctly to the elders. But to the simple they were revealed in mystery. Hence Job: 'The oxen were plowing and the donkeys were grazing beside them' (Job 1) -- because the simple adhered to the elders, believing in the mystery which the elders taught in mystery.
DISTINCTION XXV. On hope. The difference between faith and hope.
Hope, then, is the certain expectation of future blessedness, arising from the grace of God and preceding merits, regarding the thing hoped for, namely eternal life. And it concerns things not seen, just as faith does. But hope differs from faith, because hope is about good things, and future things, and things pertaining only to the one who is said to possess that hope. Faith, however, is about good things and bad things, present and past and future, pertaining both to the one who has that faith and to others -- provided, however, that believing them pertains to religion.
These, however, advance in us until we know perfectly. For Augustine says: We do not know in order to believe, but we believe in order to know.
According to this, therefore, Christ did not have faith and hope, because He knew past and future things equally as well as present things.
Hence the saints are not now said to believe or hope for the future resurrection, because they understand it most perfectly in the Word of God.
(373) On John 10: 'I will lay down my life.' (374) In the exposition of Ps. 30, 'God, my God.' (374*) Against Felicianus. (375) Book 3, On the Holy Spirit. (376) Augustine, on John. (377) Book On Marriage and Concupiscence, ch. 2.
DISTINCTION XXVI. That the saints are not now said to believe or hope.
It is read, however, that Christ believed and hoped. For He says through the prophet: 'I will be trusting in him' (Heb. 2). And in the Psalm: 'In you, Lord, I have hoped' (Ps. 30). This is to be understood with respect to the outward effect, not with respect to the inward act. For he prayed and did other things in the way that one does who, not yet seeing, believes and hopes. Yet He was not delayed from full knowledge by hoping or believing. Finally, according to this, He says to the Father: 'Your discipline itself will teach me' (Ps. 17), that is, by the outward effect, by which He displayed the form of one well corrected, not by an inward act, because He never reformed Himself from wrong to right.
DISTINCTION XXVII. On the charity of Christ. The two precepts of charity.
Christ had charity, which He demonstrated by the work of His passion, about which let us speak briefly. Charity, then, is the love by which God is loved for his own sake, and the neighbor for the sake of God. Its first and nearest commandment is: 'You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your mind, and with all your strength' (Deut. 6; Matt. 22) -- that is, that you should direct all your thoughts, your entire life, and your understanding toward him, which will be fulfilled not here but in the future. This was said, however, so that we might not be ignorant of the goal toward which we must run. The second is: 'You shall love your neighbor as yourself' (John 13), that is, for that end and for that reason for which you love yourself. By neighbor understand every man, who is called neighbor in three ways: by the condition of shared nature, by proximity of faith, and by the conferring of benefit.
DISTINCTIONS XXVIII and XXIX. Angels are bound by the precept of charity.
Hence the angels too are included under that precept. For Augustine says: It is clear that even the holy angels are included under the precept of love of neighbor, by whom the offices of mercy are bestowed upon us.
There are four kinds of things to be loved.
Every kind of thing to be loved is comprehended under the aforementioned commandments, and there are four, as Augustine says: One which is above us, namely God; another which we ourselves are; a third which is beside us, namely our neighbor; a fourth which is below us, namely our body and that of our neighbor. This is understood in those commandments, even if it is not explicitly stated. For Augustine says: If you understand that you as a whole are to be loved, that is, soul and body, you must also love your neighbor, that is, his soul and body.
That we love God and neighbor with one charity.
Although there are so many things that we love, nevertheless we love them all with one charity alone. For Augustine says: There is one charity and two precepts. For it is not a different charity that loves the neighbor from the one that loves God. Therefore charity must be ordered, both in interior affection and in exterior effect. Concerning the order of affection, Augustine says: Whoever wishes to have well-ordered love should see to it that he does not love what should not be loved, or fail to love what should be loved; or love equally what should be loved more or less, or love more or less what should be loved equally.
The order of things to be loved.
Every man, insofar as he is a sinner, is not to be loved; insofar as he is a man, he is to be loved. God, however, is to be loved more than every man. Furthermore, the neighbor is to be loved more than our own body, because the neighbor is loved for God's sake, and can enjoy God together with us, while the body cannot. Finally, all neighbors are to be loved with equal affection but unequal effect. Hence Augustine says: All men are to be loved equally; but since you cannot benefit all, those must especially be cared for who are more closely bound to you by the opportunities of places, times, or any circumstances.
Ambrose says this more distinctly: First God is to be loved; second, parents; then children, then members of the household, who, if they are good, are to be preferred to evil children. Last of all, enemies, whom God does not command us to love with all our strength or as ourselves, but simply. For it is sufficient that we love them and do not hate them. Ambrose says this not because we should not love them as ourselves -- for they are indeed our neighbors -- but to show that it is sufficient if we love them less than other neighbors, and this, of course, with respect to outward effect.
On the degrees of charity.
It must also be known that charity is not perfect as soon as it is born. For in order to be perfected, it is born; once born, it is nourished; once nourished, it is strengthened; once strengthened, it is perfected. And when perfect it says: 'I desire to be dissolved' (Phil. 1), etc.
(378) Book On Christian Doctrine, ch. 30. (379) Book 1, On Christian Doctrine, chs. 23, 24, and 26. (380) Book On Christian Doctrine. (381) Sermon on the Lord's Ascension.
DISTINCTION XXX. Whether it is better to love friends than enemies, or vice versa.
It is also customarily asked whether it is of greater merit to love a friend or an enemy. We say it is of equal merit. For each is loved with the same charity from which merit comes. But with respect to the outward act, it is a more evident sign of perfect charity to love an enemy than a friend. Hence Augustine says: Yet this great good -- namely to love an enemy and to do good to one who hates, and to pray for one who persecutes -- does not belong to as great a multitude as we believe to be heard when it is said: 'Forgive us our debts, as we also forgive our debtors' (Matt. 6).
DISTINCTION XXXI. Whether charity once possessed is lost.
By saying this, let us consider that he distinguished perfect charity from imperfect. Imperfect charity is often lost and recovered, and both good and evil persons share in it. Hence Ambrose says: To some, grace was given for use, as to Saul and Judas. For frequently those who will be good are first evil, and those who will be evil are first good. But rooted and perfect charity, once possessed, never ceases, nor do any but the good share in it. Hence charity is the proper and singular fountain of the good, which no outsider shares. According to this, resolve the apparent dissonance found among many authorities.
How charity will not be made void.
Perfect charity will remain in the future. For although it is perfected in the future, the same substance and the same mode will remain, which is to love God more than yourself, and your neighbor as yourself. But the other things will either entirely cease, like faith and hope (which some think also applies to knowledge), or at least with respect to their mode, which will be entirely different in the future from what it is in the present.
Why charity is placed after faith and hope.
It should also be noted that charity is not placed after faith and hope because it arises from them, but because after them it will remain increased. These three are now equal, not with respect to their comprehension, but with respect to the intensity of their acts. For if you believe more intensely, you also hope and love more intensely.
DISTINCTION XXXII. How Christ loved.
Christ had charity, not that of the way, so as to love every neighbor unto life, but that of the fatherland, by which He loved only the elect unto salvation. He also loved the reprobate, just as He loved them from eternity -- that is, insofar as they were to be His work, that is, those whom and such as He was going to make them. Accordingly, He loved some of the elect more and others less from eternity, not according to the essence of love but according to its efficacy, because He prepared greater goods for some than for others. According to this sense, some are said to begin to be loved by God then, when they receive the effect of His eternal love.
DISTINCTION XXXIII. On the principal virtues which they call cardinal.
After the foregoing, let us consider the four principal virtues. The first of these is justice, which consists in helping the wretched who are unable to stand against the power of the stronger. The second is prudence, in guarding against snares. The third is fortitude, in enduring hardships. The fourth is temperance, in restraining base pleasures.
That these virtues remain in the future.
These will exist in the future, but according to a different use than here. Hence Bede says: The powers of heaven are illustrious in the four aforementioned virtues, which are observed differently in heaven by angels and holy souls than they are here by the faithful.
DISTINCTION XXXIV. On the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit.
The seven gifts are also virtues, and they exist in the angels, as Ambrose says: The Spirit of God gladdens the nature of the angels with a certain more abundant richness of sanctifications. Then, explaining these sanctifications, he adds: By these sanctifications is signified the fullness of seven spiritual virtues, which Isaiah enumerates (ch. 11), saying: 'The spirit of wisdom,' etc.
But what Bede says seems contrary: After he had discussed servile and chaste fear, he added: Both will cease in the future. Augustine also says: The fear of the Lord is a great safeguard for those advancing toward salvation; for those who arrive, it is cast out. For they no longer fear a friend when they have been led to that which was promised.
But we say that fear will exist in the future, not according to the use it now has, which is the dread of separation, but according to reverence, which is mixed with the subjection of love, according to which it was in Christ. Hence the Apostle: 'He was heard because of His reverence' (Heb. 5).
A full distinction of fears. Worldly fear. Human, servile. Initial. Chaste or filial.
Here it must be known that there are five kinds of fear. Worldly fear, which is a fault, by which we fear losing the goods of the world. Human or natural fear, which is a punishment and was in Christ, by which we shrink from bodily dangers. Servile fear, by which, out of fear of hell, a man restrains himself from sin and does good, which is useful -- through this, the habit of justice gradually develops, and it is insufficient. Initial fear, when what was hard begins to be loved, and this is sufficient. Then chaste fear succeeds, and is called friendly or filial, by which the separation from the Bridegroom is feared, and this is perfecting. According to this last sense it remains until the end of the world; but according to the sense stated above, that is, according to reverence mixed with filial subjection, it will exist both here and in the future (1 John 4). When it is said that 'fear is not in charity,' this is to be understood of perfect charity and initial fear. The more charity grows, the more fear decreases. And the more charity becomes interior, the more fear is cast out -- greater charity, lesser fear; lesser charity, greater fear.
It should be noted that in the usage of Scripture, both servile fear and initial fear are called the beginning of wisdom, but for different reasons. For servile fear is called the beginning of wisdom because it prepares a place for the charity of God; initial fear, because it is part of an incipient charity.
(385) In the Enchiridion, ch. 73. (386) On ch. 9 of Romans. (387) On Exod. 26. (388) Book 1, On the Holy Spirit, ch. 20 and the last. (389) On the Proverbs, ch. 1. (390) On Psalm 5. (391) On the Epistle of John 4, Homily 9.
DISTINCTION XXXV. The distinction between knowledge, understanding, and wisdom.
Those three gifts -- knowledge, understanding, and wisdom -- are distinguished from one another as follows. Knowledge avails for the right administration of temporal things and good conduct among the wicked. Understanding, for the contemplation of the Creator and of invisible creatures. Wisdom, for the contemplation of and delight in the eternal truth alone.
DISTINCTION XXXVI. On the connection and equality of virtues.
Here it must be known that all virtues are so connected to one another that, if one is possessed, all are possessed. Hence Jerome says: All virtues cling to one another, so that whoever has one has all, and whoever lacks one lacks all. Augustine also says: The virtues that are in the human mind, although each is understood in a different way, are in no way separated from one another, so that whoever is equal in one -- for example, in fortitude -- is also equal in prudence, justice, and temperance. For if you say that these men are equal in fortitude but that one excels in prudence, it follows that this man's fortitude is less prudent, and therefore they are not equal in fortitude either, because the other's fortitude is more prudent. And so you will find with the other virtues, if you run through them all with the same consideration.
For when someone is said to excel in a particular virtue -- as Abraham in faith and Job in patience -- this must be understood according to outward practices, or in comparison with other men, because he especially displays the habit of humility, or principally carries out the work of faith or of some other virtue.
DISTINCTION XXXVII. On the ten commandments of the Decalogue, and their reduction to the two commandments of charity.
Now the distinction of the Decalogue must be considered. For the Decalogue has ten precepts: three on the first tablet pertaining to God, and seven on the second tablet pertaining to the neighbor. The first on the first tablet is: 'You shall not have strange gods. You shall not make for yourself a graven image, nor any likeness' (Exod. 20). A graven image is what has nothing similar to itself. A likeness is what has the appearance of some thing (1 Cor. 8).
The second is: 'You shall not take the name of your God in vain' (Exod. 20). Which is to say, according to the letter: You shall not swear to no purpose by the name of God. Allegorically, however, it is commanded that you should not think that Christ the Son of God is a creature.
The third is: 'Remember to keep holy the Sabbath day' (Exod. 20). According to the letter, the observance of the Sabbath is commanded. Allegorically, however, that you should expect rest both here from vices and in the future in the contemplation of God. The first commandment pertains to the Father, in whom there is unity; the second to the Son, in whom there is co-equality; the third to the Holy Spirit, in whom there is the communion of both.
On the seven commandments of the second tablet.
On the second tablet there are seven commandments, the first of which pertains to the earthly father: 'Honor your father and your mother, that you may live long upon the earth' (Exod. 20), namely the land of the living. The second is: 'You shall not kill' (ibid.). Where according to the letter the act of homicide is forbidden; spiritually, the will to kill. The third is: 'You shall not commit adultery' (ibid.), that is, you shall not be joined to anyone except through the bond of marriage. For from the part the whole is understood. Under the name of adultery, therefore, every illicit sexual intercourse and every illegitimate use of those members must be understood as forbidden. The fourth is: 'You shall not steal' (ibid.). Where sacrilege and all robbery is forbidden. For he who forbade theft did not permit robbery.
Whether the children of Israel committed theft in despoiling Egypt.
Here it is customarily asked whether the Israelites committed theft in despoiling Egypt (Exod. 3). We say they did not, because the perfect ones rendered service to God who commanded it. The weaker ones were rather permitted to do this to those who justly suffered such things, than commanded. The fifth is: 'You shall not speak false testimony against your neighbor' (Exod. 20). Where the crime of lying and perjury is forbidden.
DISTINCTION XXXVIII. On lying.
A lie, as Augustine says, is a signification of a false utterance with the intention of deceiving. To lie is to speak contrary to what one thinks in one's mind. Hence if a Jew says that Christ is God, while he does not believe this, he indeed lies, but he does not speak a falsehood.
Whether every lie is a sin.
Every lie, then, is a sin. But it matters greatly with what intention and about what things one lies. For one who lies in order to console does not sin in the same way as one who lies in order to harm; nor does one who lies about the way of the earth sin as one who lies about the way of life.
Three kinds of lies.
For one lies sometimes merely for the advantage of someone, as the midwives and Rahab did (Exod. 1; Josh. 2). Sometimes in jest, which is not fitting for the perfect. Sometimes out of malice, which all must be very careful to avoid.
Whether Jacob lied when he said he was Esau.
Jacob is excused from lying when he said he was Esau (Gen. 27), since he was only intending to obey his mother, who knew by God's intimate counsel the mystery of the sacrament that was being accomplished in him. Or Jacob did not lie, because he was Esau by right, if not in person, since he had bought the birthright from him.
DISTINCTION XXXIX. On perjury.
Perjury is a lie confirmed by an oath. To swear is to render to God what is due, namely truth and not falsehood -- that is, to call God as witness, or to pledge something to him. As one does who swears by his children, whom he pledges to God, so that what proceeds from his mouth may befall them: if true, what is true; if false, what is false.
(392) On Isaiah 10. (393) Book 6, On the Trinity, ch. 4. (394) Augustine, on that passage. (395) In the Enchiridion, ch. 18.
DISTINCTION XL. On the 6th and 7th commandments of the second tablet.
Which oaths are more binding. What perjury is.
One swears by God, by the Gospels, and by creatures. But the holier the thing by which one swears, the more punishable the perjury. Perjury, then, is to lie under oath, which occurs when someone, while swearing, speaks with the intention of deceiving -- an intention which he has either immediately or afterwards, before the time when what he swore must be fulfilled. For a guilty tongue is not produced except by a guilty mind.
The companions of an oath. An imprudent oath is a sin.
It must also be noted that an oath has three companions: truth, judgment, and justice -- so that one swears discreetly with respect to oneself, usefully with respect to the neighbor, and truthfully (or believing it to be true) with respect to God. If these are lacking, it is perjury, that is, an oath rashly taken. This is a sin because swearing is not to be sought as a good thing, nor is it to be shunned as evil when it is necessary.
When perjury is said to occur.
Perjury is properly said to occur when the oath can be fulfilled and ought to be according to the terms of the swearing, but is disregarded. This should be done with sounder counsel when fulfilling the oath leads to a worse outcome -- as when someone has sworn to persist in fornication, who is indeed perplexed between the fornication and the aforementioned perjury, where the pledge must be broken. For Isidore says: In a shameful vow, change the decree; do not do what you rashly vowed.
On one who swears by the cunning of words.
Therefore by whatever verbal artifice one swears, God accepts it as the one who swears and the one to whom the oath is sworn simply understand it.
On one who compels another to swear falsely.
If anyone knowingly demands a false oath, he is a murderer.
The sixth precept is: 'You shall not desire the wife of your neighbor' (Exod. 20). The seventh: 'You shall not covet the house of your neighbor, nor his servant, nor his handmaid' (ibid.).
Whether these last commandments are included in the former ones.
But these two precepts seem to be included in the earlier ones, in which it was said: 'You shall not commit adultery, you shall not steal.' But by those, deeds were forbidden; by these, however, concupiscence is forbidden. The aforementioned commandments of the law are therefore the ten strings of the psaltery, which must be touched by charity so that the wild beasts of the vices may be slain.
End of the book On the Incarnate Word and the Restoration of Man, which is the third book of the Sentences of Bandinus.
(396) Augustine, Letter 4 to Publicola. (397) Augustine, in the Sermon on Perjuries.